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“We	cannot	change	the	human	condition,		
but	we	can	change	the	conditions	under	which	humans	work.”		
	
(James	Reason,	2000)	
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1. Introduction  
Background	Numerous	studies	have	shown	significant	problems	in	medication	safety	as	one	of	the	main	risks	 to	patient	safety	 in	hospitals	 in	 the	past	decades	(D.	W.	Bates,	Cullen,	Laird,	&	et	al.,	1995;	 Hicks,	 Cousins,	 &	 Williams,	 2004;	 Kohn	 et	 al.,	 2000).	 Leape	 et	 al.	 stated	 that	 on	average	a	patient	in	hospital	is	exposed	to	at	least	one	medication	error	per	day	(Leape	et	al.,	 1991).	 Understanding	 the	 incidence,	 type	 and	 preventability	 of	 medication	 errors	 is	necessary	 for	 continuous	 improvement	 of	 medication	 safety	 (Lisby,	 Nielsen,	 &	 Mainz,	2005).	Without	a	systematic	analysis	of	error	chains,	it	is	difficult	to	assess	the	effectiveness	of	 implemented	 safety	 barriers	 and	 to	 establish	 preventive	 interventions.	 In	 order	 to	establish	and	verify	preventive	and	practical	interventions	breaking	error	chains,	profound	analyses	 of	 reported	medication	 errors	 at	 organizational,	 group	 and	 individual	 levels	 are	essential	(Pape,	2003).	The	aim	of	medication	incident	analyses	is	to	identify	frequent	error	types	 and	 failing	 safety	 barriers	 as	 early	 as	 possible	 in	 the	 medication	 use	 process	 to	prevent	them	from	propagating	and	ultimately	reaching	patients.		Research	on	the	distribution	of	medication	errors	indicate	incidence	of	errors	in	all	steps	of	the	 medication	 use	 process.	 Until	 recently,	 the	 analyses	 of	 medication	 errors	 have	predominantly	focused	on	isolated	process	steps,	particularly	on	medication	administration	(Aspden,	Wolcott,	Bootman,	&	Cronenwett,	2006;	Hughes	&	Ortiz,	2005;	Taylor,	2007).	This	isolated	view	does	not	reflect	the	system	complexity	of	error	occurrence	and	propagation.	A	holistic	 view	 of	 safety	 barriers	 takes	 the	 entire	medication	 use	 process	 into	 account	 and	reflects	the	interdependencies	between	all	process	stages.	While	the	concept	of	error	chains	has	been	used	previously	in	incident	analyses,	it	has	not	yet	been	applied	systematically	in	medication	management.	 Surprisingly,	 researchers	have	 started	only	very	 recently	 to	use	similar	approaches	(Carayon	et	al.,	2014;	Samaranayake,	Cheung,	Chui,	&	Cheung,	2013).	
Purpose	and	aim	The	 thesis	 aimed	 to	 introduce	 a	 novel	 process-oriented	 approach	 of	 medication	 error	chains	 to	 medication	 incident	 analysis.	 The	 major	 benefit	 and	 contribution	 of	 the	 error	chain	model	is	to	gain	important	insights	into	complementing	existing	knowledge	on	errors,	system	weaknesses	and	safety	barriers	along	the	entire	medication	use	process.	This	opens	
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up	 new	 perspectives	 for	 detecting	 and	 stopping	 errors	 by	 targeted	 interventions	 before	reaching	the	patient.	This	novel	method	closes	existing	research	gaps	by	–	for	the	first	time	–	systematically	applying	a	holistic,	process-oriented	approach	to	analyze	errors	across	all	stages	 of	 the	 medication	 use	 process	 and	 to	 implement	 and	 evaluate	 targeted	 safety	barriers	and	interventions	based	on	these	results.		The	 thesis	 applied	 this	 method	 to	 three	 settings	 that	 have	 been	 investigated	 in	 three	separate	research	studies.	Study	A	systematically	applies	the	process-oriented	approach	of	medication	 error	 chains	 to	 medication	 incident	 analysis	 with	 the	 aim	 to	 identify	 (a)	frequency	 of	 medication	 errors,	 (b)	 frequent	 medication	 error	 chains,	 (c)	 errors	 in	 the	various	 stages,	 (d)	 contributing	 factors	 and	 (e)	 targeted	 safety	 barriers	 for	 stopping	medication	 error	 chains.	 Based	 on	 this	 study	 results,	 study	 B	 evaluates	 the	 effect	 of	optimizing	 the	 work	 environment	 by	 separate	 medication	 rooms	 as	 one	 specific	intervention	 and	 safety	 barrier	 to	 improve	 medication	 safety	 during	 the	 critical	 task	 of	medication	preparation.	One	aim	was	to	reduce	interruptions	as	an	important	contributing	factor	to	medication	errors	and	critical	link	within	error	chains.	Finally,	Study	C	uses	staff	training	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 safety	 vests	 as	 a	 simpler	 and	 inexpensive	 combined	intervention	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	 during	 medication	 preparation.	 An	 overview	 of	 all	study	aims,	research	questions,	hypothesis	and	settings	is	given	in	figure	1.		
Thesis	structure	The	following	chapters	cover	all	three	studies	in	more	detail.	In	order	to	position	the	thesis	aim	 Chapter	 2	 introduces	 relevant	 definitions	 (Chapter	 2.1)	 and	 theoretical	 foundations,	including	human	factors	(Chapter	2.2)	and	medication	safety	(Chapter	2.3)	covering	errors	in	 the	 medication	 use-process	 (Chapter	 2.3.1),	 medication	 error	 chains	 (Chapter	 2.3.2),	interruptions	as	one	important	contributing	factor	to	medication	errors	(Chapter	2.3.3)	and	safety	barriers	to	reduce	interruptions	(Chapter	2.3.4).	Chapter	3	examines	the	present	thesis	
including	an	overview	 (Chapter	 3.1)	 of	 the	 three	 scientific	 studies	 (Studies	A,	B	 and	C).	 The	
three	 research	 studies	 are	 key	 elements	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 overall	 purpose	 of	 this	 thesis.	
Chapter	 3.2	 links	 and	 integrates	 the	 three	 studies	 under	 the	 medication	 error	 chain	 view.	Chapter	 4	 provides	 a	 general	 discussion	 with	 limitations,	 practical	 and	 theoretical	implications	 and	 an	 outlook	 for	 future	 research.	 Finally,	 Chapter	 5	 presents	 the	 three	original	study	articles.			
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Figure	1:	Overview	of	thesis	studies	A,	B	and	C	
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2. Theoretical framework of human factors and medication 
safety 
Clarifying	fundamental	concepts	and	definitions	of	human	factors	and	medication	safety	is	remarkably	difficult,	but	very	 important	 for	a	common	understanding.	The	current	use	 in	literature	is	sometimes	inconsistent,	unclear	and	overlapping.	Therefore,	the	entire	chapter	is	an	attempt	to	present	coherent	definitions	in	order	to	facilitate	the	consistent	application	of	 the	 term	 and	 concepts	 within	 the	 thesis.	 The	 section	 introduces	 the	 taxonomic	foundations	and	central	 terms	used	 throughout	 this	 thesis:	human	 factors,	human	errors,	medication	safety,	medication	use	process,	medication	errors,	medication	error	chains	and	interruptions	 as	 one	 important	 contributing	 factor	 to	 medication	 errors.	 The	 following	subsections	 state	 precise	 descriptions	 integrating	 the	 various	 definitions	 that	 come	 into	play	 when	 addressing	 human	 factors,	 medication	 safety	 and	 errors	 within	 healthcare	systems.	 The	 final	 subsection	 summarizes	 the	 transfer	 of	 the	 theoretical	 framework	 and	background	to	the	thesis	and	its	applications	within	the	three	research	studies.	The	author	does	not	 claim	 that	 the	presented	definitions	 and	 concepts	 are	 a	 “gold	 standard”	 but	 are	based	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 minimum	 consensus	 on	 the	 terms	 and	 concepts	 from	 previous	literature	is	achieved	and	consistently	applied	within	the	thesis.	
Annotation:	In	the	following,	underlining	the	relevant	phrases,	sentences	or	paragraphs	in	the	text	and	
figures,	highlights	the	key	points	for	the	theoretical	foundation	of	this	thesis.	
2.1 Human	factors	approach:	theoretical	background	and	basic	concepts		Since	 the	 Institute	 of	 Medicine	 (IOM)	 (Kohn	 et	 al.,	 2000)	 report	 “To	 err	 is	 human”	 was	published,	 human	 factors	 in	 healthcare	 and	 preventable	 adverse	 patient	 outcomes,	especially	 medication	 errors,	 have	 received	 enormous	 public	 and	 scientific	 attention	(Vincent,	2012).	A	human	factors	approach	is	 used	 to	 understand	 where	 and	 why	systems	or	processes	break	down	based	on	human	errors.	 Studying	human	 factors	 can	contribute	 to	 the	 design	 of	 safer	 systems	and	processes,	for	example,	simplifying	and	standardizing	processes,	building	in	redundancy,	improving	communications	within	teams,	
Human	 factors	 studies	focus	on	human	beings	and	how	they	interact	 with	 products,	 devices,	 procedures,	 workspaces,	 and	the	work	environments	(Sanders	&	McCormick,	1993).	Human	factors	research	considers	human	strengths	and	limitations	to	the	 design	 of	 interactive	 systems	 of	 people,	 equipment,	 and	their	 environment	 to	 ensure	 their	 effectiveness,	 safety	 and	ease	of	use	(Chapanis,	Garner,	&	Morgan,	1949).	
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or	 redesigning	 the	work	 environment	 (Kohn	 et	 al.,	 2000).	 The	 report	 “To	 Err	 is	 Human:	Building	 a	 Safer	 Health	 System”	 underlined	 the	 role	 of	 human	 errors	 in	 patient	 and	medication	 safety	 (Kohn	 et	 al.,	 2000).	 Human	 factors	 literature	 in	 healthcare	 has	 been	particularly	 inspired	 by	 the	 work	 of	 Rasmussen	 (Rasmussen,	 1983),	 Reason	 (1997)	 and	Vincent	 (Vincent,	 Taylor-Adams,	 &	 Stanhope,	 1998).	 All	 approaches	 contribute	 to	 the	theoretical	framework	of	this	thesis.	The	following	conceptual	frameworks	cover	models	and	theories	of	human	factors,	human	errors	and	organizational	accidents.	Different	approaches	and	theories	to	patient	safety	and	medication	 safety	 have	 been	 proposed	 in	 the	 literature.	 The	 thesis	 is	 based	 and	 focuses	particularly	 on	 theories	 of	 Reason	 and	 his	 “Swiss	 cheese	model”.	 Reason	 has	 proposed	 a	fundamental	concept	of	human	factors	research	and	theory	in	healthcare	to	the	present	day.	The	“Swiss	cheese	model”	has	been	applied	and	translated	into	the	novel	error	chain	model	for	medication	safety	(introduced	in	Chapter	2.3).	The	error	chain	model	is	the	underlying	framework	for	all	three	scientific	studies	in	this	thesis.		
2.1.1 Error	context	and	management:	person	and	system	approach	Error	management	can	help	 to	detect,	minimize,	 reduce	or	prevent	errors.	There	are	 two	well-known	 ways	 to	 view	 and	 manage	 human	errors	 and	 to	 improve	 medication	 safety:	 the	person	 approach	 and	 the	 system	 approach	(Reason,	1990,	2000).		The	person	 approach	 concentrates	 on	 unsafe	 acts	 of	 humans	 at	 the	 sharp	 end	 causing	errors.	 It	 considers	 the	 individual’s	 behavior	 as	 unsafe	 and	 ascribes	 it	 to	 forgetfulness,	inattention,	 low	motivation,	etc.	The	 ‘person’	approach	concentrates	on	modifying	human	behaviors	to	reduce	errors	(e.g.	to	reduce	inattention	and	improve	individual’s	awareness	and	recognition	of	 ‘error	 traps’)	and	 it	does	not	consider	conditions	or	problems	 that	are	inherent	in	the	work	environment,	systems	and	processes	and	contribute	to	human	errors	(Reason,	2000).		The	system	approach	concentrates	on	the	conditions	under	which	humans	work	and	tries	to	identify	factors	in	the	workplace,	organizational	processes	or	systems	that	contribute	to	errors	and	to	build	defenses	to	prevent	errors	(e.g.	better	design	of	systems,	minimize	staff	interruptions,	 add	 redundancies	 ‘double	 checks’).	 The	 assumption	 is	 that	 humans	 are	
Human	error	has	been	defined	“as	a	failure	of	a	planned	action	or	a	 sequence	of	mental	or	physical	actions	 to	be	completed	 as	 intended,	 or	 the	 use	 of	 a	 wrong	 plan	 to	achieve	an	outcome”	(Reason,	1990).	
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fallible	and	“to	err	is	human”.	Averting	errors	and	improving	patient	safety	need	a	systems	approach	 to	 adapt	 the	 conditions	 that	 contribute	 to	 errors	 involving	 various	 aims:	 the	person,	 the	 team,	 the	 task,	 the	workplace,	 and	 the	 institution	 as	 a	whole.	When	an	error	
occurs,	there	is	a	breakdown	in	the	defenses,	barriers	and	safeguards.	The	important	issue	is	
how	and	why	the	defenses	failed	and	did	not	prevent	errors	from	occurring,	which	is	displayed	
in	the	“Swiss	cheese	model”	(Reason,	2000).		
2.1.2 The	“Swiss	cheese	model”	of	system	accidents	Reason	argued	that	errors	should	be	understood	in	relation	to	the	context	in	which	humans	work	and	not	 in	 isolation.	Contributing	factors	further	back	in	the	causal	chain	can	create	conditions	in	which	errors	or	accidents	occur.	This	places	operators	(e.g.,	physician,	nurses,	pharmacists	etc.)	at	the	sharp	end	of	a	process	with	direct	contact	to	the	patient,	e.g.	a	nurse	administering	a	wrong	drug	to	a	patient.	In	the	patient	safety	community,	the	“Swiss	cheese	
model”	 or	 “organizational	 accident	model”	of	 Reason	 (Reason,	 1990,	 1997)	 is	 one	 of	 the	most	 well	 known	 system	 model.	 This	 model	 is	 displayed	 in	 figure	 2	 and	 explains	 the	
alignment	of	hazards	(or	‘holes’)	that	contribute	to	frontline	human	errors	or	accidents	close	
to	 the	 patient.	 Defenses,	 barriers,	 and	 safeguards	 have	 a	 central	 role	 in	 this	 approach.	Healthcare	systems	have	numerous	defensive	layers	(e.g.	alarms,	physical	barriers,	etc.)	and	their	function	is	to	protect	potential	errors	or	accidents	from	hazards.	Many	defensive	layer	are	weak	like	“slices	of	Swiss	cheese”,	having	several	holes.	The	occurrence	of	weak	holes	in	any	 one	 “slice”	 does	 not	 generally	 cause	 a	 negative	 outcome.	 Normally,	 a	 preventable	adverse	event	(or	patient	injury)	only	arises,	when	inadequate	barriers	or	defenses	(holes)	in	many	 layers	 temporarily	 line	up	 to	permit	a	 trajectory	of	accident	opportunity	and	 fall	short	 in	 intercepting	 active	 failures.	 (Reason,	 2000).	 Reason	 described	 the	 holes	 in	 the	defenses	occur	for	two	reasons:	active	failures	(i.e.,	outcome	mainly	from	systems	factors,	causing	immediate	events	and	include	operators	of	complex	systems)	and	latent	conditions	(i.e.,	factors	that	are	inherent	in	the	system).	Approximately	all	adverse	events	comprise	a	combination	of	both	factors,	which	can	be	detected	by	incident	analyses	(Reason,	1990).		
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Figure	2:	“Swiss	cheese	model”	of	system	accidents	(Reason,	2000)		
2.1.3 Types	of	error	
Active	failures	are	unsafe	acts	caused	by	individuals	who	are	in	direct	interaction	with	the	patient	or	system	and	having	immediate	effects	at	“the	sharp	end”	(e.g.,	administering	the	wrong	medicine).	Active	failures	tend	to	be	the	final	outcome	of	a	sequence	of	events	ending	in	an	error	and	are	directly	involved	in	an	accident.	They	can	take	a	variety	of	forms:	slips,	
lapses,	mistakes,	and	violations	(Reason,	1991).		
Slips	are	associated	with	attentional	failures	and	refer	to	doing	the	right	action,	but	doing	it	incorrectly	 (e.g.,	 picking	 up	 the	wrong	 drug).	Lapses	 are	 failures	 of	memory	 and	 lack	 of	actions	 that	 did	 not	 arise	 as	 planned	 (e.g.	 forgetting	 to	 give	 a	 drug	 because	someone/something	caused	an	interruption).	Slips	and	lapses	often	occur	when	functioning	
on	"auto-pilot"	and	affect	the	short-term	memory,	which	is	used	for	attention	and	awareness	
(Reason,	1991).	For	example,	interruptions	can	cause	staff	to	lose	attention	at	a	critical	time	that	 can	 certainly	 result	 in	 an	 error.	Mistakes	 are	 errors	 of	 knowledge	 or	 planning	 (e.g.,	because	 of	 lack	 of	 medication	 information,	 choosing	 the	 wrong	 drug	 for	 a	 patient).	
Violations	occur	when	rules	of	correct	behavior	are	consciously	ignored	(e.g.,	not	checking	patient	 identification	 before	 medication	 administration).	 Principally,	 interruptions,	communication	problems,	time	pressure,	and	noise	are	tasks	of	the	external	environment,	whereas,	 the	 risk	 for	 slips	 and	mistakes	 is	 a	 function	 of	 the	 internal	 environment.	When	
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inherent	human	influences	and	external	pressures	combine,	errors	are	more	likely	to	occur	(Reason,	1991).	For	this	reason	it	is	central	to	consider	both.	Further,	Rasmussen	(Rasmussen,	1983)	and	Reason	(Reason,	1990)	classified	human	errors	in	 three	 categories	 and	 described	 the	mechanism	 of	 cognitive	 functioning	 as	 skill-based	
(attention	 and	memory	 failures	 like	 slips	 and	 lapses,	 including	 omitted	 tasks),	 rule-based	(misinterpretation	or	misuse	of	relevant	data	or	applying	the	wrong	rule),	and	knowledge-
based	 (errors	made	due	 to	 lack	of	 knowledge	or	 experience	with	a	particular	process	or	situation).	Working	conditions	that	cause	interruptions	and	divert	attention	often	trigger	a	skill-based	error.	 For	example,	 carrying	out	 the	 right	 action	on	 the	wrong	object,	 such	as	nursing	staff	change	the	infusion	rate	on	the	wrong	medication	when	numerous	drugs	are	being	infused	simultaneously.	Mistakes	are	knowledge-	or	rule-based	errors.	A	considered	plan	is	followed,	but	the	plan	is	wrong	to	reach	the	required	aim.	A	mistake	is	a	knowledge-based	 error	 when	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 in	 knowledge	 or	 misinterpretation	 of	 a	 problem.	 For	example,	 knowledge-based	 errors	 can	 happen	 when	 a	 nurse	 is	 floated	 to	 a	 unit	 with	patients	who	have	conditions	that	are	unfamiliar	to	the	nurse.	(Rasmussen,	1983;	Reason,	1990)	
Latent	 conditions	 may	 lie	 inactive	 within	 the	 system	 for	 several	 years	 as	 contributing	factors	 leading	 to	 active	 failures	 such	 as	mistakes,	 violations	 and	 lapses	 (Reason,	 2000).	Often,	latent	factors	are	hidden	until	they	combine	with	other	factors	and	an	active	failure	appears	that	leads	to	an	adverse	event.	Latent	conditions	occur	from	decisions	at	the	“blunt	end”	made	 by	managers,	 designers	 and	 others.	 Latent	 conditions	 contribute	 to	 errors	 by	error	provoking	working	conditions	(e.g.,	 lack	of	staff,	 inadequate	equipment,	 fatigue,	and	inexperience)	 and	 they	 can	 create	 long-lasting	 holes	 or	weaknesses	 in	 the	 defenses	 (e.g.,	poor	design,	incorrect	installation,	poorly	structured	organizations,	untrustworthy	alarms,	and	 construction	 deficiencies).	 Examples	 of	 latent	 factors	 are	 drugs	 that	 are	 packed	similarly	and	sound	alike.	All	systems	contain	defenses,	but	if	for	some	reasons	they	fail,	an	adverse	 event	 occurs.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 identify	 and	 remove	 proactively	 latent	
conditions	before	an	adverse	event	occurs.	(Reason,	2000)	
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2.1.4 Expanded	human	factors	framework	for	analyzing	critical	incidents		Analyzing	critical	 incidents	provides	an	understanding	of	the	conditions	that	produced	an	error,	where	systems	broke	down,	why	errors	occurred,	and	contributing	factors	(Kohn	et	al.,	2000).		Vincent	 and	 colleagues	 (Vincent	 et	 al.,	 1998)	 have	 expanded	 the	 organizational	 accident	model	 based	 on	 the	 research	 by	 Reason	 (Reason,	 1990,	 1997).	 This	 framework	 defines	seven	 categories	 of	 system	 factors	 that	 influence	 healthcare	 professionals	 in	 their	 daily	work	 and	 the	 contributions	 to	 errors:	 (1)	 institutional	 context,	 (2)	 organizational	 and	management	factors,	(3)	work	environment,	(4)	team	factors,	(5)	individual	(staff)	factors,	(6)	task	factors,	and	(7)	patient	characteristics	(Vincent	et	al.,	1998).	According	to	Vincent’s	model	(Vincent	et	al.,	1998),	adverse	events	occur	as	a	consequence	of	 latent	 failures	(i.e.	management	 decision,	 organizational	 processes)	 that	 cause	 conditions	 of	 work	 (i.e.	workload,	 supervision,	 communication,	 equipment,	 knowledge/skill),	 which	 in	 turn	produce	 active	 failures.	 Barriers	 or	 defenses	may	 prevent	 the	 active	 failures	 to	 turn	 into	adverse	 events.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 these	 conditions	 generate	 problems	 for	 care	 delivery	and	 may	 lead	 to	 unsafe	 acts	 (i.e.,	 errors	 and	 violations),	 which	 may	 then	 produce	 an	incident	if	the	defenses	and	barriers	are	not	appropriate	(Vincent	et	al.,	1998).	Henriksen	 and	 colleagues	 (Henriksen,	 Dayton,	 Keyes,	 Carayon,	 &	 Hughes,	 2008)	 have	adapted	the	model	of	Reason	and	Vincent	by	categorizing	human	factors	influencing	patient	and	 medication	 safety	 as	 follows:	 (1)	 characteristics	 of	 individuals	 (e.g.,	 skill,	 education,	
experience,	 training,	 knowledge,	 inattention	 and	 fatigue	 levels),	 (2)	 nature	 of	 clinical	 work	
(e.g.,	 need	 for	 attention,	 interruptions,	 time	 pressures,	 workload),	 (3)	 design	 of	 physical	
environment	 (e.g.,	 designing	 rooms	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	during	medication	preparation),	human-system-interfaces	 (e.g.,	 not	 accessible	 or	 up	 to	 date	 drug	 information)	 and	organizational/social/environmental	 (e.g.	 communication),	 (4)	 management	 (e.g.,	 patient	load	and	safety	culture)	and	(5)	external	environment	(e.g.,	regulations	for	safe	medication	practices,	 public	 awareness	 of	 patient	 and	 medication	 safety)	 (Henriksen	 et	 al.,	 2008).	Figure	 3	 shows	 this	 framework	 and	 the	 important	 contributing	 factors	 that	 should	 be	attended	to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	the	nature	of	preventable	errors.		
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Figure	3:	Contributing	Factors	to	Adverse	Events	in	Health	Care	(Henriksen	et	al.,	2008)		
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	Furthermore,	the	World	Alliance	for	Patient	Safety	developed	an	international	classification	
and	 conceptual	 framework	 for	 categorization	 and	 analyzing	 patient	 safety	 incidents	 as	 an	extension	 of	 the	 human	 error	 and	 organizational	 accidents	 approach	 (Organization	 &	Organization,	 2009;	 Runciman	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Sherman	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 This	 international	classification	 and	 framework	 standardized	 the	 patient	 safety	 terminology.	 Patient	 safety	
incidents	are	at	 the	central	part	of	 this	 framework	and	can	be	categorized	 for	example	 into	
medication/IV	fluids,	clinical	administration	and	procedure,	healthcare-associated	infection	etc.	(Runciman,	et	al.,	2009).	The	conceptual	 framework	displays	that	contributing	factors	can	lead	to	incidents	and	such	incidents	can	be	detected	or	mitigated	(i.e.	preventing	patient	harm)	(Organization	&	Organization,	2009;	Runciman	et	al.,	2009;	Sherman	et	al.,	2009).	An	overview	 of	 the	 conceptual	 framework	 is	 displayed	 in	 figure	 4	 and	 an	 overview	 of	 the	medication	error	framework	and	contributing	staff	factors	in	figure	5	and	6	(Organization	&	Organization,	2009).				 	
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Figure	 4:	 The	 Conceptual	 Framework	 for	 the	 International	 Classification	 for	 Patient	 Safety	
(Organization	&	Organization,	2009)	
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Figure	5:	Medication	Error	Framework	of	 the	 International	Classification	 for	Patient	Safety	
(Organization	&	Organization,	2009)			
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Figure	 6:	 Contributing	 staff	 factors	 of	 the	 International	 Classification	 for	 Patient	 Safety	
(Organization	&	Organization,	2009)		 	
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2.2 Application	 of	 the	 human	 factors	 framework:	 understanding	 medication	
errors	and	improving	medication	safety		Research	 of	 human	 factors,	 based	 on	 industrial	 engineering	 and	 psychology,	 has	 only	recently	 been	 applied	 to	 health	 care,	 especially	 to	medication	 safety	 (Kohn	 et	 al.,	 2000).	Medication	 safety	 is	 dependent	 upon	 systems,	 processes	 and	 human	 factors,	 which	 can	differ	 across	 health	 care	 settings	 and	countries.	Sharp-end,	frontline	human	errors	occur	 close	 to	 the	 delivery	 of	 medications	(Kennedy,	 2004).	 Basic	 psychological	limitations	 should	 be	 considered	 for	 those	involved	 in	 the	 task.	 These	 include	 a	 person's	 ability	 to	 focus	 in	 the	 face	 of	 interruptions,	conversation	 and	 noise,	 while	 preparing	 or	 administering	 medications	 safely.	 Studying	medication	errors	 in	 the	hospital	setting	 is	 important	 for	several	reasons:	 they	are	one	of	the	most	common	types	of	error	and	occur	frequently	in	hospitals,	substantial	numbers	of	individuals	 are	 affected,	 and	 they	 can	 result	 in	 a	 substantial	 increase	of	health	 care	 costs	(Kohn	et	al.,	2000).	Preventing	medication	errors	from	reaching	the	patient	means	designing	
health	care	systems	and	processes	safer.	Limited	research	exists	addressing	human	factors	and	
work	 redesign	 to	 reduce	medication	 errors	and	 contributing	 factors.	Most	published	 studies	
recognize	causes	and	measures	to	reduce	medication	errors,	but	few	have	provided	practical	
interventions	(Pape,	2003).	How	health	care	systems	and	processes	could	be	analyzed	and	designed	safer	is	addressed	in	the	following	subsections.	Therefore	the	chapters	translated	and	mapped	the	theoretical	framework	of	human	factors	 to	understand	medication	errors	and	to	 improve	medication	safety	in	hospital	settings.	For	building	safe	hospital	environments,	the	thesis	first	describes	the	mechanisms	of	errors	in	the	medication	use	process.	These	mechanisms	have	led	to	the	novel	 concept	 of	medication	 error	 chains	 analyzing	 interruptions	 as	 contributing	 factors	and	establishing	effective	interventions	and	safety	barriers.					
Patient	 safety	 is	 defined	 from	 the	 patient’s	 perspective	 as	freedom	from	accidental	 injury	(Kohn,	Corrigan,	&	Donaldson,	2000).	Therefore,	medication	 safety	 can	be	described	as	 the	avoidance	 and	 prevention	 of	 adverse	 outcomes,	 errors	 or	injuries	 caused	 during	 the	 medication	 use-process	 by	medications.		
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2.2.1 Errors	in	the	medication	use	process		The	medication	use	process	is	complex	and	a	high-risk	procedure,	involving	multiple	steps	and	 a	 variety	 of	 personnel.	 Therefore,	 this	 process	 is	 particularly	 vulnerable	 to	 errors	 if	attention	is	diverted.	As	a	result,	medication	errors	are	common	in	hospitals	and	can	occur	at	 any	 point	 of	 basically	 five	 stages	 of	 the	 medication	 use	 process:	 prescribing,	transcription,	 preparation,	 administration	 and	 monitoring	 (figure	 7)	 (Hughes	 &	 Ortiz,	2005).	 This	 thesis	 focused	on	 the	 process	 steps	prescribing,	 transcription,	preparation,	 and	administration.	 In	outpatient	 settings	monitoring	 problems	 may	dominate	and	are	therefore	not	covered	in	the	thesis.		
	
Figure	7:	Medication	use	process	Medication	 errors	may	 or	may	 not	 reach	 the	 patient;	 and	while	 some	medication	 errors	have	serious	consequences,	others	change	a	patient’s	outcome	but	without	resulting	in	any	harm	 (Hughes	&	Ortiz,	 2005).	Medication	errors	 are	potentially	preventable.	Thus,	 an	 in-depth	investigation	of	these	errors	is	necessary	for	continuous	improvement	of	medication	safety,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 an	 injury	 occurred	 or	 the	 potential	 for	 injury	 was	 present	(NCCMERP).	Consequently,	each	of	the	steps	in	the	process	needs	improvement	and	further	
The	 medication	 use	 process	 involves	 multiple	 steps,	 i.e.	 prescription,	transcription,	 preparation	 inclusive	 double-checking,	 administration	 and	monitoring.	 The	 process	 of	 the	 provision	 of	 a	 new	 drug	 to	 the	 delivery	 to	 the	patient	includes	approximately	50-100	steps	(Wachter,	2012).		
A	medication	error	is	defined	as	„any	preventable	event	that	may	cause	or	lead	to	inappropriate	 medication	 use	 or	 patient	 harm,	 while	 the	 medication	 is	 in	 the	control	of	the	healthcare	professional,	patient,	or	consumer”	(NCCMERP).		
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study	 (Aspden	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 Most	 medication	 errors	 cause	 no	 patient	 harm	 or	 remain	undetected	by	healthcare	 staff	 (Bates,	 1996).	Medication	 errors	 rates	 vary,	 depending	on	the	applied	detection	method.	The	most	common	types	of	reported	medications	errors	are	wrong	dose,	omitted	medicine	and	wrong	time	(Hicks	et	al.,	2004;	Leape	et	al.,	1995;	Leape	et	al.,	1991).	Of	the	displayed	stages	of	the	medication	use	process,	prescribing	most	often	initiates	an	error	chain	resulting	 in	a	patient	receiving	a	wrong	dose	or	wrong	drug.	 In	 this	stage,	 for	example,	a	wrong	drug,	dose,	or	route	can	be	prescribed	by	a	physician	in	some	cases	with	support	 by	 a	 pharmacist	 (figure	 7);	 this	 includes	 drugs	 to	 which	 a	 patient	 has	 known	allergies	(Dean,	Schachter,	Vincent,	&	Barber,	2002).	Examples	of	error	types	in	this	stage	include	unclear,	unreadable	and/or	incomplete	prescriptions,	orders	for	contraindicated	or	wrong	medications,	and	inappropriate	doses	(Hughes	&	Blegen,	2008).	In	many	hospitals,	particularly	 in	Germany	and	Switzerland,	medication	prescriptions	are	transcribed.	Nurses	are	mainly	involved	in	transcribing	medications	(figure	7).	Thus,	they	
can	 have	 an	 important	 role	 in	 intercepting	 and	 preventing	 prescribing	 errors	 before	
propagating	trough	the	medication	use	process.	Examples	of	errors	 that	can	be	 initiated	at	the	transcribing	stage	 include	errors	to	transcribe	the	order,	e.g.	wrong	drug,	wrong	dose	and	wrong	route	or	omission	of	a	medication	(Hughes	&	Blegen,	2008).	
Commonly,	nurses	are	the	last	link	at	the	sharp	end	of	the	medication	use	process,	performing	
final	 safety	 checks	 intended	 to	 identify	 and	 intercept	medication	 errors	 before	 reaching	 the	
patient.	This	includes	preparing	inclusive	verifying	or	double-checking	and	administering	the	right	medication	to	the	right	patient,	at	the	right	time,	with	the	right	dosage,	frequency,	route,	and	technique,	with	no	omissions	by	nurses	or	pharmacists	(figure	7)	(S.	Flanders	&	A.	P.	Clark,	2010).	Research	on	medication	preparation	and	administration	reported	errors	mostly	in	the	form	of	wrong	time,	wrong	rate,	or	wrong	dose	(Hughes	&	Blegen,	2008).	Overall,	 the	 fundamental	environmental	conditions	encouraging	safe	medication	practices	include	 the	 right	 to	 (a)	 complete	 and	 clearly	 written	 prescriptions	 that	 specify	 the	medication,	dose,	route,	and	frequency;	(b)	have	the	correct	drug	route	and	dose	dispensed	from	 nurses	 or	 pharmacies;	 (c)	 have	 access	 to	 drug	 and	 patient	 information;	 (d)	 have	guidelines	 on	 safe	 medication	 use;	 (e)	 administer	 medications	 safely	 and	 to	 identify	problems	 early	 and	 (f)	 stop,	 think	 and	 be	 vigilant	 when	 administering	 medications	(Colleran	Cook,	1999)	(Hughes	&	Blegen,	2008).	
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2.2.2 Medication	error	chains	
Medication	errors	are	rarely	the	result	of	one,	single	 isolated	human	error.	More	commonly,	
multiple	errors	and	contributing	factors	during	the	medication	use	process	occur,	resulting	in	in	a	network	of	 faults	and	 failures,	 called	an	error	chain.	Frequent	contributing	factors	are	
workplace	design,	interruptions,	inadequate	training	and	incomplete	information	(T.	M.	Pape	et	 al.,	 2005).	 Several	 error-producing	conditions	 have	 been	 identified	 to	 affect	performance	 during	 the	 medication	 use	process,	 for	 example	 over-stimulation	 can	affect	 attention,	 knowledge,	 concentration,	and	 skill	 performance	 (Moray,	 1994).	 Due	to	 errors	 in	 multiple	 steps	 of	 the	medication	 use	 process,	 many	 studies	recommend	 a	 systems	 approach	 to	 reduce	medication	errors	(Clifton-Koeppel,	2008).		Reason`s	 “Swiss	 Cheese	 Model”	 is	 well	suited	 to	 discuss	 medication	 error	 chains	 that	 are	 similar	 to	 Reason`s	 error	 trajectory	(Badke-Schaub,	 Hofinger,	 &	 Lauche,	 2008).	 Each	 slice	 of	 cheese	 represents	 a	 defense,	barrier	 or	 safeguard	 against	 medication	 errors.	 Medication	 errors	 and	 deficiencies	 are	results	 of	 unsafe	 practices	 by	humans	 that	work	 in	 a	 hospital	 (e.g.	 omission	 of	 a	 double-check	 of	 a	 prepared	 drug	 by	 a	 nurse),	 while	 latent	 conditions	 (e.g.	 interruptions)	 are	reflecting	 defective	 system	 structures.	 When	 a	 medication	 error	 passes	 through	 one	defense,	 perhaps	 it	 will	 stop	 in	 another	 defense	 (e.g.	 medication	 process	 step)	 or	 it	 will	propagate	 through	 the	 process,	 resulting	 in	 an	 increasing	 risk	 of	 a	 medication	 error	reaching	the	patient.	In	the	case	of	well-designed	healthcare	systems	the	medication	error	would	 rarely	 be	 able	 to	 pass	 through	 existing	 defenses	 (Karavasiliadou	 &	 Athanasakis,	2014).	
The	novel	concept	of	medication	error	chains	highlights	the	fact	that	many	errors	are	the	result	of	a	sequence	of	events,	the	contributing	 factors	 of	 which	 may	 be	 tightly	 coupled,	 all	contributing	to	the	final	outcome.	The	basic	idea	behind	using	the	error	chain	concept	is	to	identify	a	critical	link	in	the	error	chain	and	remove	it	so	that	the	error	chain	is	broken,	and	thus,	no	incident	should	occur	(AHRQ;	Huckels-Baumgart	&	Manser,	2014).	According	to	this	model,	fatal	errors	usually	occur	when	several	 safety	 barriers	 fail	 (Reason,	 1995,	 2000).	 Safety	barriers	are	often	vulnerable,	but	in	most	cases	a	succession	of	barriers	 ensures	 that	 an	 error	 is	 caught	 before	 a	 negative	outcome	occurs	(Mahajan,	2010;	Reason,	1995,	2000).	
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Figure		8:	Simplified	illustration	the	concept	of	error	chains	spanning	across	the	stages	of	the	
hospital	medication	use	process	The	 general	 idea	 of	 the	 process-oriented	 medication	 error	 chain	 approach,	 which	 was	newly	 developed	 in	 this	 thesis,	 is	 illustrated	 in	 figure	 8.	 This	 novel	 error	 chain	 model	suggests	that	input	errors	(e.g.	an	illegible	handwritten	prescription)	can	be	activated	and	transformed	into	output	errors	(e.g.	wrong	prepared	or	administered	dose	or	drug)	through	contributing	factors	(e.g.	 inattention,	 interruptions),	working	conditions	(e.g.	space,	noise)	and	 missing	 or	 ineffective	 safety	 barriers	 (e.g.	 undisturbed	 workspace	 for	 drug	preparation).	 One	 example	 in	 this	 concept	 is	 an	 illegible	 handwritten	 prescription	 by	 a	physician	 as	 an	 input	 error.	 The	 error	 is	 activated	 when	 a	 nurse	 transcribes	 this	prescription	with	 a	wrong	 dose	without	 re-checking	with	 the	 physician.	 The	wrong	 dose	may	 propagate	 through	 the	 further	medication	 use	 process	 and	 be	 prepared	 by	 another	nurse	without	recognition	of	the	pre-existing	error	and	administered	to	the	patient.	While	in	 figure	 8	 an	 error	 chain	 spans	 across	 all	 stages	 of	 the	 medication	 use	 process,	 it	 is	important	to	note	that	error	chains	can	be	triggered	and	stopped	at	any	stage	by	adequate	safety	barriers	(Huckels-Baumgart	&	Manser,	2014).		Although	the	idea	of	error	chains	has	been	used	previously	in	incident	analyses,	it	has	not	been	 applied	 systematically	 using	 a	 process-oriented	 approach	 for	 analyzing	 reported	medication	errors	before	this	thesis.	Until	recently,	the	analyses	of	medication	errors	have	predominantly	 focused	on	 isolated	process	steps,	especially	on	medication	administration	(Aspden	et	al.,	2006;	Hughes	&	Ortiz,	2005;	Taylor,	2007).	Studying	medication	error	chains	
helps	 to	 identify	 weaknesses	 in	 safety	 barriers	 and	 to	 point	 out	 where	 exactly	 in	 the	
medication	 use	 process	 safety	 barriers	 are	 missing,	 not	 effective	 or	 require	 improvement.	
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Improving	the	effectiveness	of	existing	safety	barriers	and	establishing	new	ones	will	help	to	interrupt	error	chains	before	affecting	a	patient	and,	thus,	improve	patient	safety.		Frequent	 contributing	 factors	 to	medications	 errors	 are	 interruptions	 in	 the	 preparation	stage	of	the	medication	use	process.	Using	the	concept	of	error	chains,	interruptions	during	
medication	 preparation	may	 be	 viewed	 as	 one	 important	 critical	 link	 between	 preparation	
activities	and	errors	because	they	can	 interfere	with	the	primary	task	as	well	as	with	safety	
checks	and	may	thus	increase	inattention	and	medication	errors	(Li,	Magrabi,	&	Coiera,	2012;	Page,	2004;	Reason,	1990).	If	this	link	is	removed	the	error	chain	is	broken	and	an	incident	averted.	This	lead	to	a	more	detailed	outline	of	interruptions	and	their	dynamics	in	the	next	subsection.		
2.2.3 Interruptions	as	a	major	contributing	factor	to	medication	errors	Interruptions	of	healthcare	staff	are	common	(Weigl,	Muller,	Vincent,	Angerer,	&	Sevdalis,	2012).	 Interruptions	 are	 particularly	
relevant	 to	 patient	 safety	 when	
occurring	 during	 high-risk	 procedures	
in	 the	 hospital	 such	 as	 the	 medication	
use	 process	 because	 staff	 attention	 is	
diverted	 from	 concentrated	 tasks,	
increasing	the	risk	of	medication	errors	(Grundgeiger	 &	 Sanderson,	 2009;	Palese,	 Sartor,	 Costaperaria,	 &	Bresadola,	 2009).	 Several	 studies	indicated	 that	 interruptions	 are	 an	important	 contributing	 factor	 to	medication	 errors	 (Armutlu,	 Foley,	Surette,	 Belzile,	 &	McCusker,	 2008;	 A.	D.	 Biron,	 Loiselle,	 &	 Lavoie-Tremblay,	2009;	Fry	&	Dacey,	2007;	Hickam	et	al.,	2003;	 Karavasiliadou	 &	 Athanasakis,	2014;	Mayo	&	Duncan,	2004;	Tang,	Sheu,	Yu,	Wei,	&	Chen,	2007)	and	medication	error	rates	increase	with	interruption	frequency	(J.	 I.	Westbrook	et	al.,	2010).	These	findings	are	also	consistent	with	psychological	studies	that	display	a	variety	of	negative	outcomes	associated	
Interruptions	are	defined	as	“a	break	in	the	performance	of	a	human	activity	initiated	by	a	source	internal	or	external	to	the	recipient,	with	occurrence	 situated	 within	 the	 context	 of	 a	 setting	 or	 a	 location”	(Brixey	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Interruptions	 are	 situations	 in	 which	 a	 nurse	ceases	 the	medication	preparation	or	checking	 in	order	to	attend	 to	an	external	stimulus	(J.	 I.	Westbrook,	Woods,	Rob,	Dunsmuir,	&	Day,	2010).	 An	 interruption	 can	 be	 initiated	 by	 the	 nurse	 him/herself	(self-initiated),	 by	 another	 individual	 or	 by	 the	 work	 environment	(e.g.	 alarms).	 In	 the	 context	 of	 medication	 preparation	 a	 common	source	 of	 interruptions	 is	 communication;	 often	 concerning	information	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 primary	 task	 (e.g.	 a	 (non-)verbal	 cue	from	 another	 individual	prompting	 the	nurse	 to	 give	a	 (non-)verbal	response	 (Grundgeiger	&	Sanderson,	 2009;	Smeulers,	Hoekstra,	van	Dijk,	 Overkamp,	 &	 Vermeulen,	 2013)	 or	 the	 nurse	 initiating	 a	conversation	with	 another	 person).	While	 other	 studies	 distinguish	between	 “interruptions”	 and	 “distractions”	 to	 describe	 causes	 and	precursors	 of	 errors	 (Relihan,	 O'Brien,	 O'Hara,	 &	 Silke,	 2010;	Sanderson	 &	 Grundgeiger,	 2015),	 in	 this	 thesis	 the	 term	“interruption”	 (including	 self-initiated	 interruptions)	 is	 used	 as	comprising	both.	
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with	 interruptions,	 like	 frequent	 errors,	 forgetting	 or	 taking	 longer	 to	 complete	 tasks	(Johanna	 I	 Westbrook,	 2014).	 Experimental	 studies	 indicate	 that	 interruptions	 produce	
negative	 impacts	 on	memory	 by	 requiring	 individuals	 to	 switch	 attention	 from	 one	 task	 to	
another	(A.	D.	Biron	et	al.,	2009).	These	studies	also	display	that	interruptions	can	activate	cognitive	 failures,	 including	 lapses	 in	 attention,	 memory	 or	 perception	 (Johanna	 I	Westbrook	et	al.,	2010).		Particularly	in	a	hospital	setting,	nurses	are	vulnerable	to	a	multitude	of	interruptions	that	affect	 situation	 awareness,	 working	 memory,	 concentration	 and	 therefore	 the	 ability	 to	focus	during	critical	tasks	of	the	medication	use	process.	Interruptions	include	anything	that	
draws	nurses	away,	diverts,	or	disturbs	their	attention	(Pape,	2003;	T.	M.	Pape	et	al.,	2005).	Interruptions	 stop	 the	 main	 activity	 performed	 by	 nurses	 (e.g.	 medication	 preparation),	who	then	begin	a	secondary	and	unplanned	task,	leaving	the	primary	task	to	be	continued	later	(Brixey	et	al.,	2007).	When	nurses	are	interrupted	during	the	medication	use	process,	they	need	to	remember	at	which	step	they	paused	when	restarting	the	task.	Consequently,	omission	errors	are	 likely	 to	happen	because	nurses	may	believe	 they	were	at	a	different	step	in	the	medication	process	than	they	were.	Research	indicates	omission	errors	linked	to	prospective	 memory	 failures	 can	 explain	 the	 relationship	 between	 interruptions	 and	human	errors	(Craig,	Clanton,	&	Demeter,	2013;	Grundgeiger	&	Sanderson,	2009).	Even	 if	nurses’	 attention	 is	 not	 immediately	 redirected	 to	 an	 interruption,	 an	 initiating	 event	automatically	 capturing	 attention	 will	 distract,	 causing	 an	 interruption	 from	 the	 current	task,	at	least	briefly.	Also	alarms	and	short	phone	calls,	which	do	not	necessarily	require	a	lengthy	 shift	 to	 a	 new	 task	 will	 often	 be	 noted	 as	 an	 interruption	 (Boehm-Davis	 &	Remington,	2009).		
Nurses	 commonly	 prepare	 and	 administer	 medications.	 Thus,	 they	 have	 the	 major	
responsibility	 as	 the	 last	 link	 in	 the	medication	 use	 process,	 performing	 final	 safety	 checks	
intended	to	identify	and	intercept	medication	errors	before	reaching	the	patient.	This	includes	preparing	and	administering	the	right	medication	to	the	right	patient,	at	the	right	time,	with	the	right	documentation,	frequency,	dose,	route,	and	with	no	omissions	(Sonya	Flanders	&	Angela	P	Clark,	2010).	Skill-based	performance	is	mostly	automatic	and	is	found	in	routine	actions,	 like	 medication	 preparation	 and	 administration.	 These	 routine	 actions	 require	attentional	 checks	 to	 ensure	 correct	 task	 completion.	 Interruptions	 during	 skill-based	
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performance	may	interfere	with	these	required	attentional	checks	and	can	lead	to	slips	and	lapses		(Reason,	1990).		
The	previous	arguments	make	 it	 clear,	 that	unnecessary	 interruptions	 should	be	 reduced	 in	
the	medication	use	process.	Although	 interruptions	may	occur	 at	 any	 stage	of	 this	process	(Vincent,	Barber,	 Franklin,	&	Burnett,	 2009),	medication	preparation	 is	especially	prone	to	
interruptions	because	it	is	the	last	stage	and	opportunity	before	medication	administration	and	 for	 an	 error	 to	 be	 intercepted	 before	 reaching	 the	 patient.	 Thus,	 it	 has	 very	 few	safeguards	against	errors.	Reducing	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	appears	to	
be	an	effective	strategy	to	improve	patient	safety	and	decrease	the	risk	of	medication	errors.	
The	 preparation	 phase	 requires	 nurses’	 full	 attention	 because	 several	 critical	 cognitive	processes	are	involved,	such	as	reading	the	medical	prescription,	verifying	the	name	of	the	drug	and	patient,	searching	for	the	medications	in	the	right	dose	and	form,	and	confirming	if	 the	 selected	medications	matches	with	 the	prescription	 (Tomietto,	 Sartor,	Mazzocoli,	&	Palese,	2012).	Interruptions	during	the	medication	use	process	have	been	studied	across	various	hospital	settings	particularly	with	a	focus	on	medication	administration	(Raban	&	Westbrook,	2014;	Relihan	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 While	 its	 known	 that	 interruptions	 and	 errors	 both	 are	 common	during	medication	preparation,	we	found	only	four	studies	(Anthony	et	al.,	2010,	Tomietto	et	al.,	2012,	Biron	et	al.,	2009b,	Duruk	et	al.,	2016)	specifically	 investigating	 interruptions	during	 medication	 preparation.	 No	 study	 considered	 their	 relationship	 to	 medication	errors.	 Thus,	 the	 existing	 evidence	 for	 interventions	 effectively	 reducing	
interruptions(Colligan,	 Guerlain,	 Steck,	 &	 Hoke,	 2012;	 Freeman,	 McKee,	 Lee-Lehner,	 &	Pesenecker,	2013;	Julie	Kliger,	Singer,	Hoffman,	&	O'Neil,	2012)	has	not	yet	been	linked	to	a	
reduction	 of	 errors	 during	 medication	 preparation.	 Therefore,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 develop	
interventions	and	safety	barriers	that	can	reduce	interruptions	and	errors	during	medication	
preparation.		
2.2.4 Safety	barriers	Studies	on	contributing	factors,	like	interruptions,	help	to	understand	the	underlying	causes	of	 medication	 errors.	 Such	 studies	 are	 urgently	 needed	 to	 assist	 in	 the	 development	 of	effective	 safety	 barriers	 (Vincent	 et	 al.,	 1998).	 The	 first	 step	 is	 to	 become	 aware	 of	 when	
interruptions	happen,	the	types	that	commonly	occur,	and	the	effects	they	have	on	medication	
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errors	 (Clifton-Koeppel,	 2008).	 Consequently,	 it	 becomes	 important	 to	 implement	 safety	
barriers	 that	 eliminate	 interruptions	 as	 latent	 conditions	 and	 increase	 patient	 safety	 (A.	 D.	Biron	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Grundgeiger	 &	 Sanderson,	 2009).	 Effective	 safety	 barriers	 present	opportunities	 to	 interrupt	medication	 error	 chains	 and	prevent	 errors	 from	 reaching	 the	patient.	Patient	safety	experts	have	 turned	to	other	high-risk	 industries	such	as	airline	or	nuclear	 power	 to	 achieve	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 interventions	 to	 improve	 safety,	including	 the	 reduction	 of	 interruptions.	 For	 example,	 the	 airline	 industry	 acknowledged	the	relationship	of	interruptions,	unnecessary	conversations	during	critical	processes,	and	pilot	errors	with	the	“sterile	cockpit”	regulation	(Clifton-Koeppel,	2008).	Training	 staff	 to	 work	 effectively	 and	 safely	 have	 achieved	 important	 improvements	 of	human	performance	in	aviation.	In	addition	staff	training	costs	comparably	little,	whereas	increasingly	 advanced	 equipment	 and	 technology	 alone	 do	 not	 help	 and	 simply	 relocate	human	 factors	 problems	 (Reason,	 1995).	 Many	 intervention	 strategies	 to	 reduce	interruptions	 require	 a	 change	 in	 clinician’s	 behavior	 so	 that	 unnecessary	 or	 non-urgent	communications	are	avoided	or	delayed	during	medication	preparation.	Educating	clinical	
staff	 about	 the	 impact	 of	 interruption	 on	 patient	 safety	 provides	 reasons	 and	 principles	 for	
changing	behavior	and	 safety	awareness	 (T.	M.	 Pape	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 Staff	 training	 is	widely	recognized	 as	 an	 effective	 strategy	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	 during	 medication	administration	(J.	Kliger,	2010;	Pape,	2003;	T.	M.	Pape	et	al.,	2005;	Relihan	et	al.,	2010).		
The	redesign	of	workspaces	might	offer	an	alternative	or	additional,	 sustainable	 solution	 to	
avoid	 interruptions	 during	 medication	 preparation.	 Designing	 work	 environment	 with	attention	 to	 human	 factors	 means	 attending	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 interruptions,	 and	 their	relationship	to	alertness.	Safe	design,	for	example,	can	avoid	reliance	on	memory	(Kohn	et	al.,	 2000).	 Creating	 a	 separate	 room	 reduces	 the	 occurrence	 of	 interruptions	 during	medication	administration	(Bennett,	Harper-Femson,	Tone,	&	Rajmohamed,	2006;	Tomietto	et	al.,	2012)	and	 intuitively	appears	 to	be	also	an	effective	 intervention	to	 improve	safety	during	 medication	 preparation.	 Another	 approach	 is	 to	 provide	 clearly	 marked	 ‘No	Interruption	Zones’	or	physical	barriers	 to	 clinical	 staff	 to	 clarify	 that	 they	are	entering	a	zone	 of	 higher	 risk	 task,	 and	 that	 interruption	 is	 not	 permitted	 or	 limited	 to	 urgent	communication.	This	 idea	 is	based	on	 the	concept	of	a	 sterile	cockpit	 in	aviation	 (Clifton-Koeppel,	2008;	Hohenhaus	&	Powell,	2008;	O'Shea,	1999).	
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In	 addition,	 the	 wearing	 of	 ‘Do	 Not	 Disturb’	 vests	 by	 the	 nurse	 reminds	 the	 team	 not	 to	
interrupt.	 This	 safety	 barrier	 is	 considered	 effective	 in	 preventing	 interruptions	 during	medication	 administration	 (Pape,	 2003;	 T.	M.	 Pape	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Relihan	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 and	consequently,	it	could	be	also	effective	during	medication	preparation.	Other	interventions	to	reduce	interruptions	include	removing	phones	and	placing	visible	“Do	Not	Disturb”	signs	to	support	as	reminders	to	avoid	interruptions	(Pape,	2003;	T.	M.	Pape	et	al.,	2005;	Relihan	et	al.,	2010).	Remarkably,	 most	 of	 the	 mentioned	 safety	 barriers	 and	 interventions	 were	 designed	 to	reduce	 interruptions	 during	 medication	 administration,	 with	 limited	 evaluation	 of	 the	impact	on	medication	error	rates.	There	is	only	weak	evidence	regarding	the	effectiveness	of	
such	 interventions	 in	 reducing	 interruptions	 and	 medication	 errors	 during	 medication	
preparation.	 Medication	 preparation	 is	 one	 important	 step,	 where	 most	 of	 the	 medication	
errors	can	be	caused,	for	example	the	preparation	of	a	wrong	dose,	wrong	drug,	a	drug	for	a	
wrong	 patient	 and	 wrong	 route.	 Consequently,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 requirement	 to	 develop	
interventions	 during	 medication	 preparation	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	 as	 one	 important	
contributing	factor	to	medication	errors.			 	
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2.3 Conclusion	and	transfer	for	the	thesis	Different	 models	 of	 human	 errors	 and	 organizational	 accidents	 are	 important	 in	highlighting		(1)	different	types	of	errors	(Rasmussen,	1983;	Reason,	1990),		(2)	the	importance	of	contributing	factors	(Organization	&	Organization,	2009;	Runciman	et	al.,	2009;	Vincent	et	al.,	1998),	and		(3)	 the	 implementation	 of	 effective	 safety	 barriers	 respectively	 interventions	 to	 reduce	errors.	These	models	and	 frameworks	are	 important	 to	examine	complex	patient	care	processes,	like	 the	medication	 use	 process,	with	 various	 interactions	 that	 can	 lead	 to	 patient	 safety	incidents.	 Preventable	 patient	 errors	 can	 occur	 without	 adequate	 safety	 barriers	 or	defenses,	which	 could	 intercept	 frontline	 human	 errors	 (Reason,	 1995).	 In	 summary,	 the	key	aspects	and	novel	approaches	of	the	thesis	that	we	have	used	and	adapted	for	analyzing	medication	errors	and	improving	medication	safety	in	the	hospital	setting	are	based	on	the	following	key	components	of	the	previously	discussed	theoretical	frameworks:	
• The	“Swiss	 cheese	model”	 or	 “organizational	accident	model”	of	Reason	 (Reason,	1990,	 1997)	was	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	medication	 error	 chain	model,	 applied	 in	
study	A	of	this	thesis.	When	a	medication	error	occurs,	there	is	a	breakdown	in	the	defenses,	barriers	and	safeguards.	The	important	issue	is	how	and	why	the	defenses	failed	 and	 did	 not	 prevent	 errors	 from	 occurring,	 which	 is	 displayed	 in	 our	medication	error	chain	concept.	In	our	novel	process-oriented	concept	we	used	the	terms	 “input	 and	 output	 errors”,	 which	 is	 similar	 to	 “active	 failures”,	 and	“contributing	 factors”	comparable	with	“latent	conditions”.	 	The	results	of	study	A	were	 used	 in	 study	 B	 and	 C	 to	 implement	 targeted	 interventions	 to	 intercept	frequent	contributing	factors	to	medication	error	chains	(figure	9).	
• The	following	aspects	of	Henriksen	 and	 colleagues	 (Henriksen	et	al.,	2008)	were	considered	 in	 the	 three	 studies:	 (1)	 preventable	 adverse	 events	 (reported	medication	errors	in	study	A	and	B),	(2)	characteristics	of	individuals	(staff	training	about	 the	 impact	 of	 interruption	 on	 medication	 safety	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	 in	
Study	C),	(3)	nature	of	clinical	work	(inattention	and	interruptions	in	Study	B	and	
C),	 (4)	 design	 of	 the	 physical	 environment	 (implementing	 separate	 medication	
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rooms	 in	 Study	 B	 and	 ‘Do	 Not	 Disturb’	 safety	 vests	 in	 Study	 C	 to	 reduce	interruptions	during	medication	preparation)	(figure	9).	
• For	the	critical	incident	analysis	of	the	reported	medication	errors	the	international	classification	 and	 conceptual	 framework	 for	 categorization	 and	 analyzing	
patient	safety	incidents	(Organization	&	Organization,	2009;	Runciman	et	al.,	2009;	Sherman	et	al.,	2009)	was	used	in	study	A	and	B	(figure	9).		
• Medication	 errors	 are	 rarely	 the	 result	 of	 one,	 single	 isolated	 human	 error.	 More	commonly,	 multiple	 errors	 and	 contributing	 factors	 during	 the	 medication	 use	process	occur,	resulting	in	an	error	chain	(Huckels-Baumgart	&	Manser,	2014).		
• 	Interruptions	 may	 be	 viewed	 as	 one	 important	 critical	 link	 between	 preparation	activities	and	errors	because	they	can	interfere	with	the	primary	task	as	well	as	with	safety	 checks	 and	 may	 thus	 increase	 inattention	 and	 medication	 errors	 (Li	 et	 al.,	2012;	Page,	2004;	Reason,	1990).	Interruptions	include	anything	that	draws	nurses	away,	diverts,	or	disturbs	their	attention.	Reducing	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	 appears	 to	 be	 an	 effective	 strategy	 to	 improve	 patient	 safety	 and	decrease	the	risk	of	medication	errors.	Therefore,	the	focus	in	study	C	and	B	was	to	become	aware	of	when	 interruptions	happen,	 the	 types	 that	 commonly	occur,	 and	the	 reduction	 of	 interruptions	 as	 a	 main	 attentional	 problem	 and	 necessary	condition	for	skill-based	errors	(attention	and	memory	failures	like	slips	and	lapses,	including	omitted	tasks)	by	safety	barriers	during	medication	preparation.	Slips	and	lapses	 often	 occur	 when	 functioning	 on	 "auto-pilot",	 like	 the	 preparation	 of	medications,	 and	 affect	 the	 short-term	 memory,	 which	 is	 used	 for	 attention	 and	awareness	(Reason,	1990).		
• The	 theoretical	 background	 showed	 that	 there	 is	 only	 weak	 evidence	 regarding	medication	 error	 chains	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 interventions	 reducing	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	as	an	important	contributing	factor	to	medication	 errors.	 Most	 published	 studies	 recognize	 only	 single	 process	 steps,	causes	and	measures	to	reduce	medication	errors,	but	few	have	provided	a	process-oriented	 approach	 and	 practical	 interventions	 especially	 during	 medication	preparation	(Pape,	2003).	This	research	gap	was	addressed	in	this	thesis	by	study	A,	
B	and	C.		
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Figure		9:	Overview	of	applied	frameworks	in	the	three	thesis	studies		 	
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3. The studies of this thesis 
The	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	address	existing	research	gaps	on	medication	error	chains	on	the	basis	of	critical	incident	reports	and	to	contribute	to	a	deeper	understanding	of	medication	errors,	system	weakness,	safety	barriers	and	targeted	interventions	during	the	medication	use	process,	especially	with	focus	on	medication	preparation,	to	detect	and	stop	medication	errors	before	reaching	 the	patient.	Medication	preparation	 is	one	 important	process	step,	where	 many	 of	 the	 medication	 errors	 can	 be	 caused,	 for	 example	 the	 preparation	 of	 a	wrong	dose,	wrong	drug,	a	drug	for	a	wrong	patient	and	wrong	route.	The	weak	evidence	in	the	 literature	 clarified,	 that	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 need	 to	 develop	 and	 evaluate	 interventions	during	medication	preparation	to	reduce	interruptions	as	one	important	contributing	factor	to	medication	errors.		Reasons	 premise	 is	 that	 “we	 cannot	 change	 the	 human	 condition,	 we	 can	 change	 the	conditions	under	which	humans	work”	(Reason,	2000).	Overall,	 this	 is	the	foundation	and	basic	idea	for	this	thesis	and	the	three	displayed	studies	A,	B	and	C.			 	
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3.1 Summary	of	thesis	studies		
3.1.1 Study	A		
Identifying	Medication	Error	Chains	From	Critical	 Incident	Reports:	A	New	Analytic	
Approach	Authors:	Saskia	Huckels-Baumgart	&	Tanja	Manser	(published	2014)	The	 first	 study	 A	 aimed	 to	 provide	 a	 novel	 process-oriented	 approach	 to	 medication	incident	 analysis	 focusing	 on	 medication	 error	 chains.	 Previous	 research	 into	 the	distribution	of	medication	errors	usually	focused	on	isolated	stages	within	the	medication	use	process.		Study	 A	 was	 conducted	 across	 a	 900-bed	 teaching	 hospital	 in	 Switzerland.	 All	 reported	1,591	 medication	 errors	 2009–2012	 were	 categorized	 using	 the	 Medication	 Error	 Index	NCC	 MERP	 and	 the	 WHO	 Classification	 for	 Patient	 Safety	 Methodology	 (Organization	 &	Organization,	2009).	In	order	to	identify	medication	error	chains,	each	reported	medication	incident	was	allocated	to	the	relevant	stage	of	the	hospital	medication	use	process.		The	 results	 displayed	 that	 only	 25.8%	 of	 the	 reported	 medication	 errors	 were	 detected	before	 they	 propagated	 through	 the	medication	 use	 process.	 The	majority	 of	medication	errors	 (74.2%)	 formed	 an	 error	 chain	 encompassing	 two	 or	 more	 stages.	 Most	 of	 the	medication	errors	in	our	study	reached	the	patient,	propagated	across	more	than	one	stage	and	 potential	 safety	 barrier	 along	 the	 medication	 use	 process.	 The	 most	 frequent	 error	chain	comprised	preparation	up	to	and	including	medication	administration	(45.2%).	“Non-consideration	 of	 documentation/	 prescribing”	 during	 the	 drug	 preparation	was	 the	most	frequent	 contributor	 for	 “wrong	 dose”	 during	 the	 administration	 of	 medication.	 As	contributing	 factors	 “inattention,”	 “work	 condition,”	 and	 “lack	 of	 training”	 were	 most	frequently	reported	by	the	staff.	In	order	to	prevent	medication	errors	clinicians	frequently	proposed	“improvement	of	training,”	“good	communication,”	and	“situational	awareness.”	Study	A	showed	that	medication	error	chains	provide	important	insights	for	detecting	and	stopping	medication	errors	before	they	reach	the	patient.	Existing	and	new	safety	barriers	need	to	be	extended	to	interrupt	error	chains	and	to	improve	patient	safety.	The	results	of	study	A	formed	the	basis	for	the	displayed	interventions	in	studies	B	and	C.	
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3.1.2 Study	B		
Separate	medication	preparation	rooms	reduce	interruptions	and	medication	errors	
in	the	hospital	setting:	a	prospective	observational	study	Authors:	 Saskia	 Huckels-Baumgart,	 André	 Baumgart,	 Ute	 Buschmann,	 Guido	 Schüpfer	 &	Tanja	Manser	(published	2016)	In	 study	 A,	 only	 few	medication	 errors	were	 prevented	 before	 reaching	 the	 patient.	 The	most	 frequent	 error	 chain	 comprised	 preparation	 up	 to	 and	 including	 medication	administration	 and	 one	 of	 the	 most	 named	 contributing	 factors	 were	 “inattention”	 and	“working	conditions”.	These	results	point	at	necessary	improvements	of	safety	barriers	at	the	 critical	 stage	 of	 medication	 preparation	 to	 interrupt	 error	 chains	 before	 medication	administration	 and	 reaching	 the	 patient.	 One	 intervention	 to	 improve	 “situational	attention”	 and	 to	 reduce	 errors	 and	 interruptions	 during	 medication	 preparation	 is	 to	optimize	the	work	environment	(e.g.,	space,	noise)	by	establishing	an	undisturbed	separate	medication	room.	This	intervention	was	implemented	and	evaluated	in	Study	B.		The	aim	of	study	B	was	to	evaluate	the	effect	of	separate	medication	rooms	on	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	on	self-reported	medication	error	rates.	 Interruptions	and	errors	during	the	medication	process	are	common,	but	published	literature	shows	no	evidence	 supporting	 whether	 separate	 medication	 rooms	 are	 an	 effective	 single	intervention	 in	 reducing	 interruptions	 and	 errors	 during	 medication	 preparation	 in	hospitals.		Study	B	performed	a	pre-	and	post-intervention	study	using	direct	structured	observation	of	 nurses	 during	 medication	 preparation	 and	 daily	 structured	 medication	 error	 self-reporting	 of	 nurses	 by	 questionnaires	 in	 two	 wards	 at	 a	 major	 teaching	 hospital	 in	Switzerland.		In	study	B	a	volunteer	sample	of	42	nurses	was	observed	preparing	1498	medications	for	366	 patients	 over	 17	 hours	 pre-	 and	 post-intervention	 on	 both	 wards.	 During	 122	 days	nurses	 completed	 694	 reporting	 sheets	 containing	 208	 medication	 errors.	 After	 the	introduction	 of	 the	 separate	 medication	 room	 the	 mean	 interruption	 rate	 decreased	significantly	 from	 51.8	 to	 30	 interruptions	 per	 hour	 (p<0.01)	 and	 the	 interruption-free	preparation	time	increased	significantly	from	1.4	to	2.5	minutes	(p<0.05).	Overall,	the	mean	medication	 error	 rate	per	day	was	 also	 significantly	 reduced	 after	 implementation	of	 the	
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separate	medication	room	from	1.3	to	0.9	errors	per	day	(p<0.05).	Most	medication	errors	were	detected	during	medication	preparation	and	double-checking.	Therefore,	most	of	the	reported	 medication	 errors	 were	 recognized	 and	 prevented	 before	 medication	administration	and	reaching	the	patient.		Study	B	indicated	the	positive	effect	of	a	hospital-based	intervention:	after	the	introduction	of	 the	 separate	medication	 room,	 the	 interruption	 and	medication	 error	 rates	 decreased	significantly.	The	results	of	study	B	highlighted	the	importance	of	mitigating	interruptions	during	 medication	 preparation	 to	 reduce	 errors	 and	 to	 incease	 the	 likelyhood	 of	 error	detection	 at	 this	 step.	 Therefore,	 the	 implementation	 of	 safety	 barriers	 by	 redesigning	workspaces,	are	important.		 	
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3.1.3 Study	C		
A	combined	intervention	to	reduce	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	
double-checking:	a	pilot-study	evaluating	the	impact	of	staff	training	and	safety	vests	Autors:	Saskia	Huckels-Baumgart,	Milena	Gauch,	Tanja	Manser,	Christoph	R.	Meier	&	Carla	Meyer-Massetti	(under	review	2016)	Another	 intervention	 to	 improve	 “situational	 attention”	 and	 “working	 conditions”	 is	 to	reduce	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	by	implementing	clinical	staff	training	regarding	contributing	factors	to	medication	errors	and	possible	safety	barriers	on	the	one	hand	 and	 safety	 vests	 with	 the	 sign	 “Do	 not	 disturb”	 on	 the	 other	 hand.	 This	 combined	intervention	were	implemented	and	evaluated	in	Study	C.		The	 aim	 of	 study	 C	 was	 to	 evaluate	 the	 impact	 of	 staff	 training	 and	 safety	 vests	 on	interruptions	 during	 medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking.	 We	 tested	 the	hypothesis	 that	 the	 rate	 of	 interruptions	 during	 medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking	would	 decrease	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 staff	 training	 and	 safety	 vests	labeled	“Do	not	disturb”.	Study	 C	 performed	 a	 pre-	 and	 post-intervention	 pilot-study	 used	 direct	 structured	observation	 of	 nurses	 during	 medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking	 in	 a	 medical	ward	at	a	major	teaching	hospital.		The	 interruption	 rate	 during	 medication	 preparation	 was	 reduced	 from	 36.8	 to	 28.3	interruptions	per	hour	and	during	double-checking	from	27.5	to	15	interruptions	per	hour	with	 the	 help	 of	 staff	 training	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 safety	 vests.	 Most	 interruptions	occurred	due	to	conversations	and	were	initiated	mostly	by	the	nurses	themselves.	Study	 C	 showed	 that	 interruptions	 during	 the	 preparation	 and	 double-checking	 of	medications	in	the	inpatient	setting	can	be	reduced	by	the	combined	intervention	such	as	staff	training	and	safety	vests.			 	
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3.2 Integrating	and	linking	thesis	studies	under	the	medication	error	chain	view		All	 three	studies	can	be	 integrated	 into	 the	model	of	medication	error	chains	considering	different	aspects	of	this	concept	(figure	10).	Error	chains	highlight	the	fact	that	errors	are	the	result	of	a	sequence	of	events,	the	contributing	factors	of	which	may	be	tightly	coupled,	all	contributing	to	the	final	outcome.	The	basic	idea	behind	using	the	error	chain	concept	is	to	identify	critical	links	in	the	error	chain	and	remove	it	so	that	the	error	chain	is	broken,	and	thus,	no	incident	should	occur.		While	in	figure	8	an	error	chain	spans	across	all	stages	of	the	medication	use	process,	it	is	important	to	note	that	error	chains	can	be	triggered	and	stopped	at	any	stage.	
Study	 A	 systematically	 applies	 the	 novel	 process-oriented	 approach	 of	medication	 error	chains	to	medication	incident	analysis	with	the	aim	to	identify	(a)	frequency	of	medication	errors,	 (b)	 error	 chains,	 (c)	 errors	 in	 the	 various	 stages,	 (d)	 contributing	 factors	 and	 (e)	targeted	 safety	 barriers	 for	 stopping	 medication	 error	 chains.	 The	 results	 of	 study	 A	displayed	 that	 input	 errors	 (especially	 a	 wrong	 prepared	 dose)	 can	 be	 frequently	transformed	into	output	errors	(a	wrong	administered	dose)	through	contributing	factors	(especially	 inattention	respectively	 interruptions	as	a	main	attentional	problem),	working	conditions	 (e.g.	 space,	 noise)	 and	missing	 or	 ineffective	 safety	 barriers	 (e.g.	 undisturbed	workspace	 for	 drug	 preparation).	 Study	 A	 showed	 that	 the	majority	 of	 errors	 occurring	during	 medication	 preparation	 were	 not	 intercepted	 prior	 to	 medication	 administration	and	reached	the	patient	due	to	a	sequence	of	events	forming	an	error	chain.	Inattention	was	the	most	frequent	contributing	factor	to	medication	errors	reported	by	the	staff	(Huckels-Baumgart	&	Manser,	2014).	One	recommendation	of	study	A	was	that	the	effectiveness	of	established	 or	 newly	 implemented	 safety	 barriers	 (e.g.	 undisturbed	 workspace	 for	 drug	preparation)	should	be	evaluated	systematically	using	observations	and	focused	reporting	by	 staff.	 Possible	 interventions	 to	 reduce	 “inattention”	 by	 optimizing	 the	 working	environment	 (e.g.	 space,	 noise)	 are	 to	 establish	 undisturbed	 workspaces	 for	 drug	preparation	or	to	use	“Do	Not	Disturb”	safety	vests.	Based	on	this	study	results,	these	recommended	targeted	safety	barriers	were	implemented	and	their	effect	were	evaluated	in	study	B	 (optimizing	the	work	environment	by	separate	medication	 rooms	 separate	 medication	 rooms)	 and	 study	 C	 (staff	 training	 and	 the	implementation	 of	 “Do	 Not	 Disturb”	 safety	 vests	 as	 a	 more	 simple	 and	 inexpensive	combined	 intervention)	 to	reduce	 interruptions	as	a	main	attentional	problem	during	 the	
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critical	 task	 of	 medication	 preparation	 (figure	 10).	 Using	 the	 concept	 of	 error	 chains,	interruptions	 during	 medication	 preparation,	 commonly	 performed	 by	 nurses,	 may	 be	viewed	 as	 one	 important	 critical	 link	 between	 preparation	 activities	 and	 errors.	Interruptions	 can	 interfere	with	 the	 primary	 task	 as	well	 as	with	 safety	 checks	 and	may	thus	increase	inattention	and	medication	errors	(Li	et	al.,	2012;	Page,	2004;	Reason,	1990).			
	
Figure	10:	Integrating	and	linking	thesis	studies	under	the	medication	error	chain	view				 	
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3.3 Author’s	contribution	to	thesis	articles		Table	1	lists	Ph.D.	candidate’s	contribution	to	study	A-C.		
Paper	 Publication	
Status	 
Ph.D.	candidate’s	contribution	
Study	A	Huckels-Baumgart	&	Manser	
	Published	in	Journal	of	Clinical	Pharmacology	(2014)	
	Substantial	contribution	to		
• conception	&	design,	
• data	acquisition	and	collection,		
• analysis	and	interpretation,		
• draft	and	revision	of	the	manuscript	
Study	B	Huckels-Baumgart,	Baumgart,	Buschmann,	Schüpfer	&	Manser		
	Published	ahead-of-	print	in	Journal	of	Patient	Safety	(2016)	
	Substantial	contribution	to		
• conception	&	design,	
• data	acquisition	and	collection,		
• analysis	and	interpretation,		
• draft	and	revision	of	the	manuscript	
Study	C	Huckels-Baumgart,	Gauch,	Manser,	Meier	&	Carla	Meyer-Massetti	
	Under	Review	in	Journal	of	Nursing	Management		(2016)	
	Substantial	contribution	to		
• conception	&	design,	
• data	acquisition	and	collection,		
• analysis	and	interpretation,		
• draft	and	revision	of	the	manuscript	
	
Table	1:	Overview	of	author’s	contributions	to	thesis	articles	
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4. Discussion and synthesis 
4.1 Contribution	to	theory	and	practice	The	 thesis	provided	new	evidence	on	human	 factors	and	medication	safety	 research.	The	three	studies	aimed	to	contribute	to	a	deeper	understanding	of	medication	error	chains	and	investigating	the	effectiveness	of	practical	interventions.	In	particular,	the	studies	explored	the	 reduction	 of	 interruptions	 during	 the	 critical	 task	 of	 medication	 preparation	 as	 one	important	contributing	factor	to	medication	errors.		The	medication	error	chain	concept	provided	a	novel,	 innovative	framework	developed	in	this	 thesis.	 The	 existing	 theoretical	 foundations	 revealed	 only	 weak	 evidence	 regarding	medication	 error	 chains	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 interventions	 reducing	 interruptions	during	medication	preparation.	Existing	research	into	the	distribution	of	medication	errors	indicates	incidence	of	errors	in	all	stages	of	the	medication	use	process,	but	predominantly	focuses	on	 isolated	process	steps	(Aspden	et	al.,	2006;	Hicks	et	al.,	2004;	Hughes	&	Ortiz,	2005;	Lisby	et	al.,	2005;	Taylor,	2007).	This	isolated	view	does	not	reflect	the	complexity	of	error	 occurrence	 along	 the	 entire	 medication	 use	 process	 and	 neglects	 the	interdependencies	 between	 these	 stages.	 Most	 published	 studies	 recognize	 only	 single	process	 steps,	 causes	 and	 measures	 to	 reduce	 medication	 errors,	 but	 only	 few	 have	provided	 a	 process-oriented	 approach	 and	 interventions	 during	 medication	 preparation.	Taking	the	dynamics	of	medication	errors	 into	account,	these	existing	research	gaps	were	addressed	in	this	thesis	by	study	A,	B	and	C	covering	practical	interventions	that	influence	error	chains	surrounding	medication	preparation.		
Study	 A	 systematically	 applies	 a	 novel	 process-oriented	 approach	 of	 medication	 error	chains	to	medication	incident	analysis	with	the	aim	to	identify	(a)	frequency	of	medication	errors,	 (b)	 error	 chains,	 (c)	 errors	 in	 the	 various	 stages,	 (d)	 contributing	 factors	 and	 (e)	targeted	safety	barriers	for	stopping	medication	error	chains.		While	the	concept	of	error	chains	has	been	used	previously	in	incident	analyses,	it	has	not	been	 applied	 systematically	 in	 medication	 management	 before	 this	 thesis.	 Surprisingly,	researchers	have	only	very	recently	started	to	use	similar	approaches	(Carayon	et	al.,	2014;	Samaranayake	et	al.,	2013).	While	no	study	explicitly	referring	 to	 the	error	chain	concept	could	 be	 found,	 two	 recent	 analyses	 of	medication	 incidents	 applied	 similar	 approaches.	
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One	study	(Samaranayake	et	al.,	2013)	compared	intercepted	and	non-intercepted	(34.1%)	medication	errors	along	the	medication	use	process	using	Reason’s	"Swiss	Cheese	Model"	(Reason,	 1995,	 2000)	 as	 an	 analytic	 framework.	 This	 framework	 provides	 a	 useful	foundation	 for	 targeted	 prevention	 strategies.	 A	 second	 study	 (Carayon	 et	 al.,	 2014;	Samaranayake	et	al.,	2013)	analyzed	medication	incidents	in	two	intensive	care	units	using	a	combination	of	incident	reports	and	chart	reviews.	
Study	A	indicated	that	the	majority	of	errors	occurring	during	medication	preparation	were	not	 intercepted	 prior	 to	 medication	 administration	 and	 reached	 the	 patient	 due	 to	 a	sequence	 of	 events	 forming	 an	 error	 chain.	 "Inattention",	 “work	 condition”	 and	 “lack	 of	training“	were	 the	most	 frequently	 reported	 contributing	 factors	 to	medication	errors.	 In	order	 to	 prevent	 medication	 errors	 clinicians	 frequently	 proposed	 “improvement	 of	training”	 and	 “situational	 awareness”.	 The	 study	 results	 strongly	 suggest	 a	 need	 for	 the	implementation	 of	 targeted	 interventions	 respectively	 safety	 barriers	 to	 reduce	interruptions	as	a	main	attentional	problem	during	medication	preparation.		Although	interruptions	may	occur	at	any	stage	of	the	medication	use	process	(Vincent	et	al.,	2009),	 medication	 preparation	 is	 especially	 prone	 to	 interruptions	 because	 it	 is	 the	 last	stage	and	opportunity	 intercepting	errors	before	medication	administration	and	 reaching	the	 patient.	 A	 high	 frequency	 of	medication	 errors	 occurs	 during	medication	preparation	(Huckels-Baumgart	&	Manser,	 2014).	 For	 example,	wrong	dose,	wrong	drug,	 a	drug	 for	 a	wrong	patient	 and	wrong	 route	 are	major	preparation	 errors.	Nurses	 commonly	prepare	and	administer	medications	and	 they	have	 the	major	 responsibility	as	 the	 last	 link	 in	 the	medication	use	process.	In	nursing	driven	health	services	like	Switzerland,	nurses	perform	final	safety	checks	intended	to	identify	and	intercept	medication	errors	before	reaching	the	patient.	Thus,	 the	preparation	phase	has	very	 few	safeguards	against	errors	and	 requires	nurses’	full	attention.		Interruptions	during	the	medication	use	process	have	been	studied	across	various	hospital	settings	particularly	with	a	focus	on	medication	administration	(Raban	&	Westbrook,	2014;	Relihan	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 While	 its	 known	 that	 interruptions	 and	 errors	 both	 are	 common	during	medication	preparation,	we	found	only	four	studies	(Anthony	et	al.,	2010;	Biron	et	al.,	 2009;	 Duruk,	 Zencir,	 &	 Eşer,	 2016;	 Tomietto	 et	 al.,	 2012)	 specifically	 investigating	interruptions	 during	 medication	 preparation.	 No	 study	 considered	 their	 relationship	 to	medication	 errors.	 Thus,	 the	 existing	 evidence	 for	 interventions	 effectively	 reducing	
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interruptions	(Colligan	et	al.,	2012;	Freeman	et	al.,	2013;	Julie	Kliger	et	al.,	2012)	has	not	yet	been	linked	to	a	reduction	of	errors	during	medication	preparation.	Preventing	medication	errors	from	reaching	the	patient	means	designing	health	care	systems	and	processes	safer.	Limited	research	exists	addressing	human	factors	and	work	redesign	to	reduce	medication	errors	and	contributing	factors.	Most	published	studies	recognize	causes	and	measures	to	reduce	 medication	 errors,	 but	 few	 have	 provided	 practical	 interventions	 (Pape,	 2003).	Therefore,	 the	 thesis	 addressed	 the	 need	 to	 develop	 interventions	 and	 safety	 barriers	during	medication	preparation	to	reduce	interruptions	as	one	important	contributing	factor	to	medication	errors.		Based	on	the	results	of	study	A	and	the	existing	research	gaps,	study	B	evaluates	the	effect	of	 optimizing	 the	 work	 environment	 by	 separate	 medication	 rooms	 as	 one	 targeted	intervention	 and	 safety	 barrier	 to	 improve	 medication	 safety	 during	 medication	preparation.	 The	 aim	 was	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	 during	 the	 critical	 task	 of	 medication	preparation	and	 thus	 the	potential	 to	 cause	medication	errors.	Finally,	Study	 C	uses	 staff	training	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 “Do	 Not	 Disturb”	 safety	 vests	 as	 a	 more	 simple	 and	inexpensive	 combined	 intervention	 to	 reduce	 interruptions.	 The	 focus	 of	 study	 B	 and	 C	was	to	become	aware	of	(1)	when	interruptions	happen,	(2)	what	types	commonly	occur,	and	 (3)	 how	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	 as	 a	 main	 attentional	 problem	 during	 medication	preparation.	Henriksen	and	colleagues	(Henriksen	et	al.,	2008)	considered	similar	aspects	related	to	the	studies:	(1)	preventable	adverse	events	(reported	medication	errors	in	study	
A	and	B),	(2)	characteristics	of	individuals	(staff	training	about	the	impact	of	interruption	on	 medication	 safety	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	 in	 Study	 C),	 (3)	 nature	 of	 clinical	 work	(inattention	and	 interruptions	 in	Study	B	 and	 C),	 (4)	design	of	 the	physical	environment	(implementing	separate	medication	rooms	in	Study	B	and	‘Do	Not	Disturb’	safety	vests	in	
Study	 C	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	during	medication	preparation).	Study	 B	 and	 C	 showed	that	 interruptions	 during	medication	 preparation	 and	 in	 study	 B	 also	medication	 errors	could	be	successfully	reduced	by	a	re-design	of	the	work	environment	and	staff	training	as	an	important	part	of	human	factors	research.	However,	not	all	interruptions	are	preventable	and	lead	to	errors.	Interruptions	might	also	have	positive	effects	on	patient	safety,	for	example	alarms	in	emergency	cases.	Despite	any	interventions	 and	 safety	 barriers	 implemented,	 interruptions	will	 likely	 remain	 a	 part	 of	clinical	 work,	 due	 to	 its	 very	 nature	 (Grundgeiger	 &	 Sanderson,	 2009)	 and	 a	 complete	
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interruption	 of	 medication	 error	 chains	 could	 not	 be	 achieved.	 In	 consequence	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	will	probably	never	be	eliminated	completely	in	daily	hospital	practice.		Therefore,	it	is	important	that	hospitals	have	a	wider	range	of	safety	barriers	in	place.	For	example,	 further	well-established	safety	barriers	 in	medication	management	are	the	“four	eyes	 principle	 or	 double-check”	 (i.e.	 a	 cross-check	 of	 a	 prepared	 medication	 by	 two	clinicians)	 and	 the	 “six	 rights”	 (i.e.	 checking	 every	medication	 for	 right	medication,	 right	patient,	 right	 time,	 right	documentation,	 right	 route	 and	 right	dosage)	 (Hughes	&	Blegen,	2008).	 The	 strict	 application	 of	 the	 “double-checks”	 and	 “six	 rights”	 are	 important	 safety	barriers	 after	 medication	 preparation	 and	 before	 administration.	 When	 performed	carelessly,	without	thought	and	attention,	the	importance	and	effectiveness	of	these	safety	checks	get	lost	(Clifton-Koeppel,	2008).	When	completed	correctly	(attentively,	completely,	independently,	and	uniformly)	and	in	a	manner	in	which	safety	is	the	goal,	these	checks	can	be	 effective	 in	detecting	 and	 reducing	medication	errors.	 Correctly,	 safely	 and	attentively	performed	double-checks	can	catch	approximately	95%	of	all	errors	and	should	be	applied	as	an	added	safety-net	for	patients	(ISMP,	2013).	Overall,	 the	three	studies	 in	this	thesis	 include	a	theoretical	and	practical	approach	based	on	human	factors	frameworks	and	the	medication	error	chain	concept.	This	thesis	has	given	an	important	contribution	to	existing	human	factors	and	medication	research	as	well	as	the	practical	 implementation	 of	 safety	 barriers	 within	 hospitals.	 By	 evaluating	 targeted	interventions	 to	 improve	 the	work	 environment	 and	 redesign	 of	medication	 preparation	areas	the	thesis	proposed	means	that	ensure	effectiveness,	safety	and	ease	of	use.				 	
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4.2 Limitations		Despite	its	strengths	and	novelties,	several	limitations	need	to	be	taken	into	account	when	interpreting	the	results	of	this	thesis.	First,	 the	 three	 studies	 of	 this	 thesis	 were	 performed	 in	 one	 academic	 teaching	 hospital	across	three	hospital	sites	in	one	country	(Switzerland).	Therefore,	the	findings	may	not	be	generalizable	 to	 other	 settings.	 For	 example,	 the	 system	of	 care,	ward	 layout,	medication	process	and	staffing	patterns	may	be	different	across	units,	hospitals	and	countries.		Second,	different	formats	of	data	collection	such	as	chart	review,	observation	and	incident	reporting	or	respectively	self-reporting	will	lead	to	different	findings.	As	shown	by	several	investigators,	 a	 self-reporting	 method	 carries	 the	 risk	 of	 reporting	 biases	 and	underreporting	(Hughes	&	Blegen,	2008).	Self-reported	incident	reports	are	recognized	as	under-representing	 actual	 errors	 (Evans	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Lawton	 &	 Parker,	 2002).	 In	 the	hospital	setting,	multiple	studies	have	demonstrated	that	errors	often	go	unreported	with	only	5%	of	significant	errors	being	reported	(Leape	et	al.,	1995).	Moreover,	 in	study	B	we	received	a	much	higher	number	of	medication	error	reports	through	the	focused	action	on	structured	 daily	 reporting	 of	 medication	 errors	 than	 through	 the	 hospital	 wide	 critical	incident	 reporting	 system.	 This	 approach	 captures	 medication	 errors	 that	 have	 been	detected	 and	 corrected	 and	 thus	 would	 not	 be	 captured	 by	 chart	 review.	 Although	medication	errors	can	be	detected	by	chart	reviews,	 this	 is	also	a	subjective	and	resource	intensive	method	because	errors	are	often	not	clearly	documented	and	a	relationship	based	on	 given	 drugs	 needs	 to	 be	 interpreted	 by	 the	 reviewers.	 Further,	 participant	 behavior	during	observation	 is	subject	 to	 the	Hawthorne	effect	 that	 is	behavior	changes	due	to	 the	act	of	being	observed.	The	observation	duration	should	be	extended	and	of	equal	 lengths	pre-	and	post-intervention	in	future	studies,	which	is	a	resource	intensive	method.	Third,	 we	 considered	 the	 process	 steps	 prescribing,	 transcription,	 preparation	 and	administration	in	study	A	and	focused	on	the	process	step	medication	preparation	in	study	B	and	C.	 In	outpatient	settings	monitoring	problems	may	dominate.	Thus,	 there	may	be	a	lack	of	generalizability	to	other	healthcare	settings.		Fourth,	 in	 study	A	 “inattention”	was	 the	most	 frequent	 contributing	 factor	 to	medication	errors	 reported	by	 staff.	We	 considered	 “interruptions”	 as	 a	main	 attentional	 problem	 in	
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study	 B	 and	 C,	 but	 we	 have	 not	 explicitly	 measured,	 whether	 “inattention”	 was	 also	improved	and	“attention”	has	increased	generally	by	reducing	interruptions.		A	further	limitation	is	the	linearity	of	the	error	chain	model	in	study	A:	An	error	does	not	always	 lead	 directly	 to	 the	 next	 error,	 but	 "local	 trigger"	 and	 "unusual	 conditions"	meet	with	errors.	Thus,	it	is	also	possible	to	speak	of	a	collection	of	safety	barriers,	where	errors	can	slip	through	the	holes.		Additionally,	the	outcome	of	study	B	and	C	was	not	equal	because	medication	errors	could	not	be	measured	in	study	C.	In	study	C	it	was	tested	if	a	reduction	of	interruptions	could	be	achieved	 as	well	with	 a	 less	 expensive	 intervention.	 Future	 studies	 should	 consider	 both	outcomes	“interruptions”	and	“medication	errors”.	Finally,	this	thesis	addressed	a	subset	of	existing	research	gaps	identified	in	the	literature	and	focused	on	the	most	relevant	gaps	in	the	given	hospital	setting;	however,	 it	could	not	consider	all	of	them.		 	
	 42	
4.3 Conclusion	and	outlook	This	 thesis	makes	 a	 valuable	 contribution	 to	 the	 field	 of	 research	 on	 human	 factors	 and	medication	safety	and	addressed	existing	research	gaps	identified	in	the	literature.	Whereas	study	A	highlights	the	importance	of	identifying	medication	error	chains	in	general,	Studies	B	and	C	focus	more	specifically	on	targeted	interventions	to	reduce	interruptions	as	a	main	attentional	 problem	 and	 contributing	 factor	 to	 medication	 errors	 during	 medication	preparation.		The	benefit	of	the	novel	process-oriented	approach	to	medication	error	analysis	in	study	A	is	 to	 gain	 important	 insights	 concerning	medication	 error	 chains	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 of	safety	 barriers	 along	 the	 entire	medication	 use	 process.	 The	 identification	 of	medication	error	chains	complements	existing	knowledge	on	medication	errors	and	system	weakness.	This	thesis	opens	up	new	perspectives	for	detecting	and	stopping	medication	errors	before	they	 reach	 the	patient.	Thus,	 the	medication	 error	 chain	 concept	 forms	a	novel	 and	 solid	basis	 for	 future	 research	 and	 more	 sophisticated	 or	 complex	 evaluations	 based	 on	 this	process-oriented	analysis.		Further,	studies	should	follow	to	increase	knowledge	around	error	chains	and	to	implement	comprehensive	 safety	 barriers	 to	 improve	medication	 safety.	 The	 feasibility	 of	 the	 novel	process-oriented	 analytic	 approach	 in	 study	 A	 has	 been	 illustrated	 in	 this	 thesis	 using	medication	 incident	 reports	 in	 a	hospital.	 In	 the	 future,	 this	 concept	 can	also	be	used	 for	other	 healthcare	 settings	 and	 patient	 safety	 “hot-spots”.	 Additional	 data	 sources	 such	 as	chart	 reviews	 or	 observations	 could	 provide	 further	 insights	 into	 error	 chains	 and	underlying	 event	 rates.	 In	 study	 A,	 only	 few	 medication	 errors	 were	 prevented	 before	reaching	 the	 patient.	 This	 points	 towards	 necessary	 improvements	 of	 safety	 barriers	 at	each	 stage	 -	 especially	 in	 early	 stages	 -	 of	 the	medication	 use	 process	 to	 interrupt	 error	chains.	 While	 hospitals	 usually	 have	 implemented	 a	 range	 of	 safety	 barriers,	 without	 a	systematic	analysis	of	error	chains	it	is	difficult	to	assess	their	effectiveness	and	to	establish	preventive	measures	breaking	these	error	chains	as	early	as	possible.			Nurses	are	mostly	involved	in	medication	preparation,	double-checking	and	administration	of	drugs.	They	provide	a	fundamental	function	in	nursing	driven	systems	in	detecting	and	preventing	 errors	 that	 occurred	 in	 the	 prescribing,	 transcribing,	 and	 preparation	 stages.		The	 studies	 of	 this	 thesis	 clarified	 that	 nurses’	 work	 environment	 is	 characterized	 by	
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frequent	 interruptions	 as	 a	 main	 attentional	 problem	 that	 are	 initiated	 mostly	 by	colleagues.	Although	 interruptions	are	 commonplace	and	have	been	 identified	as	 a	major	contributor	 to	 medication	 administration	 errors	 previously,	 little	 evidence	 existed	 to	reduce	 interruptions	 during	 medication	 preparation	 before	 this	 thesis.	 Study	 B	 and	 C	addressed	 this	 research	 gaps	 and	 indicated	 positive	 effects	 of	 different	 hospital-based	interventions:	 separate	 medication	 rooms,	 staff	 training	 and	 the	 wearing	 of	 safety	 vests	with	the	note	"Do	Not	Disturb"	could	reduce	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	improve	medication	safety.	The	results	of	this	thesis	highlight	the	importance	of	incorporating	patient	safety	at	an	early	architectural	 design	 stage.	 While	 measures	 to	 minimize	 interruptions	 such	 as	 separate	medication	 rooms	 and	 safety	 vests	 contribute	 to	 an	 improved	 work	 environment	 for	medication	 preparation,	 nurses	 also	 need	 to	 feel	 empowered	 to	 speak	 up	 to	 discourage	unwanted	interruptions	and	conversation	while	preparing	medications.	These	attempts	will	be	more	successful	 if	adequately	supported	by	work	design.	For	this	reason,	architectural	changes	are	recommended	as	they	present	an	even	stronger	defense	against	interruptions.	Additionally,	 an	 improved	 work	 layout	 with	 direct	 access	 to	 medical	 records	 could	eliminate	 specific,	 unnecessary	 interruptions.	 Even	 though	 electronic	medication	 logistics	are	 being	 introduced	 widely	 in	 hospitals	 and	 wards	 and	 may	 seemingly	 make	 those	interventions	unnecessary,	they	will	still	be	required	in	practice	for	medication	preparation	on	 short	 notice	 or	 in	 case	 of	 emergency.	 Future	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 better	 understand	why	interruptions	occur	and	to	implement	effective	interventions	to	reduce	interruptions.	The	study	design	of	this	thesis	could	be	expanded	to	determine	if	the	interventions	will	be	effective	in	other	types	of	process-steps,	units	and	hospitals.	Overall,	in	addition	to	technical	interventions,	clinical	staff	has	to	be	trained	regarding	error	chains,	suitable	safety	barriers	and	on	how	errors	and	unnecessary	interruptions	can	be	reduced	successfully	by	increasing	staff	awareness	and	the	implementation	of	physical	barriers.		This	 thesis	 ends	 in	 accordance	 to	 James	 Reason,	 whose	 following	 quote	 accurately	illustrates	 the	 motivation	 of	 this	 thesis	 and	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 investing	 in	human	 factors	 and	 (medication)	 safety	 for	 all	 those	 involved	 in	 hospitals	 and	 healthcare	system:	“We	cannot	change	the	human	condition,	but	we	can	change	the	conditions	under	which	humans	work.”			 	
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5. Thesis Articles 
The	three	studies	(Study	A-C)	are	presented	as	self-contained	articles	 including	their	own	structure	and	references.	Language,	formatting	and	citation	style	is	based	on	the	journal	in	which	the	article	was	published	or	to	which	it	was	submitted.	All	references	from	Chapter	1-4	are	listed	at	the	end	of	this	thesis.		 	
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Identifying Medication Error Chains From
Critical Incident Reports: A New Analytic
Approach
Saskia Huckels-Baumgart, MSc1 and Tanja Manser, PhD2
Abstract
Research into the distribution of medication errors usually focuses on isolated stages within the medication use process. Our study aimed to provide a
novel process-oriented approach to medication incident analysis focusing on medication error chains. Our study was conducted across a 900-bed
teaching hospital in Switzerland. All reported 1,591 medication errors 2009–2012 were categorized using the Medication Error IndexNCCMERP and
theWHOClassiﬁcation for Patient Safety Methodology. In order to identify medication error chains, each reported medication incident was allocated
to the relevant stage of the hospital medication use process. Only 25.8% of the reported medication errors were detected before they propagated
through the medication use process. The majority of medication errors (74.2%) formed an error chain encompassing two or more stages. The most
frequent error chain comprised preparation up to and including medication administration (45.2%). “Non-consideration of documentation/
prescribing” during the drug preparation was the most frequent contributor for “wrong dose” during the administration of medication. Medication
error chains provide important insights for detecting and stopping medication errors before they reach the patient. Existing and new safety barriers
need to be extended to interrupt error chains and to improve patient safety.
Keywords
medication error chains, medication error, medication use process, incident analysis
Numerous studies have shown signiﬁcant problems in
medication safety as one of the main threats to patient
safety in hospitals.1–6 Understanding the incidence, type
and preventability of medication errors is crucial to
improving the safety of healthcare delivery.2
A medication error is deﬁned as “any preventable
event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication
use or patient harm, while the medication is in the control
of the healthcare professional, patient, or consumer.”7
Medication errors can occur at any point of the well-
established ﬁve stages of the medication use process:
prescribing, transcribing, preparation, administering, and
monitoring. Furthermore, medication errors may or may
not reach the patient; and while some medication errors
have serious consequences, others change a patient’s
outcome but this change does not result in any harm.8
Medication errors are—by deﬁnition—potentially
preventable. Thus, an in-depth investigation of these
errors is necessary for continuous improvement of
medication safety, regardless of whether an injury
actually occurred or the potential for injury was present.7
The aim of medication incident analyses is to identify
frequent error types as early as possible in the medication
use process to prevent them from propagating and
ultimately reaching patients.
Research into the distribution of medication errors
across the different stages of the medication use process
found that, in hospitals, medication errors were common
at the stages prescribing, transcription, preparation and
administration, thus highlighting their relevance along the
entire medication use process.2,4,8–10
While these ﬁndings indicate incidence of medication
errors in all stages, research predominantly focuses on
isolated process steps. This isolated view does not reﬂect
the system complexity of error occurrence and failing
safety barriers along the entire medication use process and
neglects the interdependencies between these stages. In
order to gain a deeper understanding of medication errors,
safety wholes and barriers throughout the entire medi-
cation use process we applied a novel approach to
medication error analysis that focuses on medication
error chains.
The concept of error chains highlights the fact that
many errors are the result of a sequence of events, the
contributing factors of which may be tightly coupled, all
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contributing to the ﬁnal outcome. The basic idea behind
using the error chain concept is to identify a critical link in
the error chain and remove it so that the error chain is
broken, and thus, no incident should occur.11 Hospitals
usually have a whole range of safety barriers in place. For
example, well-established safety barriers in medication
management are the “four eyes principle” (ie, a cross-
check of a prepared medication by two clinicians) and the
“six rights” (ie, checking every medication for right
medication, right patient, right time, right documentation,
right route, and right dosage).7,12
Safety barriers are often vulnerable, but in most cases a
succession of barriers ensures that an error is caught
before a negative outcome occurs.13–15 Studying medica-
tion error chains helps to identify weaknesses in safety
barriers and to pinpoint where exactly in the medication
use process safety barriers are missing, not effective or
require improvement. Improving the effectiveness of
existing safety barriers and establishing new ones will
help to interrupt error chains before affecting a patient
and, thus, improve patient safety.
The general idea of error chains in the hospital
medication use process is illustrated in Figure 1. An
example for an input error is an illegible handwritten
prescription by a physician. The error is activated when
this prescription is transcribed by a nurse with a wrong
dose without double-checking with the physician. The
wrong dose may propagate as through the further
medication use process and be prepared by another nurse
without recognition of the preexisting error. This error
chain may result in the output error of the wrong dose
being administered to the patient. While this example
of an error chain spans across all stages of the
medication use process, it is important to note that error
chain can be triggered and stopped at any stage.
Effective safety barriers present opportunities to inter-
rupt error chains and prevent the error from reaching the
patient. One safety barrier helping to interrupt the error
chain in our example during the prescription and
transcription stages might be an electronic order entry
system. The strict application of important safety
practices such as “four eye principle” and “six rights”
could act as safety barriers after the preparation and
before administration.
While the concept of error chains has been used
previously in incident analyses, it has not yet been applied
systematically in medication management. Surprisingly,
researchers have started only very recently to use similar
approaches.16,17 We believe that the identiﬁcation of
medication error chains provides important insights
complementing existing knowledge on medication errors,
system weakness, effectiveness of safety barriers and
opens up new perspectives for detecting and stopping
medication errors before reaching the patient.
This study aimed to address these research gaps by
systematically applying a process-oriented approach to
medication incident analysis. We aimed to identify
frequent medication error chains including a classiﬁcation
of error types. We also explored contributing factors and
possible safety barriers for interrupting error chains along
the medication use process.
Method
The studywas conducted in a 900-bed teaching hospital in
Switzerland with 6,000 employees across three hospital
sites which all share a critical incident reporting system
(CIRS) that had been introduced as part of a quality
improvement project in 2006.
Nurses, physicians, pharmacists, and other healthcare
professionals from all departments can report critical
incidents anonymously. The blank CIRS template used at
the three study sites is attached in supplemental Table S1.
We analyzed all 3,557 incidents reported across the three
hospital sites from 2009 to 2012.
Data Analysis
Using a Microsoft Excel export of the reports from the
hospital-wide CIRS, incident data were coded in several
steps applying established coding systems.18,19 All
Figure 1. Simpliﬁed illustration the concept of error chains spanning across the stages of the hospital medication use process.
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reported medication errors we analyzed contained de-
identiﬁed information, so ethics approval and consent
were not required. In a ﬁrst step, all 3,557 incident reports
in this database were analyzed and grouped according to
the World Health Organization (WHO) Classiﬁcation for
Patient Safety Methodology.18 In a second step, all 1,591
reports coded as medication errors in the previous step
were categorized using (a) theMedication Error Index and
(b) the WHO Categories for medication errors. Each
incident was then allocated to all relevant stages of the
mediation use process. Finally, within the allocated stages
all applicable medication error types according to the
WHO Classiﬁcation were assigned.
Categorization Using the Medication Error Index. All
1,591 medication errors were categorized using the
Medication Error Index established by the National
Coordinating Council forMedication Error Reporting and
Prevention (NCC MERP). NCC MERP classiﬁes errors
according to the severity of the outcome and if it reached
the patient or not. Category A includes error-causing
circumstances and category B covers recognized and
prevented errors. Categories C–D incorporate errors that
reached the patient. In category C an error occurred but
did not cause patient harm whilst category D required an
intervention/monitoring. In Categories E–I medication
errors result in patient harm or death.19 Because the CIRS
we based our analysis is not intended to collect reports
that include patient harm or death for which a separate
reporting procedure exists in all participating hospitals,
the severity of medication errors included in our study
cover categories A–D.
Categorization Using the WHO Classiﬁcation for Patient
Safety Methodology. The 1,591 medication errors were
each categorized into medication error types according to
the WHO classiﬁcation (wrong patient, wrong drug,
wrong dose, wrong quantity, omitted medicine or dose)
with one reported medication error potentially including
several errors at different stages.
Allocation to Stages of the Medication Use Process and
Identiﬁcation of Medication Error Chains. To identify error
chains, each reportedmedication incident was allocated to
the relevant stages of the hospital medication use process:
prescribing, transcription, preparation, and administering.
A medication error may extend over several stages before
it is averted. In these error chains, events can be detected
and intercepted or they remain undetected through all
stages. For every incident report we recorded in which
stage(s) what kind of error type occurred. Afterwards,
frequent medication error chains with their input and
output errors were identiﬁed. “Input errors” were deﬁned
as errors triggering a medication error chain, while
“output errors” marked the endpoint and characterized a
potential adverse outcome. In the next step we added two
error types not contained in the WHO classiﬁcation (ie,
“wrong time” and “non-consideration of documentation/
prescribing”). Furthermore, the contributing factors
reported by the staff in the incident reports were assigned
to the medication error chains concerned.
Review Process
Two reviewers (quality manager and intensive care nurse)
independently categorized all medication incidents
according to the coding steps described above and
thereafter all codings were discussed, to reach a
consensus. Using the categorization Medication Error
Index (NCC MERP) there was an initial agreement
between rates of 98.5% (1,567 reports) and for the
categorization WHO Classiﬁcation for Patient Safety
Methodology the initial agreement was 95.8% (1,524
reports). In the allocation to the stages of the medication
use process the initial agreement was 86.4% (1,375
reports). After discussing all disagreements in the
research team, consensus was reached for all cases.
Therefore, no reports were excluded.
Prior to coding, the two reviewers were trained in
incident report classiﬁcation. Training manuals provided
deﬁnitions of medication error types, process steps and
the NCC MERP Index as well as examples of medication
error reports. Training was followed by pilot coding of
actual CIRS data. Reviewers received feedback concern-
ing accuracy and inter-reviewer agreement.
Statistical Analysis
Descriptive statistics were used to examine the charac-
teristics of the reported medication errors. For the
statistical analysis of reported medication error catego-
ries and main types of medication errors we used the
Pearson’s Chi-squared test of independence. The
independence of the reported error categories and
main types of medication errors were examined using
Chi-square statistics comparing the years 2009–2012.
Category counts smaller than 5 were not included in the
statistical analyses. All statistical analyses were per-
formed in R (Version 2.15.3).
Results
Frequency of Medication Errors Reaching the Patients
Table 1 provides an overview of the reported medication
errors assigned to the NCC MERP Medication Error
Category Index for each year of the study period and in
total. A total of 3,557 incidents were reported 2009–2012
including 1,591 (44.7%) medication incidents. 15.7% of
medication incidents were recognized and averted before
reaching the patient (ie, categories A and B). 84.3% of the
reported medication errors reached the patient (categories
C–D). A further 75.5% fell into category C and 8.8% in
category D. No errors were recorded in categories E–I
because the CIRS we based our analysis on does not
include patient harm or death. Overall, annual frequencies
1190 The Journal of Clinical Pharmacology / Vol 54 No 10 (2014)
	 49	 	
of reported medication errors (ie, categories B, C, and D)
differed signiﬁcantly by year (Chi-square 49.137,
P< .05).
Most Frequent Types of Medication Errors
Table 2 provides an overview of the main medication
error types based on the WHO Classiﬁcation for Patient
Safety Methodology. The most frequent types of
medication errors were “wrong frequency of dose/
strength” (27.5%), “omitted medicine or dose” (17%)
and “wrong drug” (13.3%). There was no signiﬁcant
difference in the types of medication errors captured from
2009 to 2012 (Chi-square 30.76, P¼ .078) (Table 2).
Medication Error Chains and Single-Stage Medication
Errors
Allocation of all data from 2009 to 2012 to the four stages
of the hospital medication use process showed that a
single report might include errors at multiple stages.
Therefore, the number of medication errors across stages
exceeded the number of medication incidents reported
during the study period.
Using the total number of the reported medication
errors (n¼ 1,591) as the denominator for calcula-
ting percentages, our analysis showed that only 410
(25.8%) of the reported medication errors were success-
fully detected before propagating through the medica-
tion use process (ie, single stage error; gray arrows in
Figure 2).
The majority of medication errors (74.2%) formed an
error chain comprising two or more stages. Most error
chains were triggered during medication preparation with
50.3% and during prescription with 26.1%. Output errors
as endpoints occurred most frequently in the administra-
tion stage (82.5%). Detailed information on the distribu-
tion of medication error chains and single error stages
broken down for the three hospital sites and each year
from 2009 to 2012 is presented in supplemental Table S2.
Overall, we identiﬁed six different error chains in the
medication use process. Error chains and single stage
medication errors are summarized in Figure 3. For all
error chains we identiﬁed different input errors triggering
the error chain and the same input error could result in
different output errors.
Table 1. Frequencies and Percentages of Incidents Per NCC MERP Medication Error Category Index
Medication Error Category Index
2009
(n¼ 375)
2010
(n¼ 385)
2011
(n¼ 341)
2012
(n¼ 490)
Total
(n¼ 1,591) x2
n % n % n % n % n %
A¼Circumstance or events that had capacity to cause error 0 0.0 2 0.5 0 0.0 2 0.4 4 0.3 n.a.
B¼ Error did not reach patient 67 17.9 37 9.6 33 9.7 109 22.2 245 15.4 60.15*
C¼ Error reached patient but caused no harm 282 75.2 298 77.4 287 84.2 334 68.2 1,202 75.6 5.50
D¼ Error reached patient and required monitoring to confirm
no harm or intervention to preclude harm
26 6.9 48 12.5 21 6.2 45 9.2 140 8.8 15.60*
x2-value¼ statistic for the comparison of differences between years. n.a., not applicable. Categories E–H¼ Error, harm or I¼ Error, death are not part of our
critical incident reporting dataset. Category A was excluded from analysis due to minor relevance and data values smaller 5. *P< 0.05
Table 2. Main Types of Medication Errors From 2009 to 2012 Per WHO Classiﬁcation
Main Types of Medication Errors
2009
(n¼ 375)
2010
(n¼ 385)
2011
(n¼ 341)
2012
(n¼ 490)
Total
(n¼ 1,591) x2
n % n % n % n % n %
Wrong dose/strength of frequency 94 25.1 113 29.4 108 31.7 123 25.1 438 27.5 3.99
Omitted medicine or dose 76 20.3 47 12.2 60 17.6 87 17.8 270 16.9 13.76*
Wrong quantity 62 16.5 62 16.1 39 11.4 70 14.3 233 14.6 9.22*
Wrong drug 56 14.9 47 12.2 55 16.1 53 10.8 211 13.3 0.92
Wrong formulation or presentation 33 8.8 37 9.6 29 8.5 60 12.2 159 10 14.56*
Wrong patient 27 7.2 33 8.6 22 6.5 41 8.4 123 7.7 6.53
Contraindication 11 2.9 20 5.2 11 3.2 24 4.9 66 4.2 7.82
Wrong route 10 2.7 9 2.3 8 2.4 14 2.9 41 2.6 2.02
Wrong storage 1 0.3 5 1.3 6 1.8 7 1.4 19 1.2 n.a.
Wrong dispensing label/instruction 3 0.8 8 2.1 2 0.6 5 1.0 18 1.1 n.a.
Adverse drug reaction 0 0 3 0.8 1 0.3 5 1.0 9 0.6 n.a.
Expired medicine 2 0.5 1 0.3 0 0.0 1 0.2 4 0.3 n.a.
x2-value¼ statistic for the comparison of differences between years. n.a., not applied. The last four rows were excluded from analysis due to data values smaller
5. *P< 0.05
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The three most frequent error chains were: preparing
up to and including medication administration (45.2%),
prescribing up to and includingmedication administration
(16.2%) and transcription up to and including medication
administration (10.3%).
Prescribing to Administration. The input error “wrong
formulation” during prescribing propagated most fre-
quently until administration. This resulted in “wrong
quantity” (39.7%) or “wrong dose” (28.4%) during
transcription and remained undetected until the
administration.
Transcription to Administration. The transcription of a
“wrong quantity” remained undetected until administra-
tion 54.9%. In 40.8% “wrong formulation” during
transcription spread to “wrong dose” during preparation
and remained undetected until administration.
Preparation to Administration. In 54% of reports the
preparation of a “wrong quantity” remained undetected
until administration. “Non-consideration of documenta-
tion/prescribing” during preparation was the most
frequent contributor for “wrong dose” [14.7%] during
administration.
Successfully Interrupted Error Chains
Most successfully intercepted medication errors were
contained to a single stage; that is, 82 cases (10.2%) of
801 errors occurring during preparation were captured
before propagating further. Concerning error chains
starting during prescription (n¼ 416), 17 (4.1%) were
successfully interrupted during transcription and another
18 (4.3%) before administration. At the different stages
the following safety barriers were successful: double
check by a second person, application of the “six rights”
and “four eyes principle” as well as conﬁrming a
prescription with another clinician and involving patients
as vigilant partners.
Contributing Factors and Proposals for the Prevention
of Medication Errors
As shown in Table 3, staff reported “inattention” and
“work conditions” as contributing factors for medication
errors most frequently. The most frequent proposals for
preventing medication errors were “improved training”,
“good communication,” and “situational awareness.”
Discussion
Errors in medication management and their frequency
have been widely studied, but until recently without
consideration of medication error chains. Our study
identiﬁed frequent medication error chains including a
classiﬁcation of error types. Further, we explored
contributing factors and possible improvements to safety
barriers for interrupting error chains along the medication
use process.
Our ﬁndings indicate a need for improvement in safety
barriers in all stages of the medication use process. Most
of the medication errors in our study reached the patient,
propagated across more than one stage and potential
safety barrier along the medication use process.
Stages of the medication use process
Prescription Transcription Preparation Administration Total input
errors in stage
416 (26 1%).
n=122
(7.7%)
n=20 (1.3%)
n=257 (16.2%)
202 (12.7%)
n=34
(2.1%)
n=4 (0.3%)
n=164 (10.3%)
801 (50.3%)
n=82
(5.2%)
9 (45.2%)
172 (10.8%)
n 71
n=172
(10.8%)
Total single
stage errors
122 (7.7%) 51 (3.2%) 106 (6.7%) 1312 (82.5%) 1591 (100%)
=
n=17 (1.1%)
Figure 2. Medication error chains and input and output errors across stages of the medication use process.
1192 The Journal of Clinical Pharmacology / Vol 54 No 10 (2014)
	 51	 	
Medication Error Chains and Reason’s “Swiss Cheese
Model”
While we were unable to ﬁnd any study explicitly
referring to the error chain concept, two recent analyses of
medication incidents applied similar approaches. One
study17 compared intercepted and non-intercepted
(34.1%) medication errors along the medication use
process using Reason’s “Swiss Cheese Model”13,14 as an
analytic framework and provides useful for targeted
prevention strategies. A second study16,17 analyzed
medication incidents in two intensive care units (ICU)
using a combination of incident reports and chart reviews.
The identiﬁed medication errors were categorized into
single, grouped and sequential errors, with the ﬁnal group
resembling themedication error chains that were the focus
of our study.
Prescription Transcription Preparation Administration
Main Error 
Chains from 
Prescription to 
Administration
n=257
Main Detected 
Errors in the 
Stage 
Prescription
n=122
Main Error 
Chains from 
Transcription to 
Administration
n=164
Main Detected 
Errors in the 
Stage 
Transcription
n=34
Main Error 
Chains from 
Preparation to 
Administration
n=719
Main Detected 
Errors in the 
Stage 
Preparation
n=82
Main Detected 
Errors in the 
Stage 
Administration
n=172
Input Error: 
Wrong
Formulation
Wrong
Quantity
Activation Wrong
Quantity
Propagation Propagation
Wrong
Dose 
Activation Wrong
Dose
Propagation Propagation
Output Error: 
Wrong Quantity
n=102, 39.7%
Output Error: 
Wrong Dose n=73, 
28.4%
Wrong
Time
Activation Wrong
Time
Propagation Propagation Output Error: 
Wrong Time 
n=36, 14%
Input Error: 
Wrong Dose
Wrong
Dose 
Activation Wrong
Dose
Propagation Propagation Output Error: Wrong Dose n=49, 
19.1%
Input Error: 
Wrong
Quantity
Wrong
Quantity
Activation Propagation Output Error: Wrong Quantity
n=90, 54.9%
Input Error: 
Wrong
Formulation
Wrong
Dose 
Activation Propagation Output Error: Wrong Dose n=67, 
40.8%
Input Error: 
Wrong
Quantity
Activation Output Error: Wrong Quantity
n=388, 54%
Input Error: Non 
Consideration of
Documentation
Activation Output Error: Wrong Dose 
n=106, 14.7%
Single Error: 
Wrong Dose n=35, 
28.7%
Single Error: 
Wrong Drug
n=16, 13.1%
Single Error: 
Wrong Quantity
n=16, 47.1%
Single Error: 
Wrong Dose
n=11, 32.4%
Single Error: 
WrongDrug
n=32, 39%
Single Error: 
WrongQuantity
n=19, 23.2%
Single Error: 
Wrong Patient
n=73, 42.4%
Single Error: 
Wrong Drug
n=73, 42.4%
Figure 3. Main input and output errors in the medication error chains and detected errors in the single stages.
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In line with our results, both studies found medication
errors related to prescribing and administration to be most
frequent. Differences between the three studies, such as
the higher frequency of error chains in our study may be
due to the different study settings (ICU vs. hospital-wide/
pharmacists involved in medication preparation or not),
the database (incident reports vs. chart review) and the
primary research goals leading to the identiﬁcation of
error chains. While these differences will require further
exploration in future studies, it is important to highlight
the valuable insights that the shift from focusing on
isolated stages in the medication use process to a
workﬂow-oriented analysis has generated in all three
studies.
Reason’s well-established “Swiss Cheese Model” is
well suited to discuss medication error chains that are
similar to Reason’s error trajectory.20 According to this
model, fatal errors usually occur when several safety
barriers fail.13–15Thiswasalso thecase formostmedication
incidents in our sample that actually reached the patient.
Moreover, our study identiﬁed a number of latent
conditions thatmay negatively inﬂuencemedication safety
(eg, heavy workload, inadequately trained personnel,
stressful environment, poor communication).21
Types and Frequency of Medication Errors
In our study the most common error types were wrong
dose/strength of frequency (27.5%), wrong quantity
(16.9%), omitted medicine or dose (14.6%) and wrong
drug (13.3%). Although 16.9% of all medication errors in
our study were related to omitted medicine or dose, and
thus seemingly less serious, the potential impact of such
occurrences should not be underestimated. The majority
of medication errors (74.2%) propagated as an error chain
through two or more stages. The main input errors were
most frequent during medication preparation (50.3%) and
during prescription (26.1%). Output errors as endpoint
and adverse outcome occurred most often in the
administration stage with a total of 1,312 (82.5%).
The frequency of medication errors we found is in line
with several other studies.1–6 However, results from
different studies are difﬁcult to compare because of
differing deﬁnitions and methods of detecting errors.
Thus, reported error rates in medication administration
vary greatly depending on factors such as the inclusion or
exclusion of different routes of administration as well as
timing errors.9
One study found that error frequency fell from 56% to
34%when excluding timing errors.22 Most errors in other
studies occurred during the administration of the
medication use process. Nearly one quarter of the errors
involved incorrect dose of a medication. Three quarters of
the errors were inﬂuenced by distractions.2,4–6,9,10,22,23
Common reasons for medication errors include for
example handwritten prescriptions that are difﬁcult to
read, selection of incorrect strength/dosage, medication
names that sound alike and medicine administered to the
wrong patient.9 Other studies show that omission and
wrong dosage errors were also found to be commonly
occurring medication errors.2,4–6,9,10,22,23 Another, re-
view ofmedication errors observed in critical care settings
found similar results,24 as did a review of prescribing
errors in hospitals, which found that dosage errors were
most commonly reported in the majority of studies.
Wrong time, administration rate, and preparation errors
were among the most common medication error
subcategories observed with regard to intravenous
administration.24
Contributing Factors and Practical Implications for
Incident Interception and Analysis
In our study “inattention,” “work condition,” and “lack of
training” were the contributing factors most frequently
reported. In order to prevent medication errors clinicians
Table 3. Contributing Factors of Medication Errors and Proposals for Medication Error Prevention
Leading Causes of Error Total Reports (n¼ 1,591)
n %
Contributing factors of medication errors
Inattention 962 60.5
Work conditions (heavy workload, time pressure, staff shortages, team composition) 500 31.4
Lack of training (skills) 282 17.7
Work environment (space, noise) 92 5.8
Communication problem (team, patient) 146 9.2
Recommendations for medication error prevention
Improved training (appropriate experience, better preparation, correct algorithms) 1,122 70.5
Good communication 836 2.5
Situational attention 758 47.6
Improved work conditions (additional staff) 121 7.6
Note: In the CIRS it was possible to report more than one contributing factor and proposal for prevention, therefore the total numbers exceeded those of the
reported medication errors. Total numbers of reported medication errors were used as the denominator for calculating percentages.
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frequently proposed “improvement of training,” “good
communication,” and “situational awareness.”
Despite existing safety barriers concerning medication
preparation and administration a complete interruption of
medication error chains could not be achieved. The
introduction of a computerized physician order entry
system might help to further reduce “wrong or unclear
formulation” as well as communication and knowledge-
based errors during the prescription.24 Thus, this
intervention can be seen as a critical safety barrier
helping to interrupt medication error chains at the stage of
the prescription.
To interrupt medication error chains at the stages
prescription and administration and to mitigate the
contributing factor “lack of training,” the introduction
of ward pharmacy services is a possible solution. Clinical
pharmacists can support physicians to intercept prescrib-
ing errors and can provide pharmacotherapeutic informa-
tion to nursing staff.25,26
Two commonly used practices that can act as a safety
barrier at themedication administration stage are the “four
eyes principle” and the “six rights.”12 These practicesmay
also help to counteract “inattention” that was mentioned
frequently as a contributing factor in our study. Similarly,
bar code assisted medication administration can improve
“situational attention” and interrupt medication error
chains at the administration stage through the indication
of misidentiﬁcation (ie, patient, medication). This
intervention has also been reported to reduce the number
of wrong-time omission and wrong dose errors24 and is
thus relevant to many medication incident reports in our
study.
Another intervention to reduce “inattention” by
optimizing the working environment (eg, space, noise)
is to establish an undisturbed workspace for drug
preparation27 or to use interruption vests (eg, “Do not
interrupt medication round in progress”).28 These
interventions may help to improve “situational attention”
and will facilitate other safety practices such as the “four
eye principle” during the drug preparation. In our sample,
these interventions might impact on the most frequently
reported medication errors at this stage (ie, wrong
medication for the wrong patient, wrong dose and omitted
medicine).
Another important strategy to reduce medication error
chains, lack of training and communication problems is
the continuous staff training and education surrounding
the most frequent errors and contributing factors.11 Many
opportunities for improvement and prevention exist when
clinicians and healthcare facilities are willing to share
information about medication errors and error chains. In
particular, effective safety barriers should be emphasized
and communicated regularly together with the success-
fully interrupted error chain and contributing factors such
as “inattention” (interruptions) and working conditions
(space, noise). Further, the effectiveness of established or
newly implemented safety barriers (eg, undisturbed
workspace for drug preparation) should be evaluated
systematically using observations and focused reporting
by staff. Based on our data, it seems that more effective
safety barriers are required especially in early stages of the
medication use process. However, due to a potential
underreporting of successfully interrupted error chains
other methods (eg, observations) and additional control
variables should be considered. For example, a study of
Dollarhide et al exploring associations between medica-
tion events and real-time performance-shaping factors
showed that physicians reporting greater patient case-
loads, greater perceived workload, and more emotional
stress were found to be substantially more likely to report
medication events.29 Further, reliable and valid databases
can provide valuable information, such as the description,
types and contributing factors of medication error chains,
the factors that contributed to the error chains, and the
patient outcome. These databases can be used for further
research studies and/or the development of policies and
procedures. Properly identifying and reporting medica-
tion errors and error chains allow for opportunities to
learn from these reports, improve team communication,
staff training and to create system level interventions that
interrupt error chains to reduce patient vulnerability.30
Further, improving communication with patients will
empower them to take a more active role in their own
medication safety. If patients are well informed about
their own medications, they are able to identify a wrong
drug or dose before this is being dispensed or adminis-
tered to them. A few medication error reports in our
reporting system described these facts, where patients
identiﬁed a medication error on time and stopped error
chains before the wrong drug or dose was administered.
Although these interventions may reduce the incidence
of certain types of medication errors, as well as
interrupting error chains before they reach the patient,
further research could consider a multifaceted approach to
error rate reduction.
CIRS analysis in medication management contains
valuable information that can help to identify (a)
frequency of medication errors, (b) error chains, (c)
errors in the various stages, (d) contributing factors, and
(e) strategies for interrupting error chains. The beneﬁt of
our novel process-oriented approach to medication error
analysis is to gain important insights concerning medica-
tion error chains and the effectiveness of safety barriers
along the entire medication use process. This opens up
new perspectives for detecting and stopping medication
errors before they reach the patient. Thus, more
sophisticated evaluations based on our process-oriented
incident analysis should follow to increase knowledge
around error chains and to implement comprehensive
measures to improve medication safety.
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Limitations
Our study has several limitations. Firstly, different
formats of data collection such as chart review or
incident reporting will lead to different ﬁndings. As
shown by several investigators, a self-reporting method
carries the risk of reporting biases and underreporting.12
The use of external observers might be considered ideal,
but this method is resource intensive and introduces the
bias of staff behaving differently while under observation
(Hawthorne effect). Because we used facilitated report-
ing by a structured questionnaire for the occurrence of
medication errors over an extended period of time, we
minimized these biases. However, more general cogni-
tive and reporting biases may have contributed to limited
information on successfully interrupted error chains in
our study. Errors that do not reach the patient may be less
likely to be noticed and considered relevant enough by
clinicians to be reported via any system. Thus, a more
comprehensive analysis of successful interruption of
error chains might require a different approach to data
collection. Secondly, we focused on the process steps
prescribing, transcription, preparation, and administra-
tion in our study. In outpatient settings monitoring
problems may dominate. Thus, there may be a lack of
generalizability to other healthcare settings. A further
limitation is the linearity of the error chain model: An
error does not always lead directly to the next error, but
“local trigger” and “unusual conditions” meet with
errors. Thus, it is also possible to speak of a network of
safety barriers, where errors can slip through the holes.
Lastly, it must be mentioned that the chosen error
categories were developed and validated by North
American hospitals; for the purpose of this study, the
method has been followed for three Swiss hospitals. In
order to conﬁrm the results achieved and draw
conclusions, it would be necessary to test and validate
it on a larger scale.
Conclusion
Research into the distribution of medication errors
indicates incidence of errors in all stages of the
medication use process, but predominantly focuses on
isolated process steps. This isolated view does not reﬂect
the complexity of error occurrence along the entire
medication use process and neglects the interdependen-
cies between these stages. Our results highlight the
importance of identifying medication error chains. The
feasibility of this novel analytic approach has been
illustrated here using incident reports. In the future
additional data sources such as chart reviews or
observations will have to be included to allow for further
insights into error chains and underlying event rates.
In our study, only few medication errors were
prevented before reaching the patient. This points at
necessary improvements of safety barriers at each stage of
the medication use process to interrupt error chains. In
addition to technical interventions, clinical staff has to be
trained regarding error chains and possible safety barriers.
Staff awareness will be enhanced by internal publication
of error chains, training on medication error chains and
suitable strategies on how error chains can be identiﬁed
and intercepted.
While hospitals usually have implemented a range of
safety barriers but without a systematic analysis of error
chains it is difﬁcult to assess their effectiveness and to
establish preventive measures breaking these error chains
as early as possible. We believe that the identiﬁcation of
medication error chains complements existing knowledge
on medication errors, system weakness and opens up new
perspectives for detecting and stopping medication errors
before they reach the patient.
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ABSTRACT	
Background:	 Interruptions	 and	 errors	 during	 the	 medication	 process	 are	 common,	 but	published	literature	shows	no	evidence	supporting	whether	separate	medication	rooms	are	an	 effective	 single	 intervention	 in	 reducing	 interruptions	 and	 errors	 during	 medication	preparation	 in	 hospitals.	 We	 tested	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 rate	 of	 interruptions	 and	reported	 medication	 errors	 would	 decrease	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 separate	medication	rooms.	
Aim:	 Our	 aim	was	 to	 evaluate	 the	 effect	 of	 separate	medication	 rooms	 on	 interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	on	self-reported	medication	error	rates.		
Methods:	 We	 performed	 a	 pre-	 and	 post-intervention	 study	 using	 direct	 structured	observation	of	nurses	during	medication	preparation	and	daily	structured	medication	error	self-reporting	 of	 nurses	 by	 questionnaires	 in	 two	 wards	 at	 a	 major	 teaching	 hospital	 in	Switzerland.		
Results:	A	volunteer	 sample	 of	 42	nurses	was	 observed	preparing	 1498	medications	 for	366	 patients	 over	 17	 hours	 pre-	 and	 post-intervention	 on	 both	 wards.	 During	 122	 days	nurses	 completed	 694	 reporting	 sheets	 containing	 208	 medication	 errors.	 After	 the	introduction	 of	 the	 separate	 medication	 room	 the	 mean	 interruption	 rate	 decreased	significantly	 from	 51.8	 to	 30	 interruptions	 per	 hour	 (p<0.01)	 and	 the	 interruption-free	preparation	time	increased	significantly	from	1.4	to	2.5	minutes	(p<0.05).	Overall,	the	mean	medication	 error	 rate	per	day	was	 also	 significantly	 reduced	 after	 implementation	of	 the	separate	medication	room	from	1.3	to	0.9	errors	per	day	(p<0.05).		
Conclusions:	The	present	study	showed	the	positive	effect	of	a	hospital-based	intervention:	after	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 separate	medication	 room,	 the	 interruption	 and	medication	error	rates	decreased	significantly.	
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INTRODUCTION	Interruptions	 of	 healthcare	 staff	 are	 common1	 and	 particularly	 relevant	 to	 patient	 safety	when	occurring	during	high-risk	procedures	such	as	 the	medication	process	known	to	be	susceptible	to	errors.	Interruptions	during	the	medication	process	have	been	studied	across	various	hospital	settings	with	a	focus	on	medication	administration.2-9	A	review	of	Biron	et.	al	 reported	 a	 rate	 of	 6.7	 interruptions	 per	 hour	 during	 medication	 administration.10	Similarly,	an	observational	study	in	surgical	wards	reported	one	interruption	for	every	3.2	drugs	given	during	nurses’	medication	 rounds.11	The	main	 sources	of	 these	 interruptions	reported	in	the	literature	are	co-workers	including	nursing	colleagues.2,10,12-14	The	 medication	 process	 is	 a	 routine	 but	 complex	 activity,	 involving	 multiple	 steps	 (i.e.	prescription,	 transcription,	 preparation,	 double-checking,	 administration	 and	monitoring)	and	a	variety	of	personnel.15	Therefore,	 this	process	 is	particularly	vulnerable	 to	errors	 if	attention	 is	diverted.	 Interruptions	have	 repeatedly	been	 identified	 as	 a	key	 contributory	factor	to	medication	errors.10,11,17-31	Westbrook	and	colleagues	found	that	medication	error	severity	increased	with	interruption	frequency.32	Although	interruptions	may	occur	at	any	stage	 of	 the	 medication	 process,33	 medication	 preparation	 is	 especially	 prone	 to	interruptions	 because	 it	 is	 the	 last	 stage	 before	medication	 administration	 to	 the	 patient	and	 it	 has	 very	 few	 safeguards	 against	 errors.28	 One	 study	 showed	 that	 the	 majority	 of	errors	occurring	during	medication	preparation	were	not	 intercepted	prior	 to	medication	administration	 and	 reached	 the	 patient	 due	 to	 a	 sequence	 of	 events	 forming	 an	 error	chain.28	Using	the	concept	of	error	chains,	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	may	be	 viewed	 as	 a	 critical	 link	 between	 preparation	 activities	 and	 errors	 because	 they	 can	interfere	 with	 the	 primary	 task	 as	 well	 as	 with	 safety	 checks	 and	 may	 thus	 increase	
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medication	 errors.34-36	 If	 this	 link	 is	 removed	 the	 error	 chain	 is	 broken	 and	 an	 incident	averted.28	While	 its	 known	 that	 interruptions	 and	 errors	 both	 are	 common	 during	 medication	preparation,	 we	 found	 only	 three	 studies4,37,38	 specifically	 investigating	 interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	no	study	considered	their	relationship	to	errors.	Thus,	the	existing	evidence	 for	 interventions	effectively	 reducing	 interruptions4,37-41	has	not	yet	been	linked	to	a	reduction	of	errors	during	medication	preparation.	Many	intervention	strategies	to	reduce	interruptions	require	a	change	in	clinician	behavior	such	as	minimizing	unnecessary	conversation	or	waiting	for	co-workers	to	complete	their	task	 before	 addressing	 them.	 The	 redesign	 of	 workspaces	 might	 offer	 an	 alternative,	potentially	 more	 sustainable	 solution	 (e.g.	 implementing	 “No	 Interruption	 Zones”	 or	physical	 barriers).26,37,39,42,43	 The	 introduction	 of	 separate	 medication	 rooms	 intuitively	appears	 to	 be	 an	 effective	 intervention	 to	 improve	 safety	 during	medication	preparation.	One	 multi-intervention	 study	 that	 included	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 dedicated	 room	 for	medication	 preparation	 as	 one	 of	 three	 components	 of	 their	 intervention	 strategy	 found	positive	 effects.4	 However,	 we	 found	 no	 evidence	 that	 separate	 rooms	 for	 medication	preparation	as	a	single	intervention	effectively	reduce	interruptions	and	errors.	Our	study	aimed	to	explore	the	effect	of	separate	medication	rooms	to	improve	medication	safety	 during	 the	 critical	 task	 of	 medication	 preparation	 when	 implemented	 as	 a	 single	intervention.	 The	 research	 questions	 of	 this	 pre-post-intervention	 study	 set	 in	 a	 surgical	and	 a	medical	 ward	 concerned	 1.	 the	 rate,	 duration	 and	 sources	 of	 interruptions	 nurses	experienced	while	preparing	medications	and	2.	the	number	and	type	of	medication	errors	before	 and	 after	 the	 intervention.	 We	 hypothesized	 that	 the	 rate	 of	 interruptions	 and	reported	medication	errors	would	decrease	as	a	result	of	the	intervention.		
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METHODS	
Setting	and	intervention	The	study	was	undertaken	in	a	medical	and	a	surgical	ward	of	a	900-bed	teaching	hospital	in	Switzerland.	Each	ward	had	18-beds	organized	in	11	patient	rooms	and	supported	by	46	nurses	 in	a	 three-shift	 system.	Between	3	 to	4	 fully	qualified	nurses	were	responsible	 for	the	patient	care	per	shift.	The	two	wards	selected	for	this	study	moved	to	newly	designed	facilities	that	were	equipped	with	a	separate	medication	room	for	each	ward	in	which	oral	and	 intravenous	medications	were	 stored,	 prepared	 and	 double-checked	 (compared	 to	 a	freely	 accessible	 medication	 preparation	 area	 at	 the	 nursing	 station	 in	 the	 old	infrastructure).	 Information	 necessary	 for	 medication	 preparation	 was	 paper	 based.	 On	both	wards	 one	 nurse	was	 responsible	 for	 preparing	 all	 patient	medications	 for	 the	 day.	The	prepared	medications	were	then	double-checked	by	a	second	nurse	and	administered	to	their	assigned	patients.	
Definitions	Interruptions	are	defined	as	“a	break	in	the	performance	of	a	human	activity	initiated	by	a	source	internal	or	external	to	the	recipient,	with	occurrence	situated	within	the	context	of	a	setting	or	a	location”.44	Interruptions	are	situations	in	which	a	nurse	ceases	the	medication	preparation	or	checking	in	order	to	attend	to	an	external	stimulus.32	An	interruption	can	be	initiated	 by	 the	 nurse	 him/herself	 (self-initiated),	 by	 another	 individual	 or	 by	 the	 work	environment	 (e.g.	 alarms).	 In	 the	 context	 of	medication	 preparation	 a	 common	 source	 of	interruptions	 is	 communication;	 often	 concerning	 information	 irrelevant	 to	 the	 primary	task	(e.g.	a	 (non-)verbal	cue	 from	another	 individual	prompting	 the	nurse	 to	give	a	 (non-)verbal	 response8,37,45	 or	 the	 nurse	 initiating	 a	 conversation	with	 another	 person).	While	other	studies	distinguish	between	“interruptions”	and	“distractions”	to	describe	causes	and	
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precursors	 of	 errors,5,9	 we	 use	 the	 term	 “interruption”	 (including	 self-initiated	interruptions)	as	comprising	both.		
Study	design	and	sample	Our	pre-	and	post-intervention	mixed-methods	study	used	direct	structured	observation	of	nurses	 during	 medication	 preparation	 by	 an	 external	 observer	 and	 structured	 daily	medication	error	self-reporting	by	nurses.	We	use	the	term	pre-intervention	for	medication	preparation	in	the	old	facilities	without	a	separate	medication	room	and	post-intervention	accordingly	 for	 medication	 preparation	 in	 the	 new	 facilities	 with	 separate	 medication	rooms.	Exclusion	criteria	were	nurses	in	training,	new	employees	and	nurses	not	routinely	working	in	the	study	units.		According	to	research	ethics	guidelines	in	Switzerland	this	study	was	exempt	from	formal	ethics	approval	because	patient	observation	was	not	included	in	this	study	(Federal	Act	on	Research	 involving	Human	Beings	 (Human	Research	Act,	HRA).	Participation	 in	 the	study	was	voluntary	and	verbal	 consent	was	 sought	 from	each	nurse	prior	 to	 each	observation	period.	
Data	collection	procedure	Data	were	collected	in	two	phases.	Pre-intervention	data	was	collected	from	April	through	May	2012.	Approximately	one	week	before	data	collection	commenced,	all	nursing	staff	was	informed	by	the	quality	manager	 that	observations	of	medication	preparation	would	 take	place	and	that	they	were	required	to	fill	in	structured	reporting	forms	for	medication	errors	at	 the	 end	 of	 each	 shift	 during	 the	 study	 period.	 To	minimize	 observation	 and	 reporting	biases,	 nurses	 were	 informed	 about	 the	 study	 aim	 but	 not	 about	 the	 exact	 outcome	measures	(i.e.	reducing	interruptions	and	medication	errors).	
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Three	months	after	both	wards	had	moved	into	the	new	facilities	with	separate	medication	rooms	and	staff	had	become	accustomed	to	the	new	work	area	post-intervention	data	were	collected	from	September	through	October	2012	using	the	same	methods	and	instruments	as	during	pre-intervention	data	collection.	Once	data	collection	was	complete,	nurses	were	debriefed	on	the	study	purpose	and	informed	about	the	findings.	
Observation	of	interruptions.	A	paper-based	observation	protocol	was	developed	to	record	interruptions	 during	 nurses’	 medication	 preparation.	We	 used	 a	modified	 version	 of	 the	validated	 Medication	 Administration	 Distraction	 Observation	 Sheet	 (MADOS)46	 to	 collect	the	 frequency	 of	 each	 of	 12	 sources	 of	 interruption	 experienced	 during	 the	 medication	round	 (see	 supplemental	 table	 S1).	 Observations	 were	 carried	 out	 pre-	 and	 post-intervention	 during	 the	 main	 medication	 preparation	 and	 when	 additional	 medications	were	 prepared	 or	 checked	 by	 other	 nurses.	 Four	 peak	 times	 of	 medication	 preparation	were	 identified	 by	 the	 nurse	 manager	 of	 both	 units	 (i.e.	 8AM-10AM,	 10.30AM-12.30AM,	1PM-3PM	 and	 3PM-5PM	 on	 weekdays);	 night	 shifts	 and	 weekends	 were	 excluded.	Observation	 lasted	 for	 2	 hours	 or	 until	 all	 medications	 were	 prepared.	 A	 medication	preparation	 cycle	 and	 thus	 observations	 started	 when	 the	 nurse	 began	 the	 medication	preparation	 for	 all	 patients	 on	 the	 ward.	 The	 medication	 cycle	 ended	 when	 the	 nurse	completed	 the	 medication	 preparation.	 To	 minimize	 the	 intrusiveness	 of	 observations,	observers	were	positioned	close	but	slightly	to	the	side	of	the	medication	preparation	area.	Two	observers	(out	of	a	pool	of	trained	observers	with	two	hospital	pharmacists,	one	nurse	and	 one	 quality	 manager)	 independently	 and	 simultaneously	 observed	 medication	preparation	of	 each	nurse.	 Each	 time	 an	 interruption	occurred,	 they	 recorded	 it	 and	 also	noted	 the	 source	 of	 the	 interruption	 in	 the	 structured	 observation	 sheet.	 After	 each	medication	preparation	session	 interobserver	agreement	was	achieved	by	comparing	and	
	 66	
discussing	 observed	 interruptions,	 their	 duration	 and	 causes.	 Discussions	 between	 the	observers	resolved	potential	disagreements.	
Medication	error	reporting.	At	 the	 end	 of	 each	 shift	 during	 the	 study	 period	 participating	nurses	 were	 requested	 to	 anonymously	 fill	 in	 a	 structured	 paper-based	 reporting	 form	based	 on	 the	 hospital’s	 electronic	 critical	 incident	 reporting	 form	 and	 the	 WHO	Classification	 for	Patient	 Safety47	 (see	 supplemental	 table	 S2).	The	 form	asked	whether	 a	medication	preparation	error	had	occurred	during	their	shift	and	if	so,	which	type	of	error,	which	factors	had	contributed	to	the	error	and	at	which	step	of	 the	medication	process	 it	was	 detected.	 Completed	 reporting	 sheets	 were	 collected	 in	 a	 locked	 post-box	 on	 each	ward.	
Data	analysis	Data	 were	 analyzed	 using	 STATAv.12.1.	 We	 used	 descriptive	 statistics	 to	 indicate	 the	observed	rate	of	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	the	reported	medication	error	rate.	Rates	were	calculated	in	line	with	previous	publications,	 i.e.	mean	interruption	per	hour	and	medication	errors	per	day.5,10	For	example,	the	mean	interruptions	per	hour	were	calculated	for	each	observed	medication	preparation	activity	by	dividing	the	observed	interruptions	 per	 medication	 preparation	 cycle	 by	 the	 duration	 of	 preparation	 time	 in	minutes	multiplied	by	60.	Medication	errors	per	day	are	given	as	 the	sum	of	all	 reported	errors	 of	 nurses	 from	 the	 returned	 reporting	 sheets.	 Frequency,	 percentage	 and	position	indexes	[mean,	standard	deviation	(SD)]	were	calculated	accordingly.	Independent	sample	two-sided	t-tests	were	conducted	to	compare	the	number	and	duration	of	interruptions	and	the	number	of	reported	medication	errors	per	day	between	the	pre-	and	post-intervention	period	 for	 the	 overall	 data	 set	 and	 for	 each	 ward.	 Differences	 were	 considered	 (highly)	statistically	 significant	 where	 the	 p-value	 was	 <0.05	 (<0.01).	 One	 self-reporting	 form	
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containing	 one	 reported	 error	 had	 to	 be	 excluded	 from	 data	 analysis	 because	 no	information	 was	 given	 on	 the	 type	 of	 error,	 the	 cause	 and	 the	 process	 step.	 All	 other	returned	self-reporting	 forms	contained	at	 least	 type	of	error	and	either	cause	or	process	step.	 Effect	 size	 and	 statistical	 power	 were	 assessed	 via	 post-hoc	 power	 analysis	 with	
G*Power	 Version	 3.1.9.2.48	 For	 the	 comparison	 of	 reported	 sources	 of	 interruptions	 and	medication	 error	 categories	 (type	 of	 error,	 cause	 and	 process	 step)	 pre-	 and	 post-intervention	we	only	report	descriptive	statistics	due	to	small	sample	size	in	subcategories	of	medication	errors.		RESULTS	Total	 observation	 time	 was	 17	 hours	 (1036	minutes)	 during	 72	medication	 preparation	cycles	on	9	weekdays	pre-	and	9	weekdays	post-intervention	(Table	1).	A	volunteer	sample	of	42	nurses	(one	male	nurse)	was	observed	preparing	1498	medications	for	366	patients	pre-	and	post-intervention	on	both	wards.	Nursing	experience	varied	between	1	and	more	than	 20	 years	 (mean	 8.6	 years,	 SD=7.1).	 The	 same	nurses	were	 included	 in	 the	 pre-	 and	post-intervention	 group.	 During	 pre-intervention	 data	 collection	 a	 total	 of	 311	 patients	were	 treated	on	 the	study	wards	 (107	patients	on	 the	surgical	ward,	204	patients	on	 the	medical	ward)	 and	 319	 patients	 (148	 patients	 on	 the	 surgical	ward,	 171	 patients	 on	 the	medical	ward)	during	post-intervention	data	collection.	
Rates	and	duration	of	interruptions	A	 2-tailed	 independent	 t-test	 revealed	 statistically	 significant	 differences	 in	 several	categories	 between	 interruptions	 before	 and	 after	 implementation	 of	 the	 separate	medication	 room.	 Table	 1	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 interruption	 rates	 pre-	 and	 post-intervention	separated	by	type	of	ward.	The	mean	interruption	rate	decreased	significantly	from	51.8	to	30	interruptions	per	hour	(p<0.01).	To	determine	whether	this	decrease	was	
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statistically	 significant	 we	 used	 the	 number	 of	 interruptions	 per	 hour	 to	 correct	 for	differences	in	the	number	of	medication	processes	that	occurred	in	the	9	days	before	and	the	 9	 days	 after	 the	 intervention	 due	 to	 variation	 in	 patient	 load.	 The	mean	 duration	 of	interruptions	was	33	seconds	(range	15	seconds	to	24	minutes).	Comparing	pre-	and	post-intervention,	the	interruption-free	preparation	time	increased	significantly	from	1.4	to	2.5	minutes	(p<0.05)	(Table	1).	For	the	interruptions	per	hour	(per	medication	cycle)	the	effect	size	was	0.68.	The	power	to	detect	an	effect	of	this	size	in	the	two	settings	was	determined	to	be	0.80	with	a	critical	t(70)	=	1.99.	
-Insert	Table	1	about	here-	
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Surgical	ward	 Medical	ward	 Both	wards	 Total	
		 Pre	 Post	 p	value	 Pre	 Post	
p	
value	 Pre	 Post	 p	value	 		
Total	observed	aspects	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		Total	numbers	of	interruptions	 160	 54	 		 284	 109	
	
444	 163	
	
607	Total	duration	of	preparation	time	in	minutes	 273	 139	 		 391	 233	
	
664	 372	
	
1036	Total	duration	of	interruption	time	in	minutes	 59	 40	 		 159	 61	
	
218	 101	
	
319	Total	numbers	of	prepared	medications		 483	 248	 		 421	 346	 	 904	 594	 	 1498	Total	numbers	of	observed	nurses	 10	 8	 	 15	 9	 	 25	 17	 	 42	Total	numbers	of	included	patients	for	medication	preparation	 92	 39	 	 157	 78	 	 249	 117	 	 366	Total	numbers	of	observations		(medication	preparations)	 13	 9	 	 31	 19	 	 44	 28	 		 72	
Interruption	rates	 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		Mean	interruptions	per	hour	 42.24	(16.79)	 18.22	(28.25)	 0.017	*	 55.87	(36.11)	 35.54	(23.32)		 0.017	*	 51.84	(34.23)	 29.97	(22.67)	 0.002	**	 43.34	(31.94)	Mean	interruptions	per	nurse	 16.00	(18.95)	 6.75	(8.96)	 0.097	 18.93	(35.66)	 12.11	(15.39)	 0.262	 17.76	(29.64)	 9.59	(12.70)	 0.115	 14.45	(24.37)	Mean	interruptions	per	nurse	per	hour	 54.91	(32.34)	 20.50	(25.80)	 0.012	*	 115.46	(81.80)	 75.03	(47.54)	 0,070	 91.24	(73.00)	 49.37	(47.00)	 0.014	*	 74.29	(65.92)	Mean	interruptions	per	drug	 2.33	(4.07)	 0.30	(0.17)	 0.045	*	 2.76	(3.43)	 1.42	(1.79)	 0.039	*	 2.63	(3.58)	 1.07	(1.58)	 0.007	**	 2.02	(3.05)	Mean	interruptions	per	drug	per	hour	 15.21	(28.55)	 0.94	(1.34)	 0.048	*	 32.22	(40.03)	 14.00	(14.21)	 0.013	*	 27.2	(5.66)	 9.80	(13.19)	 0.003	**	 20.43	(31.49)	
Mean	duration	 		 		
	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		Mean	duration	of	interruptions	in	minutes	 0.36	(0.20)	 0.80	(0.74)	 0.059	 0.52	(0.36)	 0.61	(0.77)	 0.324	 0.47	(0.33)	 0.67	(0.76)	 0.102	 0.55	(0.54)	Mean	duration	of	preparation	in	minutes	 21.0	(18.8)	 15.4	(10.3)	 0.193	 12.6	(16.9)	 12.3	(10.8)	 0.465	 15.1	(17.7)	 13.3	(10.6)	 0.295	 14.4	(15.3)	Mean	preparation	time	without	an	interruption	in	minutes	 2.00	(1.05)	 3.04	(3.13)	 0.181	 1.21	(0.70)	 2.25	(1.74)	 0.010	*	 1.44	(0.89)	 2.51	(2.25)	 0.012	*	 1.86	(1.63)	*	p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	+	 t-test,	 unequal	variances	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Table	1:	Observed	interruption	rates	and	duration	pre-	and	post-intervention	
Sources	of	interruptions	Table	2	shows	a	breakdown	of	observed	interruptions	into	different	sources	for	both	wards	and	 overall	 when	 comparing	 pre-	 to	 post-intervention	 data.	 Because	 the	 number	 of	
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medication	preparation	processes	observed	after	the	intervention	was	lower	due	to	fewer	patients	 on	 the	 wards	 the	 frequencies	 given	 here	 should	 be	 interpreted	 with	 caution.	However,	 the	 proportion	 of	 all	 observed	 interruptions	 for	 which	 these	 sources	 were	relevant	 shows	 that	 pre-intervention	 the	 most	 frequent	 source	 of	 interruptions	 in	 both	wards	were	 interruptions	 by	 colleagues	 (n=209,	 47.1%),	 especially	 staff	 interruptions	 by	nurses	(n=162,	36.5%),	and	self-initiated	interruptions	(n=127,	28.6%)	(Table	2).	Although,	there	was	 a	decrease	 after	 the	 intervention	 these	 remained	 the	most	 frequent	 sources	of	interruptions.		
-Insert	Table	2	about	here-			 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
	 Surgical	ward	 Medical	ward	 Total			 Pre	 Post	 Pre	 Post	 Pre	 Post		Sources	of	interruptions	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	Nurses	 35.6%	 57	 24.1%	 13	 37.0%	 105	 48.6%	 53	 36.5%	 162	 40.5%	 66	Physicians	 2.5%	 4	 0.0%	 0	 9.2%	 26	 0.0%	 0	 6.8%	 30	 0.0%	 0	Other	personnel	 2.5%	 4	 3.7%	 2	 4.6%	 13	 0.0%	 0	 3.8%	 17	 1.2%	 2	
Total	interruptions	by	colleagues		 40.6%	 65	 27.8%	 15	 50.7%	 144	 48.6%	 53	 47.1%	 209	 41.7%	 68	Response	to	conversation	or	noise		 24.4%	 39	 5.6%	 3	 21.5%	 61	 30.3%	 33	 22.5%	 100	 22.1%	 36	Leaves	the	room	 5.0%	 8	 20.4%	 11	 6.7%	 19	 5.5%	 6	 6.1%	 27	 10.4%	 17	
Total	self-initiated	interruptions	 29.4%	 47	 25.9%	 14	 28.2%	 80	 35.8%	 39	 28.6%	 127	 32.5%	 53	Alarm	 0.0%	 0	 0.0%	 0	 0.4%	 1	 1.8%	 2	 0.2%	 1	 1.2%	 2	Phone	call	 5.0%	 8	 9.3%	 5	 12.3%	 35	 5.5%	 6	 9.7%	 43	 6.7%	 11	
Total	interruptions	by	technology	 5.0%	 8	 9.3%	 5	 12.7%	 36	 7.3%	 8	 9.9%	 44	 8.0%	 13	Patients	 0.0%	 0	 0.0%	 0	 0.4%	 1	 0.0%	 0	 0.2%	 1	 0.0%	 0	Families/visitors	 0.0%	 0	 0.0%	 0	 0.4%	 1	 0.0%	 0	 0.2%	 1	 0.0%	 0	
Total	interruptions	by	other	people	 0.0%	 0	 0.0%	 0	 0.7%	 2	 0.0%	 0	 0.5%	 2	 0.0%	 0	Missing	 Information,	 e.g.	 patient	records	 10.6%	 17	 20.4%	 11	 2.8%	 8	 3.7%	 4	 5.6%	 25	 9.2%	 15	Missing	medication	 14.4%	 23	 13.0%	 7	 4.6%	 13	 4.6%	 5	 8.1%	 36	 7.4%	 12	Unclear	or	unreadable	prescription	 0.0%	 0	 3.7%	 2	 0.7%	 2	 0.0%	 0	 0.5%	 2	 1.2%	 2	
Total	 interruptions	 by	 other	
disabilities	/	delays	 25.0%	 40	 37.0%	 20	 8.1%	 23	 8.3%	 9	 14.2%	 63	 17.8%	 29	
Total	
100.0
%	
16
0	
100.0
%	 54	
100.0
%	 284	
100.0
%	 109	
100.0
%	 444	
100.0
%	 163	Table	2:	Observed	sources	of	interruptions	per	total	observed	interruptions	
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Self-reported	medication	errors	During	 122	 days	 (61	 days	 pre-	 and	 61	 days	 post-intervention	 in	 both	 wards)	 nurses	completed	 694	 reporting	 sheets	 containing	 208	medication	 errors.	 The	mean	medication	error	 rate	 per	 day	 was	 significantly	 reduced	 after	 implementation	 of	 the	 separate	medication	room	from	1.3	to	0.9	errors	per	day	(p<0.05).	For	 the	medical	ward	the	error	rate	decreased	significantly	from	1.4	to	0.9	errors	per	day	(p<0.05)	whereas	the	decrease	in	the	surgical	ward	was	not	statistically	significant	(Table	3).	The	self-reported	errors	per	day	resulted	in	an	effect	size	of	0.27.	The	power	to	detect	a	significant	difference	was	calculated	to	be	0.69	(t(242)	=	1.65).	
-Insert	table	3	about	here-	
	 Surgical	ward	 Medical	ward	 Total	Total	 numbers	 of	 reported	 medication	
errors	 Pre	 Post	
	
Pre	 Post	
	
Pre	 Post	
	Number	of	completed	reporting	sheets	 85	 178	 		 281	 148	 		 366	 326	 	Total	number	of	reported	medication	errors	 32	 45	 		 84	 47	 		 116	 92	 	Mean	 medication	 error	 rate	 per	 day	
(study	period)	 Pre	 Post	 p	value	 Pre	 Post	 p	value	 Pre	 Post	 p	value	
Mean	medication	error	rate	per	day		 1.1	(1.4)	 0.9	(1.1)	 0.221	 1.4	(1.7)	 0.9	(1.36)	 0.046*	 1.3	(1.6)	 0.9	(1.3)	 0.022*	*	p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.01	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	+	t-test,	unequal	variances	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Table	3:	Total	numbers	and	mean	medication	error	rate	per	day		Pre-	and	post-intervention,	the	most	frequently	reported	type	of	errors	was	“wrong	dose”.	Overall,	 this	 error	 type	 decreased	 after	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 separate	 medication	room.	Staff	of	both	wards	reported	“inattention”	most	frequently	as	contributing	factor	for	medication	errors	pre-	and	post-intervention.	Most	medication	errors	were	detected	during	medication	preparation	and	double-checking.	Therefore,	most	of	 the	 reported	medication	errors	were	recognized	and	prevented	before	medication	administration	and	reaching	the	patient	(Table	4).	
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-Insert	table	4	about	here-	
	
	 Surgical	ward	 																					Medical	ward																																																				Total			 Pre	 Post	 Pre	 Post	 Pre	 Post	
Type	of	reported	medication	errors		 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	 %	 No.	Wrong	dose	 18.8%	 6	 4.4%	 2	 23.8%	 20	 38.3%	 18	 22.4%	 26	 21.7%	 20	Omitted	medicine	or	dose	 15.6%	 5	 22.2%	 10	 6.0%	 5	 6.4%	 3	 8.6%	 10	 14.1%	 13	Wrong	time	 3.1%	 1	 15.6%	 7	 9.5%	 8	 14.9%	 7	 7.8%	 9	 15.2%	 14	Incorrect	documentation		(incl.	transmission	error)	 15.6%	 5	 4.4%	 2	 13.1%	 11	 6.4%	 3	 13.8%	 16	 5.4%	 5	Wrong	drug	 9.4%	 3	 2.2%	 1	 13.1%	 11	 8.5%	 4	 12.1%	 14	 5.4%	 5	Wrong	quantity	(e.g.	double	delivery)	 9.4%	 3	 8.9%	 4	 7.1%	 6	 8.5%	 4	 7.8%	 9	 8.7%	 8	Other	 25.0%	 8	 31.1%	 14	 22.6%	 19	 10.6%	 5	 23.3%	 27	 20.7%	 19	Wrong	route	 0.0%	 0	 4.4%	 2	 1.2%	 1	 2.1%	 1	 0.9%	 1	 3.3%	 3	Wrong	patient	 3.1%	 1	 6.7%	 3	 3.6%	 3	 4.3%	 2	 3.4%	 4	 5.4%	 5	
Contributing	factors	reported	 	Not	specified	 0.0%	 0	 62.2%	 28	 13.1%	 11	 14.9%	 7	 9.5%	 11	 38.0%	 35	Inattention	 18.8%	 6	 22.2%	 10	 34.5%	 29	 17.0%	 8	 30.2%	 35	 19.6%	 18	Miscommunication	during	prescription	 3.1%	 1	 0.0%	 0	 9.5%	 8	 8.5%	 4	 7.8%	 9	 4.3%	 4	Interruption	 12.5%	 4	 6.7%	 3	 6.0%	 5	 8.5%	 4	 7.8%	 9	 7.6%	 7	Workload	 28.1%	 9	 2.2%	 1	 8.3%	 7	 10.6%	 5	 13.8%	 16	 6.5%	 6	Other	 21.9%	 7	 6.7%	 3	 25.0%	 21	 34.0%	 16	 24.1%	 28	 20.7%	 19	Noise	 6.3%	 2	 0.0%	 0	 1.2%	 1	 2.1%	 1	 2.6%	 3	 1.1%	 1	Problem	 of	 medication	 name,	 labeling,	packaging		 0.0%	 0	 0.0%	 0	 1.2%	 1	 4.3%	 2	 0.9%	 1	 2.2%	 2	Shortage	of	staff	 9.4%	 3	 0.0%	 0	 1.2%	 1	 0.0%	 0	 3.4%	 4	 0.0%	 0	
Process	 step	 of	 medication	 error	
detection	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	During	preparation	 40.6%	 13	 55.6%	 25	 53.6%	 45	 34.0%	 16	 50.0%	 58	 44.6%	 41	During	double	check	(4-eyes	principle)	 28.1%	 9	 6.7%	 3	 26.2%	 22	 34.0%	 16	 26.7%	 31	 20.7%	 19	After	administration	 9.4%	 3	 11.1%	 5	 7.1%	 6	 14.9%	 7	 7.8%	 9	 13.0%	 12	During	administration	 9.4%	 3	 11.1%	 5	 3.6%	 3	 8.5%	 4	 5.2%	 6	 9.8%	 9	After	preparation	 3.1%	 1	 4.4%	 2	 0.0%	 0	 2.1%	 1	 0.9%	 1	 3.3%	 3	Not	specified	 9.4%	 3	 11.1%	 5	 9.5%	 8	 6.4%	 3	 9.5%	 11	 8.7%	 8	
Total	number	of	reported	medication	
errors	
100.0
%	 32	
100.0
%	 45	
100.0
%	 84	
100.0
%	 47	
100.0
%	 116	
100.0
%	 92	Note:	Data	sorted	by	frequency	of	reports	per	category	across	both	wards.	Table	4:	Reported	medication	errors,	contributing	factors	and	process	step	of	detection				
	 73	
DISCUSSION	This	 intervention	 study	 introducing	 separate	 medication	 rooms	 showed	 a	 significant	decrease	in	the	frequency	of	interruptions	and	in	medication	error	rates	during	the	critical	task	of	medication	preparation.	Our	study	made	two	important	contributions	focusing	on	the	infrequently	studied	stage	of	medication	 preparation:	 First,	 it	 showed	 that	 the	 mean	 interruption	 rate	 decreased	significantly	 from	 51.8	 to	 30	 interruptions	 per	 hour	 after	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	separate	 medication	 room.	 Our	 results	 revealed	 a	 mean	 duration	 of	 33	 seconds	 per	interruption.	Both	results	are	in	line	with	studies	on	medication	administration	that	report	an	average	of	42	interruptions	per	hour49	and	a	mean	duration	of	45	seconds.50	Overall	our	findings	 show	 that	 interruptions	 during	 medication	 preparation	 are	 frequent,	 most	interruptions	 are	 of	 short	 duration	 and	 therefore	 nurses	 act	within	 a	work	 environment	with	a	high	potential	for	interruptions.	Regarding	clinical	specialty,	our	study	showed	that	nurses	 faced	more	 interruptions	 in	medical	 than	 in	 surgical	wards.	 Again,	 this	 finding	 is	supported	 by	 a	 similar	 study	 on	 medication	 administration.45	 The	 results	 revealed	 the	relative	contribution	of	different	sources	of	interruptions.	Nurse	colleagues	were	the	most	frequent	source	of	interruptions,	which	is	consistent	with	previous	research.5,46,51,52	Nurses	interrupted	each	other	while	preparing	medication	mostly	to	discuss	personal	matters.	To	minimize	 this	 kind	 of	 interruption,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 increase	 staff	 awareness	 of	‘interruptive	communication	practices’	during	critical	medication	preparation	tasks.	Second,	 the	mean	medication	 error	 rate	 per	 day	was	 significantly	 reduced	 overall	 in	 the	post-intervention	 setting.	 Pre-	 and	post-intervention	 the	most	 frequently	 reported	 errors	were	 “wrong	dose”	 and	 the	most	 frequently	 contributing	 factor	 “inattention”,	which	 is	 in	line	 with	 findings	 by	 Westbrook	 et	 al.32	 Most	 medication	 errors	 were	 detected	 during	
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medication	preparation	and	double-checks	which	was	also	shown	 in	another	study	based	on	 incident	 reports.28	 This	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 mitigating	 interruptions	 during	medication	preparation	to	reduce	errors	and	to	incease	the	likelyhood	of	error	detection	at	this	 step.	 Therefore,	 the	 implementation	 of	 defenses,	 for	 example	 by	 redesigning	workspaces,	is	needed.		
Practical	implications	In	many	 hospital	 wards	medication	 preparation	 areas	 are	 designed	 as	 open	workspaces	shared	by	staff	involved	in	a	variety	of	tasks.	Our	study	showed	that	frequent	interruptions	are	 a	 major	 disadvantage	 of	 this	 workspace	 design	 and	 that	 separate	medication	 rooms	reduce	 interruptions	 and	 self-reported	medication	 errors.	 Although	 it	may	 be	 difficult	 to	integrate	 separate	 medication	 rooms	 in	 existing	 ward	 structures,	 ward	 redesign	 and	hospital	 construction	projects	 should	 consider	possibilities	 for	 separate	medication	 areas	or	 rooms.	 The	 present	 results	 show	 the	 relevance	 to	 incorporate	 patient	 safety	considerations	 at	 an	 early	 architectural	 design	 stage,	 especially	 until	 other	 medication	safety	measures	 such	 as	 electronic	 unit	 dose	 systems	will	 be	 implemented	 for	 automatic	medication	 preparation.	 The	 implementation	 of	 separate	 medication	 rooms	 is	 only	 one	option	 reducing	 interruptions.	 One	 important	 complementary	 intervention	 is	 awareness	trainings	 on	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	 interruptions	 on	 patient	 safety	 and	 on	 strategies	 to	effectively	manage	and	reduce	interruptions.4,5,10,46,51,53	Increasing	the	nurses’	awareness	of	these	 issues	 might	 help	 to	 lower	 self-initiated	 interruptions,	 conversations	 and	 phone	calls.7,43,45	 A	 simple	 but	 effective	 approach	 is	 that	 colleagues	 should	 acknowledge	 the	cognitive	 demands	 of	 safe	medication	 preparation	 and	minimize	 interruptions	whenever	possible.53	Further,	interruptions	can	be	reduced	by	implementing	‘No	Interruption	Zones’	in	medication	preparation	areas,	where	 interruption	 is	not	permitted	or	 limited	to	urgent	
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communication	 or	 safety	 barriers	 such	 as	 colored	 safety	 vests	 with	 the	 note	 "do	 not	disturb".26,37,51	However,	wearing	 the	 vests	 requires	 an	 appropriate	 understanding	 of	 the	staff	and	accompanying	training.	These	alternatives	should	be	considered	especially	 if	 the	implementation	of	separate	medication	rooms	is	not	feasible	due	to	structural	conditions	or	high	construction	costs.		Despite	all	 these	 interventions	 interruptions	during	medication	preparation	will	probably	never	be	eliminated	completely	in	daily	hospital	practice.	Therefore,	as	our	study	showed,	double-checking	 medication	 after	 preparation	 is	 essential	 to	 prevent	 medication	 errors	from	 reaching	 the	 patient.	 Correctly	 performed	 double-checks	 can	 catch	 approximately	95%	 of	 all	 errors.54	 Although	 staff	 may	 feel	 this	 practice	 is	 “unnecessary”	 and	 takes	additional	 time	 under	 the	 condition	 of	 staffing	 shortages	 and	 increased	 workload,	verification	tasks	are	grounded	in	a	human	factors	approach	and	should	be	applied	in	daily	practice	as	an	added	safety-net	for	patients.43		Future	research	is	needed	to	better	understand	why	interruptions	occur	and	to	implement	effective	 interventions	 to	 reduce	 interruptions.	 This	 study	 design	 could	 be	 expanded	 to	determine	 if	 the	 intervention	will	 be	 effective	 in	 other	 types	 of	 units	 and	hospitals.	 Even	though	electronic	medication	logistics	are	being	introduced	widely	in	hospitals	and	wards	and	 may	 seemingly	 make	 separate	 medication	 rooms	 unnecessary,	 they	 will	 still	 be	required	in	practice	for	medication	preparation	on	short	notice	or	in	case	of	emergency.		
Limitations	First,	the	study	was	performed	on	surgical	and	medical	units	of	one	academic	hospital	and	therefore	the	findings	may	not	be	generalizable	to	other	settings.	For	example,	the	system	of	care,	ward	layout,	medication	process	and	staffing	patterns	may	be	different	across	units,	hospitals	 and	 countries.	 Nevertheless,	 our	 study	 aimed	 to	 reduce	 factors	 contributing	 to	
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errors	reaching	the	patient	during	the	critical	task	of	preparation	in	the	medication	process.	Second,	participant	behavior	during	observation	 is	subject	to	the	Hawthorne	effect	 that	 is	behavior	changes	due	to	the	act	of	being	observed.	However,	observations	took	place	over	an	extended	period	of	time	with	the	aim	of	diminishing	observer	biases	and	as	described	in	the	 methods	 section,	 nurses	 were	 not	 informed	 about	 the	 study	 measures	 and	 should	therefore	not	have	an	 influence	on	the	study	results.	Third,	self-reported	 incident	reports	are	 recognized	 as	 under-representing	 actual	 errors.55,56	 In	 the	 hospital	 setting,	 multiple	studies	 have	 demonstrated	 that	 errors	 often	 go	 unreported	 with	 only	 5%	 of	 significant	errors	 being	 reported.57	 Moreover,	 in	 our	 study	 we	 received	 a	 much	 higher	 number	 of	medication	 error	 reports	 through	 the	 focused	 action	 on	 structured	 daily	 reporting	 of	medication	 errors	 than	 through	 the	hospital	wide	 critical	 incident	 reporting	 system.	This	approach	 captures	 medication	 errors	 that	 have	 been	 detected	 and	 corrected	 and	 thus	would	 not	 be	 captured	 by	 chart	 review.	 Although	medication	 errors	 can	 be	 detected	 by	chart	 reviews,	 this	 is	 also	a	 subjective	and	 resource	 intensive	method	because	errors	are	often	 not	 clearly	 documented	 and	 a	 relationship	 based	 on	 given	 drugs	 needs	 to	 be	interpreted	by	the	reviewers.	Thus,	we	believe,	that	focused	self-reports	as	a	new	approach	bring	a	benefit	and	identify	actual	errors.		 	
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CONCLUSIONS	
In	 summary,	 nurses’	 work	 environment	 is	 characterized	 by	 frequent	 work	 interruptions	that	are	initiated	mostly	by	colleagues.	Although	interruptions	are	commonplace	and	have	been	 identified	 as	 a	 major	 contributor	 to	 medication	 administration	 errors	 previously,	there	 is	 little	evidence	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	during	medication	preparation.	This	 study	shows	a	positive	effect	of	a	hospital-based	intervention:	after	the	introduction	of	separate	medication	 rooms,	 the	 interruption	 and	 medication	 error	 rates	 decreased	 significantly.	While	 measures	 to	 minimize	 interruptions	 such	 as	 separate	 medication	 rooms,	 ‘No	Interruption	 Zones’	 and	 safety	 vests	 contribute	 to	 an	 improved	 work	 environment	 for	medication	preparation,	nurses	also	need	to	feel	empowered	to	speak	up	for	themselves	to	discourage	unwanted	 interruptions	and	 conversation	while	preparing	medications.	These	attempts	 will	 be	 more	 successful	 if	 adequately	 supported	 by	 work	 design.	 The	implementation	 of	 separate	 medication	 rooms	 is	 just	 one	 example	 of	 an	 effective	intervention.	However,	our	results	highlight	the	importance	of	incorporating	patient	safety	at	an	early	architectural	design	stage.					 	
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ABSTRACT	AIM	The	 aim	 was	 to	 evaluate	 the	 impact	 of	 staff	 training	 and	 safety	 vests	 as	 a	 combined	intervention	on	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	double-checking.		BACKGROUND	Interruptions	 and	 errors	 during	 the	 medication	 process	 are	 common	 and	 an	 important	problem	for	patient	safety	in	the	hospital	setting.		METHODS	We	performed	a	pre-	and	post-intervention	pilot-study	using	direct	structured	observation	of	26	nurses	preparing	and	double-checking	431	medication	doses	 (225	pre-intervention	and	206	post-intervention)	for	36	patients	(21	pre-intervention	and	15	post-intervention).		RESULTS	The	 interruption	 rate	 during	 medication	 preparation	 was	 reduced	 from	 36.8	 to	 28.3	interruptions	per	hour	and	during	double-checking	from	27.5	to	15	interruptions	per	hour	with	the	help	of	staff	training	and	the	introduction	of	safety	vests.		CONCLUSION	This	study	showed	that	the	frequency	of	interruptions	decreased	during	the	critical	tasks	of	medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking	 after	 the	 introduction	 of	 staff	 training	 and	safety	vests.		IMPLICATIONS	FOR	NURSING	MANAGEMENT	Unnecessary	 interruptions	 can	 be	 reduced	 successfully	 by	 increasing	 staff	 awareness	 of	‘interruptive	communication	practices’	and	the	implementation	of	physical	barriers.	This	is	the	 first	 pilot-study	 specifically	 evaluated	 staff	 training	 and	 safety	 vests	 regarding	 the	reduction	of	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	double-checking.	
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BACKGROUND	AND	AIM	
The	medication	process	 in	 the	 inpatient	setting	 is	highly	complex,	 involving	multiple	sub-processes	(i.e.	prescription,	transcription,	preparation,	administration	and	monitoring)	and	staff	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 disciplines	 (Wachter,	 2012).	 The	 process	 of	 providing	 newly	prescribed	drugs	to	the	patient	at	bedside	includes	approximately	50-100	steps.	Therefore,	this	process	is	particularly	vulnerable	to	errors	(Hughes	and	Blegen,	2008).		Several	 studies	 indicated	 that	 interruptions	 are	 a	 significant	 risk	 factor	 for	 medication	errors	(Armitage	and	Knapman,	2003,	Fry	and	Dacey,	2007,	Mayo	and	Duncan,	2004,	Palese	et	al.,	2009,	Tang	et	al.,	2007,	Biron	et	al.,	2009c,	Stratton	et	al.,	2004,	Armutlu	et	al.,	2008,	Karavasiliadou	and	Athanasakis,	2014,	Hickam	et	al.,	2003,	Santell	et	al.,	2003,	Prakash	et	al.,	 2014,	 Flanders	 and	 Clark,	 2010,	Huckels-Baumgart	 and	Manser,	 2014,	 Ashcroft	 et	 al.,	2005,	 Samaranayake	 et	 al.,	 2013,	 Hughes	 and	 Blegen,	 2008),	 and	 that	 medication	 error	rates	 increase	 with	 interruption	 frequency	 (Westbrook	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Consequently,	interruptions	should	be	avoided.		In	 this	 pilot-study	 we	 defined	 interruptions	 as	 “a	 break	 in	 the	 performance	 of	 a	 human	activity	initiated	by	a	source	internal	or	external	to	the	recipient,	with	occurrence	situated	within	 the	 context	 of	 a	 setting	 or	 a	 location”	 (Brixey	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Interruptions	 are	circumstances	 in	 which	 a	 nurse	 stops	 preparing	 or	 checking	medication	 in	 order	 to	 pay	attention	to	an	external	stimulus	(Westbrook	et	al.,	2010).	An	interruption	can	be	generated	by	the	nurse	him/herself	(self-initiated),	by	another	individual,	or	by	the	work	environment	(e.g.	 alarms).	 Communication	 is	 a	 common	 source	 of	 interruptions;	 it	 often	 involves	information	that	is	irrelevant	to	the	primary	task,	such	as	a	(non-)verbal	cue	from	another	individual	 prompting	 the	 nurse	 to	 give	 a	 (non-)verbal	 response	 (Smeulers	 et	 al.,	 2013,	Anthony	 et	 al.,	 2010,	 Grundgeiger	 and	 Sanderson,	 2009),	 or	 the	 nurse	 initiating	 a	
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conversation	 with	 another	 person.	 Whereas	 other	 studies	 differentiated	 between	“interruptions”	and	“distractions”	to	define	causes	and	precursors	of	errors	(Relihan	et	al.,	2010,	 Sanderson	 and	Grundgeiger,	 2015),	we	use	 the	 term	 “interruption”	 (including	 self-initiated	interruptions)	for	both.		Although	 interruptions	may	 occur	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 the	medication	 process	 (Vincent	 et	 al.,	2009),	 the	 main	 focus	 should	 be	 on	 interruptions	 during	 medication	 preparation	 and	double-checking	 of	 prepared	 medications,	 because	 these	 are	 the	 last	 stages	 in	 the	medication	process	before	administration,	with	few	safeguards	against	errors	reaching	the	patient	 (Huckels-Baumgart	 and	 Manser,	 2014).	 Most	 studies	 considering	 interruptions	during	 the	 medication	 process	 concentrate	 on	 medication	 administration	 (Raban	 and	Westbrook,	2014,	Prakash	et	 al.,	 2014,	Biron	et	 al.,	 2009c,	Biron	et	 al.,	 2009a).	We	 found	only	four	studies	(Anthony	et	al.,	2010,	Tomietto	et	al.,	2012,	Biron	et	al.,	2009b,	Duruk	et	al.,	2016)	specifically	investigating	interruptions	during	medication	preparation.	While	staff	training	and	safety	vests	labelled	“Do	not	disturb”	are	widely	recommended	interventions	to	reduce	 interruptions	during	medication	administration	(Pape,	2003,	Pape	et	al.,	2005a,	Kliger,	 2010,	 Relihan	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 there	 is	 no	 evidence	 of	 their	 effectiveness	 during	medication	 preparation.	 This	 is	 the	 first	 pilot-study	 specifically	 evaluated	 the	 combined	interventions	 of	 staff	 training	 and	 safety	 vests	 regarding	 the	 reduction	 of	 interruptions	during	 medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking.	 The	 combined	 intervention	 might	offer	solutions	to	increase	awareness	of	colleagues	to	prevent	interruptions	and	to	change	clinician	 behaviour,	 such	 as	 minimizing	 unnecessary	 conversation	 or	 waiting	 for	 co-workers	to	complete	their	task,	far	less	expensive	than	the	frequently	proposed	redesign	of	workspaces	(e.g.	implementing	separate	medication	rooms)	(Anthony	et	al.,	2010,	Prakash	et	al.,	2014,	O'Shea,	1999,	Clifton-Koeppel,	2008,	Colligan	et	al.,	2012).	Many	interventions	are	not	effective	without	staff	training.	Educating	nurses	about	the	impact	of	interruptions	
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is	necessary	 to	 change	behaviour	and	 increasing	 safety	awareness	 (Pape	et	 al.,	 2005a).	 It	thus	provides	an	important	addition	to	the	implementation	of	safety	vests.		The	aim	of	this	pilot-study	was	to	close	the	research	gap	by	evaluating	the	potential	of	staff	training	 and	 safety	 vests	 as	 a	 combined	 intervention	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	 during	medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking.	 We	 hypothesised	 that	 the	 rate	 of	interruptions	 experienced	 by	 nurses	 while	 preparing	 and	 double-checking	 medications	would	decrease	as	a	result	of	the	combined	intervention.	We	also	explored	the	impact	of	the	combined	intervention	on	the	duration	and	the	sources	of	interruptions.	METHODS	
Setting		The	pilot-study	was	undertaken	on	a	medical	ward	with	a	focus	on	oncology	and	palliative	care	in	a	900-bed	teaching	hospital.	The	ward	had	20-beds	allotted	to	12	patient	rooms	and	was	staffed	by	a	 total	of	28	nurses	rotating	 through	 four	shifts.	Between	 four	 to	 five	 fully	qualified	nurses	per	shift	were	responsible	for	patient	care.	The	ward	was	equipped	with	a	freely	 accessible	 medication	 preparation	 area	 in	 the	 nursing	 station	 where	 drugs	 were	stored	and	prepared	(no	utilization	of	unit	dose	systems).	Multi-dose	dispensers	were	used	for	 medication	 preparation	 pre-	 and	 post-intervention.	 Information	 necessary	 for	medication	 preparation	 was	 paper	 based.	 One	 nurse	 was	 responsible	 for	 preparing	 all	patient	medication	 for	 the	 day.	 The	 prepared	medication	was	 than	 double-checked	 by	 a	second	nurse	and	administered	to	the	assigned	patients.	Infusions	were	prepared	as	needed	during	the	day.					
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Pilot-study	design	and	sample	Our	 pre-	 and	 post-intervention	 pilot-study	 used	 direct	 structured	 observation	 of	 nurses	during	 medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking	 by	 an	 external	 observer.	 Exclusion	criteria	 for	 personnel	 were	 nurses	 in	 training,	 new	 employees	 and	 nurses	 not	 routinely	working	on	the	study	ward	(‘floaters’).	Participation	in	the	study	was	voluntary,	and	verbal	consent	was	sought	from	each	nurse	prior	to	each	observation	period.		
Ethics	According	 to	 research	 ethics	 guidelines	 in	 Switzerland	 this	 pilot-study	was	 exempt	 from	formal	ethics	approval	because	no	direct	patient	observation	was	executed	(Federal	Act	on	Research	involving	Human	Beings	(Human	Research	Act)).	
Combined	interventions	
Staff	training	(first	intervention	step	=	post-intervention	1).	At	the	beginning	of	April,	seven	weeks	after	pre-intervention	observations,	all	nursing	staff	was	trained	as	the	first	step	of	the	combined	intervention.	The	aim	of	staff	training	as	a	first	intervention	step	was	to	raise	nurses’	 awareness	 of	 interruptions	 and	 of	 their	 risk	 during	 the	 preparation	 and	 double-checking	of	medication.	A	lecture	with	ward-specific	findings	on	interruptions	during	pre-intervention	observations,	literature-based	facts	and	potential	improvement	measures	was	created	 for	 this	 training	 intervention.	 Additionally,	 an	 information	 leaflet	with	 literature-based	 facts	and	study	results	was	compiled	and	distributed	 in	order	 to	make	new	nurses	aware	of	interruptions.		
Safety	vest	(second	intervention	step	=	post-intervention	2).	 At	 the	 end	of	April,	 two	weeks	after	 staff	 training	 was	 completed	 and	 interruptions	 were	 observed,	 safety	 vests	 were	introduced	 as	 a	 second	 intervention	 step	 of	 the	 combined	 intervention	 to	 highlight	 staff	occupied	 with	 critical	 tasks.	 All	 nurses	 had	 to	 wear	 the	 safety	 vest	 while	 preparing	 and	
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double-checking	all	medication	during	 the	observed	drug	 rounds.	The	nursing	 staff	 could	choose	between	yellow,	red	and	pink	safety	vests.	The	back	of	all	safety	vests	was	labelled	"Do	Not	Disturb".		
Data	collection	procedure	Pre-intervention	data	was	collected	without	prior	staff	training	and	safety	vests	during	12	medication	preparation	and	double-checking	cycles	in	February.	Post-intervention	data	was	collected	 during	 17	 medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking	 cycles	 after	 the	introduction	of	staff	training	(post-intervention	step	1)	and	safety	vests	(post-intervention	step	2)	as	a	combined	intervention	at	the	beginning	and	end	of	April.		
Observation	of	 interruptions.	We	 developed	 a	 paper-based	 observation	 protocol	 based	 on	the	 validated	 Medication	 Administration	 Distraction	 Observation	 Sheet	 (MADOS)	 (Pape,	2003)	to	record	the	frequency	of	each	of	14	possible	sources	of	interruptions	pre-	and	post-intervention	 (see	 appendix	 A).	 Observations	 were	 carried	 out	 by	 one	 pharmacy	 student	during	medication	preparation	and	checking	on	weekdays;	night	shifts	and	weekends	were	excluded.	Observation	 lasted	until	all	medication	was	prepared	or	double-checked	during	the	observed	medication	cycle.	A	medication	preparation	cycle	-	and	thus	the	observation-	-	started	when	 a	 nurse	 began	 the	medication	preparation	 or	 double-checking	process,	 and	ended	when	the	nurse	completed	medication	preparation	or	double-checking.	Each	time	an	interruption	 occurred,	 the	 observer	 categorized	 the	 interruption	 source	 and	 recorded	 it,	including	the	duration	on	the	structured	observation	sheet.	To	minimize	the	intrusiveness	of	 observations,	 the	 observer	 was	 positioned	 close	 by	 but	 slightly	 peripheral	 to	 the	medication	preparation	area.		
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Data	analysis	Data	were	analysed	using	Excel®.	We	used	descriptive	 statistics	 to	 indicate	 the	observed	rate	 and	differences	 of	 interruptions	during	medication	preparation	 and	double-checking	pre-	 and	post-intervention.	 For	 the	 comparison	 of	 reported	 sources	 of	 interruptions	 pre-	and	post-intervention	and	for	the	calculation	of	interruption	duration,	descriptive	statistics	were	used	as	well.	Statistical	significance	was	not	calculated	due	to	small	sample	size.	RESULTS	Total	 observation	 time	 was	 9	 hours	 (524	 minutes),	 carried	 out	 during	 6	 medication	preparation	 cycles	 (2	 pre-intervention	 and	 4	 post-intervention),	 and	 during	 23	 double-checking	 cycles	 (10	 pre-intervention	 and	 13	 post-intervention).	 The	 observed	 time	 of	medication	 preparation	was	 264	minutes	 (168	minutes	 pre-intervention	 and	 96	minutes	post-intervention)	and	of	double-checking	260	minutes	(142	minutes	pre-intervention	and	118	minutes	post-intervention).	We	observed	a	sample	of	26	nurses	 (12	pre-intervention	and	14	post-intervention)	preparing	and	double-checking	431	medication	doses	(225	pre-intervention	and	206	post-intervention)	for	36	patients	(21	pre-intervention	and	15	post-intervention).		
Rates	and	sources	of	interruptions	during	medication	preparation		The	rates	and	sources	of	interruptions	pre-	and	post-intervention	are	shown	in	Table	1.	The	mean	 interruption	 rates	 decreased	 from	 36.8	 pre-intervention	 to	 32.1	 interruptions	 per	hour	during	medication	preparation	post-intervention	1,	and	to	28.3	interruptions	per	hour	post-intervention	2.	Overall,	 the	combined	intervention	decreased	interruptions	by	23.1%	(Table	1).		
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Pre-intervention,	 nearly	 half	 of	 all	 interruptions	 (49%	 [51/103];	 18.2	 interruptions	 per	hour)	 were	 caused	 by	 nursing	 colleagues,	 followed	 by	 self-initiated	 interruptions	 (27%	[28/103];	10.0	interruptions	per	hour).		Post-intervention	 1	 interruptions	 were	 most	 often	 self-initiated	 (32%	 [7/22];	 10.2	interruptions	per	hour),	 followed	by	 interruptions	caused	by	physicians	(23%	[5/22];	7.3	interruptions	per	hour)	and	by	missing	patient	records	(23%	[5/22];	7.3	interruptions	per	hour).	 Post-intervention	 2,	 the	 majority	 of	 interruptions	 were	 missing	 patient	 records	(34.6%	[9/26];	9.8	interruptions	per	hour),	self-initiated	interruptions	(30.8%	[8/26];	8.7	interruptions	 per	 hour)	 and	 interruptions	 caused	 by	 nursing	 staff	 (26.9%	 [7/26];	 7.6	interruptions	per	hour)	(Table	1).		
-Insert	Table	1	about	here-	
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Medication	
preparation	
Pre-
Intervention	
Post-Intervention	step	1:	
after	staff	training	
Post-Intervention	step	2:	after	the	
introduction	of	safety	vests	
Sources	 of	
interruptions	
Interruptions	
per	hour		
n=103	
	
Observation	
duration=	
1h	24	min.	
Interruptions	
per	hour	
n=22	
	
Observation	
duration=	
41	min.	
Difference	of	
interruptions	
compared	to	
Pre-
Intervention	
[%]	
Interruptions	
per	hour	
n=26	
	
Observation	
duration=	
55	min.	
Difference	of	
interruptions	
compared	to	
Pre-
Intervention	
[%]	
Difference	of	
interruptions	
compared	to	
Post-
Intervention	
1:	staff	
training	[%]	
Total	 interruptions	
by	colleagues		 20.0	 10.2	 -49.0	 7.6	 -62.0	 -25.5	
§ Nurses		 18.2	 2.9	 -84.1	 7.6	 -58.3	 +162.1	
§ Physicians	 0.7	 7.3	 +928.2	 0.0	 -100.0	 -100.0	
§ Other	personnel	 1.1	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Total	 self-initiated	
interruptions	 10.0	 10.2	 +2.0	 8.7	 -13.0	 -14.7		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Total	 interruptions	
by	technology	 2.9	 4.4	 +53.8	 2.2	 -23.1	 -50.0	
§ Phone	call	 0.4	 0.0	 -100.0	 1.1	 +205.6	 -	
§ Alarm		 2.5	 4.4	 +76.0	 1.1	 -56.0	 -75.0		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Total	 interruptions	
by	other	disturbance	
	/	delays	 3.9	 7.3	 +85.3	 9.8	 +148.7	 +34.2	
§ Noise	 0.4	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	
§ Missing	medication	 1.4	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	
§ Missing	patient	records	 1.8	 7.3	 +307.8	 9.8	 +447.5	 +34.2	
§ Other	 0.4	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Total		 36.8	 32.1	 -12.7	 28.3	 -23.1	 -11.8		Table	1:	Observed	 sources	 of	 interruptions	pre-	 and	post-intervention	during	medication	preparation		
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Rates	and	sources	of	interruptions	during	double-checking		The	rates	and	sources	of	 interruptions	during	double-checking	pre-	and	post-intervention	are	displayed	in	Table	2.	The	mean	interruption	rates	decreased	from	27.5	pre-intervention	to	16.4	interruptions	per	hour	post-intervention	1,	and	to	15	interruptions	per	hour	post-intervention	 2	 (Table	 2).	 Overall,	 45.4%	 of	 interruptions	were	 reduced	 by	 the	 combined	intervention.	Pre-	and	post-intervention,	the	most	frequent	sources	of	interruptions	during	double-checking	were	interruptions	by	colleagues,	especially	staff	interruptions	by	nurses,	self-initiated	interruptions,	and	missing	patient	records.	Pre-intervention,	a	large	number	of	interruptions	 were	 caused	 by	 nursing	 colleagues	 (43%	 [28/65];	 11.8	 interruptions	 per	hour),	 followed	 by	 self-initiated	 interruptions	 (28%	 [18/65];	 7.6	 interruptions	 per	 hour)	and	 missing	 patient	 records	 (5.9	 interruptions	 per	 hour).	 Post-intervention	 1	 most	interruptions	were	 self-initiated	 (50%	 [9/18];	 8.2	 interruptions	per	hour)	 and	 caused	by	nursing	colleagues	(27.8%	[5/18];	4.5	interruptions	per	hour).	Post-intervention	2	most	of	the	 interruptions	 were	 generated	 by	 nurses	 (46%	 [6/13];	 6.9	 interruptions	 per	 hour),	followed	 by	 missing	 patient	 records	 (23%	 [3/13];	 3.5	 interruptions	 per	 hour)	 and	 self-initiated	interruptions	(15%	[2/13];	2.3	interruptions	per	hour)	(Table	2).		
-Insert	Table	2	about	here-	
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Double-Checking	 Pre-
Intervention	
Post-Intervention	step	1:	
after	staff	training	
Post-Intervention	step	2:	after	the	
introduction	of	safety	vests	
Sources	of	interruptions	 Interruptions	
per	hour	
n=65	
	
Observation	
duration=	
2h	22	min.	
Interruptions	
per	hour	
n=18	
	
Observation	
duration=	
1h	6	min.	
Difference	of	
interruptions	
compared	to	
Pre-
Intervention	
[%]	
Interruptions	
per	hour	
n=13	
	
Observation	
duration=	
52	min.	
Difference	of	
interruptions	
compared	to	
Pre-
Intervention	
[%]	
Difference	of	
interruptions	
compared	to	
Post-
Intervention	
1:	staff	
training	[%]	
Total	 interruptions	 by	
colleagues		 13.5	 6.4	 -52.9	 8.1	 -40.3	 +26.9	
§ Nurses		 11.8	 4.5	 -61.6	 6.9	 -41.5	 +52.3	
§ Physicians	 1.7	 1.8	 +7.6	 1.2	 -31.7	 -36.5	
§ Other	personnel	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Total	 self-initiated	
interruptions	 7.6	 8.2	 +7.6	 2.3	 -69.7	 -71.8		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Total	 interruptions	 by	
technology	 0.4	 0.0	 -100.0	 1.2	 +173.1	 -	
§ Phone	call	 0.0	 0.0	 0.0	 1.2	 0.0	 -	
§ Alarm		 0.4	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Total	 interruptions	 by	
other	 disturbance	 /	
delays	 5.9	 1.8	 -69.3	 3.5	 -41.5	 +90.4	
§ Noise	 0.8	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	
§ Missing	medication	 1.3	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	 -100.0	 0.0	
§ Missing	patient	records	 2.5	 0.9	 -64.1	 3.5	 +36.5	 +280.8	
§ Other	 1.3	 0.9	 -28.3	 0.0	 -100.0	 -100.0		 	 	 	 	 	 	
Total		 27.5	 16.4	 -40.4	 15.0	 -45.4	 -8.3		Table	 2:	 Observed	 sources	 of	 interruptions	 pre-	 and	 post-intervention	 during	 double-checking		 	
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Duration	of	interruptions		Overall,	most	of	the	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	double-checking	were	of	short	duration	and	lasted	a	maximum	of	10	seconds	pre-	and	post-intervention	(Figure	1).	 Pre-intervention,	 only	 a	 few	 interruptions	 lasted	 2	 minutes	 or	 longer.	 Those	interruptions	were	eliminated	post-intervention	2.	In	addition,	the	number	of	interruptions	with	a	duration	of	1	minute	or	longer	decreased	during	medication	preparation	and	double-checking	 post-intervention	 2.	 The	 number	 of	 interruptions	 with	 a	 short	 duration	 of	 a	maximum	 of	 10	 seconds	 increased	 during	 medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking	post-intervention	2	 (Figure	1).	The	 time	 for	medication	preparation	 and	double-checking	has	 generally	 decreased	 by	 52%	 from	 84	 minutes	 for	 225	 doses	 (22	 sec/dose,	 4	min/patient)	 to	 41	 minutes	 for	 206	 doses	 (12	 sec/dose,	 2.7	 min/patient)	 after	 the	combined	intervention.		
	
-Insert	figure	1	about	here-	
	Figure	1:	Duration	of	interruptions	pre-	and	post-intervention	
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DISCUSSION	This	pilot-study	 showed	 that	 the	 frequency	of	 interruptions	decreased	during	 the	 critical	tasks	of	medication	preparation	and	double-checking	after	the	introduction	of	staff	training	and	 safety	 vests	 as	 a	 combined	 intervention.	 The	 interruption	 rate	 during	 medication	preparation	 was	 reduced	 from	 36.8	 to	 28.3	 interruptions	 per	 hour,	 and	 during	 double-checking	 from	 27.5	 to	 15	 interruptions	 per	 hour.	 Overall,	 this	 was	 a	 reduction	 of	interruptions	 of	 23.1%	 during	 medication	 preparation	 and	 of	 45.4%	 during	 double-checking.	 Pre-	 and	 post-intervention	 during	medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking	interruptions	 by	 colleagues,	 especially	 staff	 interruptions	 by	 nurses,	 self-initiated	interruptions,	and	missing	patient	records	were	the	most	frequent	sources.	While	all	kinds	of	interruptions	were	recorded	in	this	pilot-study,	not	all	sources	were	directly	addressed	by	the	combined	intervention	(e.g.	missing	patient	record,	missing	medications,	and	noise).	Especially	 interruptions	 by	 staff,	 self-initiated	 interruptions	 and	 responding	 to	 alarms	 or	phone	calls	were	addressed	by	the	combined	 intervention.	One	reason	 for	 the	 increase	of	staff	 interruptions	 by	 nurses	 post-intervention	 2	 in	 comparison	 to	 post-intervention	 1	could	be	that	staff	training	was	more	accepted	by	the	nurses	than	wearing	a	coloured	safety	vest	during	medication	preparation	and	double-checking;	the	resistance	against	the	safety	vests	 was	 rather	 high.	 However,	 the	 effect	 of	 staff	 training	 can	 decrease	 over	 time,	 and	safety	vests	can	serve	as	an	important,	continuous	and	visible	reminder	for	the	team	not	to	interrupt.	 The	 increase	 of	 interruptions	 by	 physicians	 post-intervention	 1	 was	 probably	based	on	the	fact	that	they	were	not	included	in	staff	training	and,	thus,	not	instructed	that	nurses	 should	 not	 be	 interrupted	 during	 the	 critical	 task	 of	 medication	 preparation	 and	double-checking.	 Post-intervention	 2	 interruptions	 by	 physicians	 were	 reduced,	 possibly	associated	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 nurses	 did	 wear	 safety	 vests.	 Missing	 patient	 records	 as	another	 frequent	 interruption	 source	 was	 not	 affected	 by	 the	 combined	 intervention.	
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However,	as	this	is	a	system-related	problem,	which	cannot	be	easily	resolved	without	the	implementation	of	electronic	patient	records,	the	lack	of	effect	was	expected.	If	the	handling	of	paper-based	patient	records	is	excluded	from	the	analysis,	it	is	evident	that	the	combined	intervention	 had	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	 interruptions	 during	 medication	preparation	 and	 double-checking.	 Overall,	 it	 is	 an	 important	 finding	 that	 deepens	 our	understanding	 of	 the	medication	 use	 process	 and	 interruption	 sources	 to	 identify	 safety	gaps.	Most	interruptions	were	of	short	duration	and	lasted	a	maximum	of	10	seconds	pre-	and	 post-intervention.	 Interruptions	 lasting	 longer	 than	 2	 minutes	 were	 reduced	completely	 post-intervention,	 and	 contributed	 to	 a	 reduced	 overall	 preparation	 time	 by	52%.	We	found	no	evidence	that	long	interruptions	are	worse	than	short	interruptions,	but	experimental	 studies	 suggested	 that	 every	 interruption	 produces	 negative	 impact	 on	memory	 by	 requiring	 individuals	 to	 switch	 attention	 from	one	 task	 to	 another.	 They	 can	trigger	cognitive	failures,	including	lapses	in	attention,	memory	or	perception	(Biron	et	al.,	2009c).	 Overall	 our	 findings	 show	 that	 interruptions	 during	 the	 critical	 process	 steps	 of	medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking	 are	 frequent	 and	 that	 nurses	 work	 in	 an	environment	with	a	high	potential	for	interruptions.	Our	results	are	in	line	with	studies	on	medication	 preparation	 (Duruk	 et	 al.,	 2016)	 and	medication	 administration	 reporting	 an	average	 of	 42	 interruptions	 per	 hour	 (Woloshynowych	 et	 al.,	 2007)	 and	 a	 mean	interruption	 duration	 of	 45	 seconds	 (Spencer	 et	 al.,	 2004).	 In	 previous	 research,	 nursing	colleagues	were	also	the	most	frequent	source	of	interruptions	(Duruk	et	al.,	2016),	and	the	second	most	interruptions	were	self-initiated	(Pape	et	al.,	2005b,	Kreckler	et	al.,	2008,	Pape,	2003,	 Relihan	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Several	 studies,	 mainly	 based	 on	 self-reports,	 surveys	 or	retrospective	 analyses,	 have	 shown	 that	 interruptions	 can	 cause	 medication	 errors	(Armitage	and	Knapman,	2003,	Fry	and	Dacey,	2007,	Mayo	and	Duncan,	2004,	Palese	et	al.,	2009,	 Tang	 et	 al.,	 2007,	 Biron	 et	 al.,	 2009c,	 Stratton	 et	 al.,	 2004,	 Armutlu	 et	 al.,	 2008,	
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Karavasiliadou	and	Athanasakis,	2014,	Hickam	et	al.,	2003,	Santell	et	al.,	2003,	Prakash	et	al.,	 2014,	 Flanders	 and	 Clark,	 2010,	Huckels-Baumgart	 and	Manser,	 2014,	 Ashcroft	 et	 al.,	2005,	 Samaranayake	 et	 al.,	 2013,	Hughes	 and	Blegen,	 2008).	Westbrook	 et	 al.	 found	 that	one	 interruption	 increases	 the	 risk	 of	medication	 error	 by	 12.1%.	Without	 interruptions,	the	 estimated	 risk	 of	 a	 medication	 error	 is	 2.3%.	 This	 risk	 doubles	 to	 4.7%	 if	 four	interruptions	 occur	 (Westbrook	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 minimise	unnecessary	interruptions	and	subsequent	medication	errors	potentially	reaching	patients	by	 increasing	 staff	 awareness	 of	 ‘interruptive	 communication	 practices’	 and	 the	implementation	of	physical	barriers.	
Practical	implications	On	many	hospital	wards	medication	 preparation	 areas	 are	 designed	 as	 open	workspaces	shared	 by	 staff	 involved	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 tasks.	 Our	 pilot-study	 showed	 that	 frequent	interruptions	especially	by	 colleagues	are	 a	major	disadvantage	of	 this	workspace	design	and	 that	 staff	 training	 and	 safety	 vests	 can	 reduce	 interruptions.	 However,	 wearing	 the	vests	 requires	 an	 appropriate	 understanding	 of	 the	 staff,	 and	 accompanying	 awareness	training	 on	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	 interruptions	 on	 patient	 safety	 and	 on	 strategies	 to	effectively	manage	and	reduce	interruptions	(Tomietto	et	al.,	2012,	Pape,	2003,	Pape	et	al.,	2005b,	Kliger,	2010,	Relihan	et	al.,	2010,	Biron	et	al.,	2009c).	Increasing	nurses’	awareness	of	these	issues	may	help	to	 lower	self-initiated	interruptions,	conversations,	 interruptions	by	 colleagues	 and	 phone	 calls	 (Hohenhaus	 and	 Powell,	 2008,	 Clifton-Koeppel,	 2008,	Smeulers	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 A	 simple	 but	 effective	 approach	 is	 that	 colleagues	 should	acknowledge	 the	 cognitive	 demands	 of	 safe	 medication	 preparation	 and	 minimize	interruptions	 whenever	 possible	 (Kliger,	 2010).	 These	 interventions	 require	 little	infrastructure	 and	 additional	 costs.	 Furthermore,	 interruptions	 can	 be	 reduced	 by	
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implementing	separate	medication	rooms	or	‘No	Interruption	Zones’,	where	interruption	is	not	 permitted	 or	 limited	 to	 urgent	 communication	 (Anthony	 et	 al.,	 2010,	 Prakash	 et	 al.,	2014,	Pape	et	al.,	2005b).	The	availability	of	electronic	medical	records	during	medication	preparation	 and	 double-checking	 is	 also	 crucial	 to	 decrease	 such	 interruptions.	Interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	double-checking	will	probably	never	be	eliminated	completely	in	daily	hospital	practice.	Correctly,	safely	and	attentively	performed	double-checks	can	catch	approximately	95%	of	all	errors	and	should	be	applied	as	an	added	safety-net	for	patients	(ISMP,	2013).		
Limitations	First,	the	pilot-study	was	performed	on	a	single	medical	ward	of	one	hospital	and	therefore	the	findings	may	not	be	generalizable	to	other	units,	hospitals	and	countries.	Secondly,	we	observed	 only	 a	 small	 medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking	 sample,	 thus	 not	addressing	 all	 sources	of	 interruptions.	Third,	 the	 combined	 intervention	was	 introduced	and	observed	during	a	short	period	of	time.	Thus,	 it	 is	unclear	how	long	the	effect	of	staff	training	and	safety	vests	persisted.	In	addition,	the	positive	effect	of	the	safety	vest	cannot	be	 considered	 independently	 of	 the	 training	 conducted	 previously.	 Furthermore,	participant	behaviour	during	observation	is	subject	to	the	Hawthorne	effect	and	staff	might	have	behaved	differently	when	not	being	observed.		Future	 research	 is	 needed	 to	 implement	 effective	 interventions	 to	 reduce	 interruptions	during	 medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking.	 This	 pilot-study	 design	 could	 be	expanded	to	determine	 if	 the	 interventions	will	be	effective	 in	other	types	of	settings	and	evaluate	their	long-term	impact.			
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CONCLUSION	AND	IMPLICATIONS	FOR	NURSING	MANAGEMENT	
In	summary,	 interruptions	of	nursing	staff	during	the	preparation	and	double-checking	of	medications	 are	 frequent,	 especially	 those	who	 are	 initiated	 by	 colleagues.	 Interruptions	represent	a	high	risk	to	patient	safety	and	consequently	they	should	be	reduced.	This	is	the	first	pilot-study	specifically	evaluated	staff	training	and	safety	vests	regarding	the	reduction	of	 interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	double-checking.	The	study	showed	a	positive	 effect	 of	 this	 combined	 hospital-based	 intervention:	 the	 combination	 of	 staff	training	 and	 the	 wearing	 of	 safety	 vests	 with	 the	 label	 "Do	 Not	 Disturb"	 could	 reduce	interruptions	during	medication	preparation	and	double-checking,	especially	interruptions	initiated	by	colleagues.	While	the	combined	intervention	contributed	to	an	improved	work	environment	for	medication	preparation,	nurses	also	need	to	feel	empowered	to	speak	up	to	 discourage	 unwanted	 interruptions	 and	 conversations	 while	 preparing	 and	 double-checking	medications.	 Additionally,	 these	 attempts	 will	 be	more	 successful	 if	 adequately	supported	by	work	environment	design.	For	this	reason,	architectural	changes,	for	example	separate	medication	 rooms,	 are	 recommended	 as	 they	 present	 an	 even	 stronger	 defence	against	interruptions.	Also,	an	improved	work	layout	with	direct	access	to	medical	records	could	 eliminate	 these	 specific,	 unnecessary	 interruptions.	 Furthermore,	 for	 all	 kind	 of	interventions	an	accompanying	 reorganization	process	 is	 important.	Our	 results	highlight	the	 relevance	 of	 considering	 patient	 safety	 during	 medication	 preparation	 and	 double-checking,	 especially	 until	 other	 medication	 safety	 measures	 such	 as	 electronic	 unit	 dose	systems	 have	 been	 implemented	 for	 automatic	 medication	 preparation.	 Overall,	unnecessary	 interruptions	 can	 be	 reduced	 successfully	 by	 increasing	 staff	 awareness	 of	‘interruptive	communication	practices’	and	the	implementation	of	physical	barriers.		 	
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